English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 118524/149574 (79%)
Visitors : 78815324      Online Users : 23
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 文學院 > 哲學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/159704
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/159704


    Title: 康德論認知對象的經驗實在性:1770~1781
    Kant on the Empirical Reality of the Object of Human Cognition
    Authors: 王浩仁
    Wang, Hau-Ren
    Contributors: 謝昭銳
    王浩仁
    Wang, Hau-Ren
    Keywords: 康德
    現象
    物自身
    先驗觀念論
    經驗實在論
    範疇
    認知對象
    Kant
    Appearance
    Thing in Itself
    Transcendental Idealism
    Empirical Realism
    Category
    Object of Cognition
    Date: 2025
    Issue Date: 2025-10-02 11:12:41 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: <先驗感性論>的主要宣稱(「我們只能認識顯相,無法認識物自身」)帶有這樣的含意:「對人類而言,客觀實在的認知對象僅僅是顯相(現象),絕非物自身。」這層含意,對康德的哥白尼式革命是關鍵的,它體現了「對象必須符合認知」,但卻牴觸了傳統的概念。依傳統,客觀實在對象應當是個在己存在的物自身,且正因此故,認知才應當符合對象,無論是人類還是其他主體的認知。

    康德的任務乃是說明:至少在人類認知領域,傳統概念並不恰當。這要求顯相無論在形式或質料方面,均不需求助於物自身的支撐(也不可被化约到物自身)。早在 1770 年<就職論文>(ID),便提出時空(先驗)觀念性的論證,但那只是部份的解決。由於 ID並未有現象的經驗實在論,故現象之質料實在性仍須求助於智思物。最終 ID 形成兩個世界理論,且真正的實在物乃是由純粹理智獨自設定的智思世界。這種設定,在 1772年便被康德自己加以質疑。這個質疑,不但預示了康德即將採取經驗實在論(從感性開始設定對象之實在性),也可視為轉向認知曲行性(discursivity)之開端(亦即由感性與知性共同決定對象世界)。直到《純粹理性批判》(KrV)的<感性論>,以經驗實在論的架構展開顯相之論述,先驗觀念論也隨之融入其中。在<分析論>,則加入知性要素,成立現象世界;並因為純粹範疇本身之空洞性,禁止積極的智思世界,只留下作為(感性之)界限概念的消極智思物。至此,ID 的兩個世界轉為KrV 的一個現象世界,這就是對人類而言的客觀對象。

    本文便依照由ID到 KrV 的次序展開。第一章是導論,介紹本文之問題,並初步勾勒解決之道。第二章討論<就職論文>,並聚焦於現象的實在性,以及理智與感性各自獨立設定對象的問題。第三章進入KrV,提出曲行性論題,並在經驗實在論之架構下,納入時空之先驗實在性。第四章以範疇之<形上推證>與<先驗推證>為主軸,論述現象世界之成立。最後論範疇先驗運用的問題,帶出消極智思物概念來限制現象世界。第五章為結論。
    One of the central claims of Kant's Frist Critque (KrV) is that we can only cognize appearances, not things in themselves. This claim implicates that at least for us (human beings) the objective reality of cognition(about an object) should not be attached to the thing as it is, but only to the thing as it appears (to us), ie. to a phenomenon. This implication is indeed contrary to the traditional view before KrV (including the pre-critical Kant). In traditional view, the objectively real object is just the object as it is, and the object in itself forms the material criterion of all cognitions about that object, whether our or other subjects'cognitions.

    The justifications for Kant's revolutionary view must come from the inquiry into form and matter of appearance, in order to reveal that these two aspects of appearance don't need supports from the thing in itself and cannot be reduced to it. The formal aspect of that inquiry (ie. Transcendental idealism of space & time) had taken form in 1770 Inaugural Dissertation (ID), but its theoretical effect had not yet been fully exihibited, for the ontological framework of ID was still the transcendental realism of (positive) noumena, which were posited by pure intellect alone. Thus there were two worlds (phenomena & noumena) in ID. Until KrV, empirical realism of appearance (the material aspect of that inquiry) substitutes for the old ontological framework and brings transcendental idealism to its full consequence. However, the concept of noumena still has a negative role of curbing the pretension of sensibility. In the end, the two-worlds view in ID has been transformed into the one-phenomena-world in KrV, and this world is the only objective world for us.

    The content of this dissertation accords with the above structure. Chapter 1 is the Introduction to the problem and a very short sketch of the resolution, Chapter 2 discusses Kant's 1770 Inaugural Dissertation, then focuses on the question of reality of phenomena, and the problematic positing of noumena by pure intellect alone. Chapter 3 is about KrV especially focuses on the empirical realist framework of the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA) and its incorporation f transcendental idealism. Finally TA (and related texts) establishes the empirical reality of appearance. Chapter 4 is on the determination and limitation of the phenomenal world through the categories, including the conditions of their empirical use and the problem of their transcendental use. Chapter 5 is the Conclusion.
    Reference: 一、康德著作:(引用頁碼依照普魯士王室學術院版,例如:Ak 8:221=學術院版第八卷第 221 頁)

    KrV=Kritik der reinen Vernunft, (1781/1787, 亦即 A/B 版), Felix Meiner Verlag, Hanburg, 1998.
    (English Trans): Kemp Smith, Norman, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, London: Mac Millian, 1964. Guyer, Paul & Wood, Allen W., Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998.

    KpV=Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788.
    (English Trans): Gregor, Mary J., Critique of Practical Reason, Cambridge Univ Press, 2002.

    Prol. = Prolegomena zu einer jeden Kunftigen Metaphysik als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, (1783), Felix Meiner, Verlag, Hamburg, 2001.

    ID = Inaugural Dissertation, (1770). [ De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis]
    (English Trans): Walford, David, On the Form and Principle of the Sensible and the Intelligible World, In: D. Walford & R. Meerbote (eds) Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, Cambridge Univ Press, 1992.

    Prize Essay=Uutersuchungen über die Deutlichkeit der Gründsatze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral (1764)
    (English Trans): D. Walford & R. Meerbote, Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals, Cambridge, 1992.

    The Only Argument = Der einzig möglishe Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (1763)
    (English Trans): D. Walford & R. Meerbote, The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God, Cambridge, 1992.

    GMS=Gruadlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.
    (English Trans): Mary Gregor, Groundwork of the Metaphysical of Moral, Cambridge Univ Press, 2002.

    MAN=Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften. (1786)
    (English Trans): Friedman, Michael, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Cambridge Univ Press, 2002.

    On a Discovery=Über eine Entdeckung nach der alle kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine altere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll, (1790).
    (English Trans): Allison, Henry E., On a Discovery whereby any New Critigue of Pure Reason Is to be made superfluous by an Older One. