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    题名: 我國中央政府預算程序與財政紀律之研究
    A Study on the Relationship Between Budget Process and Fiscal Discipline in Central Government
    作者: 張育珍
    Chang Yu-Chen
    贡献者: 曾巨威
    張育珍
    Chang Yu-Chen
    关键词: 預算程序
    財政紀律
    預算制度
    Budget Process
    Fiscal Discipline
    Budget Institution
    日期: 2006
    上传时间: 2009-09-19 14:55:36 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 我國中央政府在1980年代以前，財政政策向採取穩健保守的策略，財政收支結果大體能維持均衡，80會計年度以後，由於經濟發展、政治開放及社會型態的轉變，為推動重大國家基礎建設及各種社會福利措施，使政府實質收支結果多為短絀，且政府債務比率亦呈上升趨勢，為因應償債高峰期及達成財政平衡目標，政府開始進行一連串的制度改革。
    財政紀律係根基於一國的政治制度，使國家財政或預算政策，須在某些限制下，經由特定且透明的程序而形成，其目的在穩定國家財政，避免政府過度支出及稅基流失，造成財政短絀。預算程序既為形成國家預算的制度與規則，必然存在一定的財政紀律效果，以約束政府收入、支出及舉債的規劃。
    本研究經由文獻探討、比較分析及實證研究結果，發現我國中央政府預算籌劃擬編、審議及執行過程，確具一定程度的財政紀律，其中，以擬編階段有較佳的財政紀律效果；雖然在執行階段藉由辦理追加（減）及特別預算，有減弱財政紀律之虞，但實證結果並不顯著；此外，我國中央政府的非營業特種基金數量，隨著財政紀律約束效力的提升，確有增加設置的趨勢，因此，可以合理懷疑非營業特種基金極有可能已成為規避財政紀律的工具；另當遭逢組織調整及政黨輪替等二項事件時，預算程序的財政紀律約束效果有相當程度的減弱，致使政府支出在當時有增加的趨勢；同時也發現，因政府各部門的業務屬性、政策或政治特性不同，預算程序對其也有不同的財政紀律效果。
    此外，本研究也發現，我國中央政府在擬編預算階段即使經過二次的改革，仍無法完全擺脫政治因素，如選舉因素及執政者的政策偏好等之影響，顯示作業流程的變革僅為提升財政紀律的手段之一，要進一步提升財政紀律，似乎需要更強而有力的作法，但現階段期待藉由立法或修法程序來進一步強化財政紀律，實非易事，所以我國若要持續提高預算程序的財政紀律效力，應可參考德國的經驗，朝提高預算透明度的方向著手。
    The fiscal policy of the central government always took a more steady but conservative approach before 1980, which also created a generally fiscal balance. After fiscal year 1980, due to economic development, political reforms and an inner transformation of the society, the government has been promoting several important national infrastructures and social welfare policies, the real income and expenditure has incurred deficits, and the public debt ratio increased. The government then began a series of institutional reforms to meet the peak periods of paying off debts and reach the goal of fiscal balance.
    Fiscal discipline is based on a nation’s political system, which demands specific and transparent procedures under some kinds of limitations for the national financial or budget policies to consolidate national finance and avoid over-expenditure and a loss of tax-basis in the government. Since the budget procedure contribute a lot to the formation of national budget system and regulations, there must exist certain fiscal disciplines to control and manage the income, expenditure and debts of the government.
    The thesis finds the government stage, parliamentary stage and implementation stage of the central government do exist certain degree of fiscal discipline through literature review, comparative analyses and empirical research. The government stage, specifically, has better fiscal discipline among the three. Although there may exist some possible risks of curtailing fiscal discipline at the implementation state through supplementary budget, the empirical research does not show the significance. Besides, the installation of the number of the special funds of the central government does have a tendency of increase. Therefore, we have reasons to doubt the special funds have been used as tools to avoid fiscal discipline by the central government. The binding effect of the fiscal discipline in the budgetary process is curtailed especially when there is some institutional adjustment or a party change in the central government, and the government expenditure is thus caused to increase. The thesis also finds the budgetary process has different fiscal disciplines due to the differences by the division of labor, policies and political characteristics of each section of the government.
    The thesis also finds the central government cannot get rid of political interference such as elections and preferences of those in power at the government stage albeit through two fiscal reforms. It shows that a reform in the task flow only serve as just one of the measures to enhance fiscal discipline. It requires more powerful and effective measures to further enhance fiscal discipline. However, it’s not an easy job at present time to expect the enhancement of fiscal discipline through legislative procedures or amendment of laws. The government may look to the experience of Germany to enhance the transparency of budget if it seeks an enhancement of the effectiveness of the fiscal discipline in the budgetary process.
