English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 113822/144841 (79%)
Visitors : 51789293      Online Users : 741
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/34228
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34228


    Title: 會計師懲戒與審計品質關連性之研究
    The Relation between CPA Sanction and Audit Quality
    Authors: 鄧佳俐
    Teng, Chia Lee
    Contributors: 周玲臺
    Chou, Ling-Tai
    鄧佳俐
    Teng, Chia Lee
    Keywords: 會計師懲戒
    審計品質
    會計師更換
    會計師任期
    客戶談判籌碼
    CPA sanction
    Audit quality
    Auditor change
    Auditor tenure
    Client bargaining power
    Date: 2005
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 09:04:03 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 從美國的安隆(Enron)、世界通訊(WorldCom)、全錄公司(Xerox),義大利的帕瑪列(Parmalat),相關專業機構包括安達信(Arthur Andersen)、美林證券(Merrill Lynch)、花旗銀行(Citibank);到臺灣的太電、博達、訊碟….等,一連串上市公司及專業機構爆發財務弊案,投資大眾人心惶惶。會計師受託查核公司財務報表並對報表表示意見,在健全資本市場的任務中擔任極為重要的角色,社會大眾對會計師之職責賦予相當大的期待,但弊案連續爆發卻使會計師的專業遭受嚴重質疑。因此,一般而言,弊案爆發或會計師受主管機關懲處後,會計師姓名就會與「審計品質不佳」劃上等號,因此先前由被懲處之會計師所簽證之其他受查公司,不論有無類似弊病,都會被人以放大鏡來觀察。然而,究竟懲戒制度實施結果是否合乎立法初衷而提升會計師之審計品質?被懲戒之會計師是否真代表其審計品質較低?則無法得知,此即為本研究欲探討的議題。
    本研究以裁決性應計數報導幅度大小將會計師之審計品質予以量化,並參考Nagy(2005)的研究模式,將樣本分為會計師更換前後期,並對獨立及配對樣本作分析,以探討因懲戒而更換會計師對審計品質之影響。研究結果發現,在更換會計師的前提下,即便懲戒更換會計師並未能顯著抑制公司對於正向裁決性應計數之報導幅度,卻能避免一般情況下更換會計師對審計品質所造成的負面情形。另外,研究結果顯示,會計師長任期(6年以上)審計品質較高;會計師短任期(2年以下)且更動過於頻繁的情況下審計品質較低。在懲戒程度與審計品質之關係方面,研究結果顯示,會計師懲戒輕重程度未與會計師審計品質高低一致;而受警告及申誡懲戒但未被客戶更換之會計師在懲戒後次期,傾向調低公司盈餘,查核工作態度變保守,但審計品質並未提升。再者,本研究發現,受懲戒而更換會計師之效果大致而言並不受客戶談判籌碼的影響。最後,就單一時點(PC=0)的會計師審計品質而言,會計師被懲戒與否其審計品質並未有顯著不同;然將樣本群組進行分析後,發現有三位至四位被懲戒會計師其審計品質顯著不佳,而被懲戒之會計師中,即使差異未達顯著,卻是幾乎每2人就有1人審計品質較一般會計師低,因此懲戒制度基本上具適當性。基於以上發現,本研究肯定會計師懲戒制度對審計品質提升之效用。
    總而言之,懲戒制度在於避免專業人士怠忽其職、違規行事而侵害大眾利益,不僅處分已違法之會計師,對於其他會計師亦有警惕之意味,因此實有其存在之必要。然其制度設立之適當性,可由懲戒制度實施案例之相關研究略知一二,主管機關應參考學者研究,找出目前會計師懲戒制度效用不彰的癥結點,進行改善,以增進大眾利益,符合社會期待。
    rom USA to Taiwan, lots of frauds upset investors in recent years. Accountants are asked to express their opinions toward the financial reports, and have played an important role in the capital market. Investors rely on what accountants assure to make decisions. However, with so many frauds broke up, accountants’ professionalism and assurance quality are being questioned. Sanctions may be due to the profession’s self-regulation system or based on judgment of the regulators’ administrative power. Nevertheless, does the sanction system actually protect or enhance accountants’ audit quality as it is originally set up for?Do the punished accountants really provide lower quality on the audit they perform? The answers to these questions are unknown, and they are the subject of this study.
    The study quantifies accountants’ audit quality by the amount of discretionary accruals of the financial statements of their audit clients. Referring to the research model of Nagy(2005), we classify samples into two periods, i.e., before and after changing accountants. Moreover, the study matches each observation sample with a paired sample and analyzes whether the sanction has affected the audit quality. The study concludes that the sanction system is appropriate basically. The results approve that the accountant sanction system in Taiwan is somewhat effective on improving audit quality.
