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| Title: | 中國匯率制度引發之國際經貿爭議研究 |
| Authors: | 陳怡蓁 |
| Contributors: | 楊光華
陳怡蓁 |
| Keywords: | 人民幣
匯率
禁止性補貼
操控匯率
yuan
exchange rate
prohibited subsidy
currency manipulation |
| Date: | 2004 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-11 17:13:03 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 自1994年以來，人民幣對美元匯率始終維持在8.28：1美元。近年來，在中國對經常帳外匯收入之法定結匯要求下，其強勁出口貿易迫使中國不斷提高貨幣供給，收購出口廠商源源不斷之美元結匯需求，以維持固定匯率，進而造成人民幣匯率被低估及累積驚人外匯存底之結果。
惟此一運作方式引來美國產業團體及國會議員高分貝抗議，主張人民幣固定且低估匯率，提高中國產品之出口競爭力，使中國出口商享有不公平之貿易競爭優勢，損害美國製造業及勞工之權益，符合WTO所禁止之禁止性補貼規範，並違反IMF避免操控匯率之義務，故促美國貿易代表署調查並向WTO提出控訴。惟美國產業團體及國會議員之訴求已遭美國貿易代表署拒絕。
本文先以美國產業團體之訴求為出發點，並以WTO及IMF兩大組織之合作關係連貫後續討論：人民幣固定且低估匯率之措施是否符合WTO禁止性補貼之規範？是否違反IMF避免操控匯率之義務？前者以補貼三項要件「財務補助」、「受有利益」及「特定性」加以檢驗，後者則以「操控匯率」之定義及目前學者、IMF及美國財政部之判斷定之。最後做出構成禁止性補貼之可能性高、操控匯率之義務違反可能性高兩個結論。
中國已明確表示其匯率改革有其自訂時間表，需與國內金融改革、相關配套措施之建立及經濟發展情況相配合，不會受制於外國壓力而逕予改革。為解決此一問題，本文再就美國單邊貿易報復措施法案、中美雙邊財政外交及各種多邊場域協商等方式中，提出較適解決此貿易爭端之建議。
Since 1994, China has fixed the exchange rate of yuan around 8.28 yuan per U.S. dollar. China requires its citizens and firms to exchange their dollars for yuan, so the strong exports and trade surplus enforce the Chinese government to add money supply to acquire the increasing dollars. As a result, China can peg and undervalue the exchange rate of yuan to dollar and accumulate astonishing foreign reserves.
This situation arise the objection of American manufacturing alliance and Congressmen. They assert the pegged and undervalued yuan increase the competitiveness of China’s products, allow the China’s export companies to have unfair trade advantages, damage the benefits of American manufactures and workers. Besides, this regime constitutes the prohibited subsidy of WTO and violates the IMF obligation of avoidance of currency manipulation. They urged the USTR to investigate and launch a dispute settlement in WTO but had been refused.
This article starts from the appeal of American alliance and use the cooperation between WTO and IMF to link the following discussion: is the regime of fixed and undervalued yuan consistent with the prohibited subsidy regulations in WTO and is the regime against the IMF obligation of avoidance of currency manipulation? The former one is examined by three elements: ‘‘financial contribution’’. ‘‘benefits’’ and ‘‘specific’’ while the latter one is tested by the definition of currency manipulation and the exchange rate reports of IMF and U.S. Treasury. The answers are positive both.
China has asserted that she has her own time table and will not surrender to the pressure of foreign countries. This article then tries to use unilateral trade retaliatory measures, bilateral financial diplomacy and other multilateral consultations to find the proper resolutions. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易研究所
92351044
93 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0923510441 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文
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