Loading...
|
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34757
|
| Title: | 勸退參選的賽局分析-政黨利益模型 |
| Authors: | 曾姵華
Tseng, Pei Hua |
| Contributors: | 王智賢
Wang, Jue Shyan
曾姵華
Tseng, Pei Hua |
| Keywords: | 黨內初選
勸退參選
序列均衡
primary
dissuasion
sequential equilibrium |
| Date: | 2007 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 11:05:56 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 綜觀國內大多數的選舉情形，不論是縣市長或是立法委員之選舉，我們常可以看到黨內高層人員為了提高選舉勝選機會，而勸退參選人的相關新聞報導。之前王智賢（2007）一文也探討過相關議題，其探討重點主要置於單純的黨內選舉，然而為使模型與現況更趨於一致，另外將政黨利益加入模型中做更進一步的分析。本文以賽局模型中的序列均衡（sequential equilibrium）之概念，解釋政黨勸退現象，且提出當黨內初選的職位愈高、競爭者與外在競爭之勝選機率愈高或是他黨參選的實力愈低時，就愈不易產生出現勸退參選者之均衡狀況。
After observing most elections in Taiwan, including the elections of the mayor, the head of the county and the legislators, it is very often for us to find those reports about that the authorities of the party dissuade the beginning candidates from running for the elections in order to raise the winning chance in elections. Jue-Shyan（2007）once discussed this correlative issue, and the focus of his paper is those elections that are only inside the party. However, to make the model in accord with the current conditions, we put another variable, the gain from the winning candidate of the same party, into the model to do further analyses. This paper establishes a model of game theory by using the concept of sequential equilibrium to explain the phenomenon in which authorities of the party dissuade the beginning candidates from running for the elections. Besides, it also points out that it is more difficult for the authorities to dissuade candidates from running for elections under the following conditions: the position in the party to be campaigned is higher, the winning probability of competing with other party is higher, and the opponent of the other party is not tough. |
| Reference: | 1.王智賢 (2007)，勸退參選的賽局分析，經濟研究，43:2，149-180
2.林修全 (2006)，聯合晚報，6 月 15 日第1 版
3.王彩鸝 (2006)，聯合晚報，10 月 19 日第4 版
4.李祖舜 (2007)，聯合報，5 月 20 日第 A4 版
5.陳永順 (2007)，聯合報，5 月 22 日第 C2 版
6.何明國、林河名 (2007)，聯合報，8 月 2 日第 A16 版
7.唐復年 (2007)，聯合報，10 月 3 日第 C1 版
8.簡慧珍、唐復年 (2007)，聯合報，10 月 25 日第 C2 版
9.Bae, H. (1993), “Patent and Entry Deterrence,” Economics Letters, 41:3, 325-328.
10.Berganza, J. C. (2000), “Two Roles for Elections: Disciplining theIncumbent and Selecting a Competent Candidate,” Public Choice, 105, 165-193.
11.Biglaiser, G. and C. Mezzetti (1997), “Politicians` Decision Making with Re-election Concerns, ” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 425-447.
12.Chen, K.-P. and S.-Z. Yang (2002), “Strategic Voting in Open Primaries,” Public Choice, 112, 1-30.
13.Chen, K.-P. (2005), “External Recruitment as an Incentive Device,” Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.
14.Chan, W. (1996), “External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion,” Journal of Labor Economics 14, no. 4:555–570.
15.Cho, S. and J. W. Endersby (2003), “Issues, the Spatial Theory of Voting, and British General Elections: A Comparison of Proximity and Directional Models,” Public Choice, 114, 275-293.
16.Church, J. and N. Gandal (1996), “Strategic Entry Deterrence: Complementary Products as Installed Base,” European Journal of Political Economy, 12:2, 331-354.
17.Dharmapala, D. (2002), “Campaign War Chests, Entry Deterrence, and Voter Rationality,” Economics and Politics, 14:3, 325-350.
18.Duggan, J. (2000), “Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information,” Economics and Politics, 12:2, 109-135.
19.Fleck, R. (2001), “Inter-party Competition, Intra-party Competition, and Distributive Policy: A Model and Test Using New Deal Data,” Public Choice, 108, 77-100.
20.Gowrisankaran, G., Mitchell, M. F. and A. Moro (2004), “Why Do Incumbent Senators Win? Evidence From a Dynamic Selection Model,” NBER working paper: 10748.
21.Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982), “Sequential Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 50, 863-894.
22.Kwon, I. and E. M Meyersson Milgrom. (2003), “Boundary of Internal Labor Markets: Do we have the empirical facts right?,” Photocopy, Center on Democracy Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University.
23.Lazear, E. P., and P. Oyer. (2004), “Internal and External Labor Markets:A Personnel Economics Approach,” Labor Economics 11, no. 5:527-554.
24.Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1982), “Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information,” Econometrica 50, 443-460.
25.Milyo, J. (2001), “What Do Candidate Maximize (and Why Should Anyone Care)?,” Public Choice, 109, 119-139.
26.Neven, D. J. (1987), “Endogenous Sequential Entry in a Spatial Model,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 5:4, 419-434. |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
94255002
96 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0942550021 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財政學系] 學位論文
|
All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
