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| Title: | 會計師的監督功能--對稱或不對稱 |
| Authors: | 李秉叡 |
| Contributors: | 戚務君
李秉叡 |
| Keywords: | 審計品質
裁量性應計
盈餘管理
audit quality
discretionary accruals
earnings management |
| Date: | 2003 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-11 17:34:51 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究延伸Becker et al. ( 1998 )六大會計師事務所審計效率高於非六大的研究，探討會計師事務所在面對管理階層不同之盈餘管理動機時，也就是當會計師與管理階層兩者間的盈餘報導動機衝突或一致時，會計師事務所的監督功能是否對稱。本研究認為高審計品質的會計師事務所在決定盈餘報導時，會比低審計品質的會計師事務所更加保守，因為高品質之會計師事務所面對審計失敗伴隨而來的訴訟成本遠較其他會計師事務所來的高，使得會計師事務所對於客戶採用增加所得的會計政策會保持較高的專業懷疑態度，抑制客戶虛增盈餘，因此，當管理者產生增加所得的盈餘報導動機時，衝突就會發生；反之，當客戶採用減少所得的會計政策，基於會計上的穩健原則，會計師事務所干涉程度則較低，使客戶較易進行減少所得的盈餘管理，故會計師事務所的監督功能不具對稱性。
而本研究結果顯示，當客戶有增加所得的盈餘管理動機時，代表高審計品質的五大與產業專家會計師事務所的客戶所報導的裁量性應計顯著低於非五大與非產業專家之會計師事務所，表示在會計師事務所與管理階層的盈餘報導動機有衝突時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的審計品質較佳，較能抑制客戶利用裁量性應計進行增加所得的盈餘管理；反之，當客戶有減少所得的盈餘管理動機時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的客戶所報導的裁量性應計也顯著低於非五大與非產業專家之會計師事務所，表示在會計師事務所與管理階層的盈餘報導動機相一致時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的審計品質反而較低，容許客戶利用裁量性應計進行減少所得的盈餘管理。此實證結果支持本研究之假說，當會計師事務所與管理階層的盈餘報導動機發生衝突(一致)時，五大與產業專家會計師事務所的審計品質高(低)於非五大與非產業專家會計師事務所，監督功能不具對稱性。
The research of Becker et al ( 1998 ) found that the big 6 CPA firms’ audit efficiency was higher than the non-big 6 CPA firms’ audit efficiency. This research extends Becker’s research and discusses whether the surveillance function of CPA firms is symmetrical or not when CPA firms face different earnings management motives of the management. In other words, when the earnings management motives between CPAs and management are conflict or consistent, whether will result in different audit quality level or not. We thought that the CPA firms with high audit quality are more conservative than those with low audit quality when deciding the reported earnings. Because the lawsuit cost of the CPA firms with high audit quality is much greater than the lawsuit cost of other CPA firms when facing the audit defeat. Thus the high audit quality CPA firms maintain the higher specialized suspicion on their customers who use the accounting policy to increase their earnings and restrain their earnings management. Therefore, when the management has the motive to increase reported earnings, the conflict will occur; on the contrary, when the management has the motive to decrease reported earnings, the CPA firms will tolerate their customers making earnings management to decrease the reported earnings base on the conservatism of accounting, so the surveillance function of CPA firms will decline and become not symmetry.
According to our research, we find that when the management has the motive to increase reported earnings, the reported discretionary accruals of the management audited by the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms are much lower than those audited by the non-big 5 and non- industrial expert CPA firms. It means when the motive of earnings reporting between the CPA firms and management is conflict, the audit quality of the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms is much better, and they can restrain their customer using the discretionary accruals to increase their earnings. On the other hand, when the management has the motive to decrease reported earnings, the reported discretionary accruals of the management audited by the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms are also much lower than those audited by the non-big 5 and non- industrial expert CPA firms. It means when the motive of earnings reporting between the CPA firms and management is consistent, the audit quality of the big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms is much lower instead, and they tolerate their customer using the discretionary accruals to decrease their earnings. This result of statistics test supports our hypotheses. When the earnings reporting motive between the CPA firms and the management is conflict ( consistent ), the audit quality of big 5 and industrial expert CPA firms is higher ( lower ) than other CPA firms’ audit quality. The surveillance function does not have the symmetry. |
| Reference: | 國外文獻
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國內文獻
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
91353022
92 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0913530221 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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