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    Title: 創投如何降低資訊不對稱風險
    Authors: 陳德仁
    Contributors: 吳啟銘
    陳德仁
    Keywords: 創投
    資訊不對稱
    Venture Capital
    Asymmetric information
    Date: 2003
    Issue Date: 2009-09-17 19:11:58 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 一般創投業者對於公司的評估，因為公司內部人與外部投資人存在「資訊不對稱」(asymmetric information)的問題，投資人必須承擔資訊不對稱的風險，尤其是新創事業或未上市公司，由於未有適當的機制規範，資訊不對稱的情形更為嚴重。因此，對於從事新創事業投資的創投業者而言，其所面臨的風險除了非系統性風險外，也增加了資訊不對稱的風險。由於新創事業的投資風險相當的高，創投與創業家的合作是建立在互信的基礎上，若創業家為了吸引資金的投入而刻意隱藏或扭曲內部真實狀況，造成創投在投資後發現投資案不符預期，將對創投與創業家互信的基礎產生不利的影響。因此，創投或外部投資人在評估投資案時，如何降低資訊不對稱的風險是非常重要的事情。
    本研究主要是站在資訊不對稱的立場，探討創投業在投資時面臨的問題，並嘗試發展出「資訊不對稱評估機制」，藉由提出一套新的篩選評估方法作為企業投資評估之輔助工具，解決因為資訊不對稱的問題導致投資者與被投資企業可能發生的衝突。期盼創投或一般投資人在投資的過程中，透過適當的機制來處理資訊不對稱的問題，希望能藉此機制來降低資訊不對稱的風險，增加投資人投資判斷的正確性，進而作出更有利的投資決策；對投資人而言，也可藉提供額外有關風險之資訊，成為考量投資對象之參考依據。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    90932719
    92
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090932719
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Finance] Theses

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