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| Title: | 公司資訊透明度、分析師跟隨與公司績效之關聯性
Relationship among Corporate Information Transparency, Analysts Following and Firms Performance |
| Authors: | 吳郁萱
Wu, Yu-Hsuan |
| Contributors: | 李怡宗
Lee, Yi-Tsung
吳郁萱
Wu, Yu-Hsuan |
| Keywords: | 公司資訊透明度
分析師跟隨人數
公司績效
Corporate Information Transparency
Analysts Following
Firms Performance |
| Date: | 2005 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-11 17:24:47 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 近年來國內外許多企業層出不窮的發生管理階層舞弊案，使得投資人以及債權人對於企業公開發佈財務資訊之信心大受影響，公司若能開誠佈公告知利害關係人其相關之資訊，不僅能提升公司之資訊透明度，亦能重拾投資人的信心，故公司資訊透明度為廣受重視之議題。分析師擁有專業知識分析公司的財務報表且能提供額外的資訊給投資大眾，並扮演了公司重要的外部監督機制。
本研究旨在探討公司資訊透明度、分析師跟隨與公司績效之關聯性。採用台灣證券暨期貨發展基金會所公布的資訊揭露評鑑系統結果作為資訊透明度的替代變數，來探討當公司資訊透明度揭露程度較低時，分析師跟隨人數愈多是否愈能增加公司之績效。此外，本研究採用標準普爾之評等分數作為穩健性測試，來驗證結果是否相ㄧ致。研究結果顯示：公司資訊透明度較佳的公司相較於揭露程度較差之公司，其績效愈高。公司績效愈好，分析師跟隨人數愈多。資訊透明度揭露程度較差的公司，分析師的跟隨人數會愈少。無論公司資訊透明度好或壞時，分析師跟隨人數愈多，均能增加公司之績效，且資訊透明度揭露程度較差的公司相較於資訊透明度揭露程度較好的公司，分析師跟隨人數愈多，愈能增加公司之績效。穩健性測試之結果亦有相ㄧ致的發現。
In recent years there were lots of frauds by managers in domestic and international enterprises, causing investors and creditors lose confidence on financial reporting. It is believed that if the company management can frankly and earnestly disclose related information to the stakeholders, the company’s transparency and thus the investors’ trust will be promoted. Corporate information transparency has become an important issue. Analysts have professional skills to analysis financial statements and disclose additional information to investors and also play an important role in supervising corporation’s operating condition.
The purpose of this study is to discuss the association among corporate information transparency, analysts following and firms performance. The research uses the evaluated result of The Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System as the disclosure transparency proxy variable to examine whether the companies with lower disclosure level have higher firms performance if more analysts follow these enterprises. In addition, this paper uses Standard and Poor’s rating scores to do robust check. The empirical results indicate follows:
1.The higher information disclosure level companies have higher firms performance than the lower information disclosure level companies.
2.Enterprises with better firm performance have a larger analyst following.
3.Analysts are less likely to follow firms with lower corporate information transparency.
4.Corporate information transparency plays an important role in analysts’ willingness to follow firms and that increased analyst following is associated with higher firm performance, particularly for firms with lower corporate information transparency.
5.The result of robust check reaches a consistent conclusion. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
93353048
94 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093353048 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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