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    題名: 資訊財定價策略之分析 - 以線上音樂為例
    Pricing Strategy of Information Goods - Taking On-line Music as an Example
    作者: 游秋華
    Yu,Chiu Hua
    貢獻者: 毛維凌
    Mao,Wei Ling
    游秋華
    Yu,Chiu Hua
    關鍵詞: 資訊財
    商品組合
    線上音樂
    Information Goods
    Bundle
    On-line Music
    日期: 2006
    上傳時間: 2009-09-18 10:58:51 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文以三階段賽局，在消費者偏好異質、只有下游廠商 (即線上音樂服務提供廠商) 擁有消費者偏好資訊、上游 (即傳統唱片音樂製作廠商)只
    能透過猜測之下，分析資訊財上游內容製造、實體提供廠商、及下游平台銷售廠商之間的互動關係。

    在上游廠商猜測需求的值對其利潤的影響方面：其猜測值若小於實體唱片的願付價格，表示廠商對消費者願付
    價格的猜測較低，此時提高猜測的值能使利潤增加；反之，當猜測需求的值大於實體唱片的願付價格，此時提高猜測的值會使利潤下降。
    並且發現，上游廠商若能提升實體唱片的價值，即能提高其利潤。

    在下游提供的平台水準方面，不論上游廠商是否提供資訊財、下游廠商是否選擇商品組合或個別出售，下游廠商的最適平台投入水準皆相同。

    在上游廠商決定不提供實體資訊財，只藉由授權下游廠商以獲利下，下游廠商在商品組合的內容夠多時，商品組合能為其帶來較個別銷售高的
    利潤。因在此情況下，只有商品組合的最適定價考慮了消費者偏好，使廠商利潤得以較個別銷售下提升。

    在上游廠商提供實體資訊財下，下游廠商在上游對實體資訊財的定價高於消費者對此資訊財實體收藏價值的評價，且商品組合內容夠多時，
    採商品組合能為其帶來較個別銷售高的利潤。

    最後，本論文認為線上音樂的興起除了受消費者收聽習慣改變及網路普及的影響外，更重要的是由原本傳統唱片業者組成的市場環境有利於
    線上音樂的發展，並認為因應線上音樂的崛起，傳統實體唱片廠商並非走入夕陽，仍可透過其身為資訊財內容提供者、握有曲目版權的優勢
    ，和下游廠商透過授權契約議定有利於自身的契約，或是更進一步，推動產業進行上、下游的整併。
    參考文獻: 中文文獻
    洪春暉 (2004),"由Apple iTunes之成功看線上音樂經營模式的轉變",
    資策會產業研究報告.
    楊正瑀 (2003), "線上音樂市場發展現況與趨勢", 資策會產業研究報告.
    英文文獻
    Adams, William James and Yellen, Janet L. (1976), “Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(3),
    475–498.
    Bakos, Yannis and Brynjolfsson, Erik (1999), “Bundling information goods: Pricing, profits, and efficiency”, Management Science, 45(12), 1613–1630.
    Bakos, Yannis and Brynjolfsson, Erik (2000), “Bundling and competition on the internet”, Marketing Science,
    19(1), 63–82.
    Carbajo, Jose, de Meza, David, and Seidmann, Daniel J. (1990), “A strategic motivation for commodity bundling”, The Journal of Industrial Economics,38(3), 283–298.
    Carlton, Dennis W. and Waldman, Michael (2002), “The strategic use of tying to preserve and create market power in evolving industries”, RAND Journal of Economics, 33(2), 194–220.
    Chuang, John Chung-I and Sirbu, Marvin A. (1999), “Optimal bundling strategy for digital information goods: network delivery of articles and subscriptions”, Information Economics and Policy, 11, 147–176.
    Fay, S. and MacKie-Mason, J. (2003), “Competition between firms that bundle information goods”, Presented at the 27th Annual Telecom Policy Research Conference, Alexandria VA, September 25-27, 1999.
    Froehlich, Jon, Chen, Mike Y., Smith, Ian E., and Potter, Fred (2006), “Voting with your feet: An investigative study of the relationship between place visit
    behavior and preference.”, in Ubicomp, 333–350.
    IFPI (2007), “Digital music report 2007”, Technical report, International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI).
    McAfee, R Preston, McMillan, John, and Whinston, Michael D (1989), “Multiproduct monopoly, commodity bundling, and correlation of values”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(2), 371–383.
    Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John (1992), Economics, Organization and Management, London: Prentice-Hall.
    Nalebuff, Barry (2004), “Bundling as an entry barrier”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 159–187.
    Salinger, Michael A (1995), “A graphical analysis of bundling”, Journal of Business, 68(1), 85–98.
    Schmalensee, Richard (1982), “Commodity bundling by single-product monopolies”, Journal of Law Economics, 25(1), 67–71.
    Stremersch, Stefan and Tellis, Gerard J. (2002), “Strategic bundling of products and prices: A new synthesis for marketing”, Journal of Marketing, 66(1), 55–72.
    Varian, Hal R. (1998), “Markets for information goods”, Available on http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/ hal/people/hal/papers.html.
    Varian, Hal R. (2000), “Buying, sharing and renting information goods”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 48(4), 473–88.
    Varian, Hal R. (2003), “Economics of information technology”, Economics of information technology. Mattioli Lecture, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy, November 2001. Available on http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/hal/people/hal/papers.html.
    Whinston, Michael D (1990), “Tying, foreclosure, and exclusion”, American Economic Review, 80(4), 837–859.
    Wikipedia (2007), “Network effect - from wikipedia, the free encyclopedia”, Available on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network effect.
    Zhu, Kevin and MacQuarrie, Bryan (2003), “The economics of digital bundling: The impact of digitization and bundling on the music industry”, Communications of The ACM, 46(9), 264–270.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    94255005
    95
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094255005
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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