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| Title: | R&D對內部董事與經營績效之關聯性影響
R&D, Inside Directors, and Firm Performance |
| Authors: | 游順合
Yu, Shun Ho |
| Contributors: | 林宛瑩
游順合
Yu, Shun Ho |
| Keywords: | R&D
內部董事
經營績效 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| Issue Date: | 2010-12-08 01:53:03 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究同時考量代理理論及資源依賴理論之觀點，認為內部董事雖因任職於公司而造成其獨立性受損，監督誘因較低，但內部董事因具備有企業特定知識與內部有用資訊，故可有效評估策略並作成適當決策，尤以在高R&D投入之企業中，更需要具備企業特定知識之人，因此，本研究探討R&D支出與內部董事席次比率間之關係，並進一步分析R&D對內部董事與經營績效關聯性之影響。
實證結果顯示，高R&D投入與內部董事席次比率間呈顯著正相關，表示在R&D密度高的公司中，其公司的董事會中會有較高的內部董事席次。在高R&D密度的公司，內部董事席次比率與公司經營績效呈顯著正向關係。表示在高研發投入公司，公司特定專業知識之需求較高，內部董事資源提供之功能強於監督之需求，因而有較多內部董事席次之公司會有較佳之經營績效。
This paper considered both agency theory and resource-dependence theory. Although hired by the firm, inside directors may have lower monitoring incentives, they have firm-specific knowledge and useful information and can evaluate strategies effectively and make better decisions. Especially in those high-R&D firms need firm-specific knowledge, therefore, this paper examines the relationship between R&D and the percentage of inside director, and also examines the relationship between inside director and firm performance in high-R&D firms.
The empirical results finds that R&D and inside director are significantly positive. It shows that high-R&D firms will have higher percentage of inside directors in their boards. And the empirical results also finds that in high-R&D firms, they will have more specific professional knowledge need, and inside directors’ resource-provision function is stronger than the monitoring function, therefore, firms with higher percentage of inside directors will have better firm performance. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
97353032
98 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097353032 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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