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Title:	董監事異動與經營績效之關聯性 Board director turnover and firm performance
Authors:	葉小嘉
Contributors:	林宛瑩葉小嘉
Keywords:	董監事異動經營績效 Board director turnover firm performance
Date:	2009
Issue Date:	2010-12-08 01:53:04 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本研究乃針對董監事異動進行分析探討，主要議題有二，第一項議題為董監事異動之決定性因素，而另一項議題為董監事異動後對經營績效之影響。在影響董監事異動的決定因素中，首先探討公司前期經營績效與董監事異動之關聯性，以分析經營績效不佳是否為發生董監事異動的因素之一，接著分析股權結構如何影響董監事異動。最後再探討董監事異動後之經營績效是否得以改善。本研究以2000年到2008年間上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，以董監事是否發生異動與董監事異動比率作為董監事異動變數以對上述關係加以探討。實證結果發現，前期經營績效與董監事異動為顯著負相關，意謂前期經營績效差時，會導致董監事異動之發生。且機構投資人持股與董監事異動為顯著正相關，當機構投資人持股比率高，董監事異動增加，說明機構投資人發揮其監督功能。不過，本研究未能發現在董監事異動後，公司績效有顯著的提升。 This paper examines the determinants of board director turnover behavior and whether board director turnover signals the firm performance of subsequent period. The empirical findings show that board director of firms with poor firm performance and high institution ownership are more likely to have turnovers. While there is no relationship between the frequency of board director turnover and improvement in firm performance.
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Description:	碩士國立政治大學會計研究所 97353034 98
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097353034
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Accounting] Theses

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