    In short, the purpose of CPA sanction is to enforce professional conduct on all members of the profession. It not only punishes the accountants that break laws, but also alerts others. Therefore, the sanction system is necessary. The regulators should refer to these findings and solve the problems that diminish the effect of the sanction system. After all, the sanction system may be able to offer investors a more matured investment environment and achieve their expectations.
    Reference: 中文部分
    江景清,1999,審計品質與合夥人輪調制度之探討,國立政治大學會計系碩士論文。
    李承易,1999,我國會計師法律責任之研究-會計師懲戒案例分析,政治大學會計學系碩士論文。
    余景仁,2000,事務所/會計師更換與盈餘管理關聯性之研究,私立東吳大學會計系碩士論文。
    林嬋娟,1999,析論會計師懲戒評比各國之優異,實用稅務,第292期(4月):12-17。
    林渝蘋,2003,審計品質對公司盈餘管理之影響—以會計師輪調為例,國立南台科技大學會計資訊系碩士論文。
    林秋景,2003,不同法律制度下管理者與會計師策略之研究,國立台北大學會計研究所碩士論文。
    林蕙玲與陳正倉,2004,統計學方法與應用(上)、(下),台北:雙葉書廊有限公司。
    俞洪昭、戚務君與李承易,2004,我國會計師受懲戒原因與種類之關聯性分析,風險管理學報,第2卷第2期(11月):37-56。
    姜家訓與葉鴻銘,2005,債權人監督、公司治理、會計師公費依賴度與盈餘穩健性之關係,2005會計理論與實務研討會,輔仁大學會計學系。
    馬秀如,2002,審計專業之變革與挑戰研討會,政治大學會計學系。
    陳依蘋,2002,美國史上最大破產案—安隆(Enron)深度報導,會計研究月刊,第195期(3月):16-20。
    陳素春,2004,會計師選擇、裁量性應計與公司特性關聯之研究,私立中原大學會計學系碩士論文。
    陳春山,2004,不實財務報告之民事責任法律適用爭議,證券暨期貨月刊,第22卷第6期(6月)。
    陳祈願,2005,我國會計師獨立性及責任之研究—美國沙班斯法之啟示(上),證券櫃臺,108期:25-50。
    黃荃、林麗月及陳惠珠,1998,臺灣會計師簽證責任與歷來受處分案例之探討,會計研究月刊,第153期(8月):76-82。
    黃惠琦,2002,會計師破產風險對於審計品質與投資之影響,私立中原大學會計學系碩士論文。
    游志煌,2003,論投資人保護法與證券詐欺訴訟之發展,證交資料,第499期(11月):2-18。
    張文瀞、周玲臺及林修葳,2003,內部人持股連續變動公司之盈餘管理行為特性,會計評論第37期:53-83。
    張麗珠,2004,我國會計師懲戒風險之特性分析,私立東吳大學會計學系碩士論文。
    楊碧茵,2004,博達案四會計師懲處過重?究竟屬於審計失敗?抑或經營失敗? 會計研究月刊,第226期(9月):26。
    劉漢妮,1999,我國會計師懲戒制度之研究,國立台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文。
    賴春田,2000,會計師業務、責任及會計師事務所組織之演變,國立台灣大學管理學院會計研究所碩士論文。
    羅婉茹,2003,會計師任期與盈餘管理關連性研究,私立朝陽科技大學會計系碩士論文。
    經濟日報,2005.3.14:會計師法修正 責任加重 風險倍增。
    政府公報:80年-94年行政院及財政部公報。
    英文部分
    Anthony, J., and K. Ramesh. 1992. Association between accounting performance measures and stock prices: A test of the life cycle hypothesis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15 (June/ September): 203-227.
    Ashbaugh, H., R. Lafond, and B. Mayhew. 2003. Do nonauit services compromise auditor independence? Further evidence. The Accounting Review 78 (July): 611-639.
    Beaver, W. 1966. Financial ratios as predictors of failure. Journal of Accounting Resesrch 4 (Supplement): 71-111.
    Becker, C., M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research 15 (Spring): 4-24.
    Brody, R., and S. Moscove. 1998. Mandatory auditor rotation. National Public
    Accountant (May): 32-36.
    Bartov, E., S. Goldberg, and M. Kim. 2001. The valuation-relevance of earnings and cash flow: an international perspective. Journal of international financial Management & Accounting 12 (smmer):p.103.
    Carcello, J., and A. Nagy. 2004. Client size, auditor specialization and fraudulent financial reporting. Managerial auditing Journal 19 (May): 651-668.
    ______.2004. Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Auditing 23 (Septemper):55-69.
    Casterella, J., J. Francis, B. Lewis, and P. Walker. 2004. Auditor industry specialization , client bargaining power, and audit pricing . Auditing: a Journal of Practice and Theory (March): 134-140.
