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| Title: | 民間參與捷運場站土地開發模式之制度經濟分析 |
| Authors: | 簡龍鳳 |
| Contributors: | 賴宗裕
簡龍鳳 |
| Keywords: | 民間參與
制度經濟分析
代理與權力
資源配置效率
賽局理論
private participation
institutional economic analysis
agent and power
allocation efficiency of resource
game theory |
| Date: | 2007 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 16:18:37 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 「促進民間參與公共建設法」賦予民間機構從事開發交通建設所需用地，藉以提高交通建設之財務自償能力。回顧目前國內所推動之高速鐵路及捷運建設BOT案，均藉由土地開發收入以挹注建設成本，誠然所引發公共論壇的焦點環繞在土地開發利益議題上。惟土地開發收入取決於開發規模及代理人努力效果等因素，在政府與民間機構存在對土地市場價值資訊不對稱下，恐衍生委託代理問題與權力宰制。
審視現行法令賦予私有土地參與捷運場站開發制度，包括政府和所有權人合作開發、政府徵收開發、所有權人申請開發等多樣性之土地開發方式。面對具提高不動產價值之捷運場站土地開發，研究思維理應從單向滿足民間機構對土地開發需求外，亦需同時考量維護所有權人參與之權益，各方最佳的策略與報酬，並非獨立於他人的行動之外，其間之策略組合報酬主要涉及土地開發方式之權益分配率及開發回饋金，捷運場站開發制度存在策略賽局關係。
因此，如何建構兼具代理規範、參與決策及均衡結果為導向的制度經濟分析模型，已成為推動民間參與捷運場站土地開發之關鍵所在。本研究首先，嘗試以代理理論、權力面向及賽局理論分析方法，作為民間參與捷運場站土地開發制度之立論基礎；其次，深入分析土地開發之代理與權力交互效果，重新詮釋資源配置效率問題；其三，研擬民間參與之代理與賽局整合模型，經由制度賽局均衡結果以達成各方自由選擇下之同意；最後，進行案例模擬分析。
本研究所獲致之結論包括：(1)民間參與捷運場站土地開發制度得以代理理論、權力面向及賽局理論一窺全貌；(2)制度的賽局均衡觀得以降低因徵收土地開發之代理與權力交互關係對資源配置效率之衝擊；(3)模擬分析民間參與之代理與賽局整合模型具可操作性並可運用於實務界。再者，本研究所提出之建議包括：(1)建構政府與民間機構之代理模型俾以降低委託代理問題；(2)建構政府與所有權人之制度賽局模型俾以達成自願交易；(3)建構代理規範與制度賽局之整合模型以維護所有權人參與土地開發之權益。
“Law for Promotion of Private Participation in Public Infrastructure Projects” provides a mechanism for the private sector to develop the land for any public infrastructure project so that the financial self-liquidating ratio may be increased. The financial concept of BOT projects in Taiwan, such as HSR and MRT, is to recoup the cost of the infrastructure project by land development revenues. Indeed, the public concerns focus on the revenues, which depend on the institution and scale of development. However, the revenues depend on the scale of development and effect of the agent’s efforts. While the information asymmetry exists, there may arise the issues of agency and power control.
The institution of the MRT station development provides a diversity of land development, including cooperation development, expropriation development and application development. The development issue has switched from government-led development approaches to the interaction between the government and landowners. As for the payoff function of their strategy combination, it depends on the right distribution rate and feedback payment. In the MRT station development institution exists a form of strategic game.
Therefore, how to establish an institutional economic analysis model takes agency norm, and involves decision-making and equilibrium, which forms the criterion, serving as a key to promote the private participation in MRT station development. This study attempts: First, to analyze the private participation in MRT station development based on the agency theory, power dimension, and game theory. Second, to explore the allocation efficiency of resources under the interaction effect of agent and power. Third, to establish an integrated model of both the agent and the game, which by equilibrium-of–the-game view of institutions reach a mutual agreement among the government, private sector, and landowners. Finally, case simulation.
It is concluded that, (1) the institution of the private participation MRT station development may be fully reviewed by agency theory, power dimension, and game theory. (2) the equilibrium-of–the-game view of institutions may reduce the impact on the allocation efficiency of resources under the interaction effect of agent and power. (3) by case simulation found that the integrated model of both agent and game is available. It is suggested that, (1) to establish an agency model for both the government and private sector serves to solve agency issues. (2) to establish an institutional game model for both the government and landowner functions as voluntary exchanges. (3) to establish an integrated model of both agent and game helps to keep landowner on the rights of participation in MRT station development. |
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| Description: | 博士
國立政治大學
地政研究所
93257504
96 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093257504 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [地政學系] 學位論文
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