    參考文獻: 一、中文部分
    行政院編印，
    1986~2005a，中華民國76至95年度中央政府總預算案。
    1986~2005b，中華民國76至95年度中央政府總預算案附屬單位預算及綜計表（非營業部分）。
    財團法人中國主計協進社編印，2002，中華民國主計史（中冊）。
    財政部統計處編印，2005，中華民國93年財政統計年報。
    二、英文部分
    Alesina, Alberto and Roberto Perotti. (1995), “The Political Economy of Budget Deficits”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol.42, No.1, PP.401-407.
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    ________. (1996b), “Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process”, The American Economic Review, Vol.86, No.2, PP.1-31.
    Alesina, Alberto, Recardo Hausmann, Rudolf Hommes and Ernesto Stein. (1996), “Budget institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin American”, NBER: Working Paper NO.5586.
    ________., (1999) “Budget institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin American”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.59, PP.253-273.
    Alt, James E. and Robert C. Lowry. (1994), “Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States”, The American Political Science Review, Vol.88, No.4, PP.811-828.
    Annett, Anthony and Albert Jaeger. (2004), “The Quest for Fiscal Discipline Among European Union Member States”, The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol.29, PP.281-290.
    Campos, Ed and Sanjay Pradhan. (1996), “Budgetary Institutions and Expenditure Outcomes: Binding Governments to Fiscal Performance”, The World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper No. 1646.
    Cheibub, José Antonio. (2006), “Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic System”, American Political Science Review, Vol.100, No.3, PP.353-368.
    De Haan, Jakob and Jan-Egbert Sturm, (1994), “Political and Indistitutional Determinants of Fiscal Policy In The European Community”, Public Choice, Vol.80, PP.157-172.
    Fatás, Antonio and Ilian Mihov. (2003), “On Constraining Fiscal Policy Discretion in EMU”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol.19, No.1, PP.112-131.
    Feld, Lars P. and Gebhard Kirchgässner (2000), “Direct Democracy, Political Culture, and the Outcome of Economic Policy: A Report on the Swiss Experience”, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol.16, PP.287-306.
    ________. (2001), “Does Direct Democracy Reduce Public Debt? Evidence from Swiss Municipalities”, Public Choice, Vol.109, PP.347-370.
    Ferejohn, John and Keith Krehbiel. (1987), “The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.31, No.2, PP.296-320.
    Gleich, Horger, (2003), “Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Central and Eastern European Countries”, ECB: Working Paper No.215.
    Hallerberg, Mark and Jürgen von Hagen. (1999), ”Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union.”, In Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, ed. James M. Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp.209-232.
    Hallerberg, Mark and Patric Marier, (2004), “Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.48, No.3, PP.571-587.
    Heald, David, (2003), “Fiscal Transparency: Concepts, Measurement and U.K. Practice”, Public Administration, Vol.81, No.4, PP.723-759.
    Jones, Mark P., Pablo Sanguinetti and Mariano Tommasi (2000), “Politics, Institutions, and Fiscal Performance In a Federal System: an Analysis of The Argentine Provinces”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.61, PP.350-333.
    Reischauer, Robert D., (1990), “Taxes and Spending Under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings”, National Tax Journal, Vol.43, No.3, PP.223-232.
    Roubini, Nouriel and Jeffrey Sachs. (1989a), “Government Spending and Budget Deficits In The Industrial Countries”, Economic Policy, Vol.8, PP.99-132.
    ________. (1989b), “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits In The Industrial Countries”, European Economic Review, Vol.33, PP.903-938.
    Stein, Ernesto, Ernesto Talvi, and Alejandro Grisanti, (1999), “Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience”, In Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, ed. James M. Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, PP.103-133.
    Swank, Otto H., (2002), “Budgetary Devices for Curbing Spending Prone Ministers and Bureaucrats”, Public Choice, Vol.111, PP.237-257.
    Von Hagen, Jürgen, (1991), “A Note on The Empirical Effectiveness of Formal Fiscal Restraints”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol.44, PP.199-210.
    ________. (1992), “Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the European Communities”, Economy Papers, No.96.
    ________. (1998), “Budget Institutions for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline”, ZEI: Policy Paper, B98-01.
    ________. (2002), “Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance”, The Economic and Social Review, Vol.33 No.3, PP.263-284.
    Von Hagen, Jürgen and Ian J. Harden, (1994), “National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance”, European Economy Reports and Studies, No.3, PP.311-418.
    ________. (1995), “Budget Process and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline”, European Economic Review, Vol.39, PP.771-779.
    ________. (1996), “Budget process and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline”, IMF: Working Paper, No.78.
    Wildavsky, Aaron and Naomi Caiden. (1997), The New politics of the Budgetary Process, 3rd ed. New York: Longman.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    行政管理碩士學程
    92921041
    95
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0929210411
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[行政管理碩士學程(MEPA)] 學位論文

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