    Chen, C. 2004. Bargaining power strength, audit failure contagion effect and audit quality. Ph. D. dissertation, National Yunlin University of Science & Technology.
    DeAngelo, L. 1981a. Auditor independence, low balling and disclosure regulation. Journal of Accounting & Economics 3 (August): 113-127.
    ______. 1981b. Audit size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting & Economics 3 (December): 183-199.
    Dechow, P. 1994. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: The role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting & Economics 18 (July): 3-42.
    ______, and I. Dichev. 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 33-59.
    DeFond, M. and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt convenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting & Economics 17 (January): 14-176.
    ______, and K. Subramanyan. 1998. Audit changes and discretionary accruals.Journal of Accounting & Economics 25 (February):35-67.
    ______, K. Raghunandan, and K. Subramanyam. 2002. Do non-audit service fees impair auditor independence? Evidence from going concern audit opinions. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (September): 1247-1274.
    Elitzur, R. and H. Falk, 1996. Planned audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 15 (fall): 247-269.
    Frankel, R., M. Johnson, and K. Nelson. 2002. The relation between auditors’ fees for non-audit services and earnings quality. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 71-114.
    Geiger, M., and K. Raghunandan. 2002. Auditor tenure and audit reporting failures. Auditing 21 (March): 67-78.
    Ghosh, A., and D. Moon. 2005. Auditor tenure and perceptions of audit quality. The Accounting Review 80 (April): 585-612.
    Gopal, V. 2003. Audit quality and the pricing of discretionary accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 22 (March): 109-126.
    Johnson, V., I. Khurana, and J. Reynolds. 2002. Audit firm tenure and the quality of financial reports. Contemporary Accounting Research 19 (Winter): 637-660.
    Jones, J. 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research 29 (Autumn): 193-228.
    Kaplan, R. 1985. Comments on Paul Healy: Evidence on the effect of bonus schemes on accounting procedures and accrual decision. Journal of Accounting & Economics 7 (April): 109-113.
    Larcker, D. and S. Richardson. 2004. Fee paid to audit firms, accrual choices, and corporate governance. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (June):625-658.
    Mensah, Y. 1984. An examination of the stationary of multivariate bankruptcy prediction model. Journal of Accounting Research. 22: 380-395.
    Moses, O. 1987. Income smoothing and incentives: Empirical tests Using accounting changes. The Accounting Review 62 (April): 358-377.
    Moreland, K. 1995.Criticisms of auditors and association between earnings and returns of client firms. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 14: 94-104.
    Myers, J., L. Myers, and T. Omer. 2003. Exploring the term of the auditor-client relationship and the quality of earnings: A case for mandatory auditor rotation? The Accounting Review (July): 779-799.
    Nagy, A. 2005. Mandatory audit firm turnover, financial reporting quality, and client bargaining power: The case of Arthur Andersen. Accounting Horizons 19 (June): 51-68.
    Palmrose, Z. 1987. Litigation and independent auditors: The role of business failures and management fraud. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Spring): 90-103.
    ______. 1991. Trials of legal disputes involving independent auditors: some
    empirical evidence. Journal of Accounting Research, (Supplement): 149-185.
    Pae, S. and S. Yoo. 2001. Strategic interaction in auditing: An analysis of auditors` legal liability. The Accounting Review (July):333-356.
    Ritter, R. 1991. The long run performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Financial. 46 (March): 3-27.
    Raghunathan, B., B. Lewis, and J. Evans. 1994. An empirical investigation of problem audit. Research in Accounting Regulation 8: 33-58.
    Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.
    Schwartz , R. 1997. Legal regimes, audit quality and investment. The Accounting Review 72 (July): 385-406.
    Sloan, R. 1996. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71 (July): 289-315.
    Titman, S., and B. Trueman. 1986. Information quality and the valuation of new issues. Journal of Accounting & Economics 8 (June): 159-621.
    Teoh, H., and T. Wong. 1993. Perceived auditor quality and the earnings response coefficient. The Accounting Review 68 (April):346-366.
    Thoman, L. 1996. Legal damages and auditor efforts. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (spring): 275-306.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    93353036
    94
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093353036
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    35303601.pdf42KbAdobe PDF2839View/Open
    35303602.pdf67KbAdobe PDF2802View/Open
    35303603.pdf103KbAdobe PDF2922View/Open
    35303604.pdf142KbAdobe PDF2847View/Open
    35303605.pdf412KbAdobe PDF2909View/Open
    35303606.pdf717KbAdobe PDF2846View/Open
    35303607.pdf490KbAdobe PDF2898View/Open
    35303608.pdf472KbAdobe PDF2845View/Open
    35303609.pdf315KbAdobe PDF2832View/Open
    35303610.pdf213KbAdobe PDF21059View/Open
    35303611.pdf361KbAdobe PDF22228View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback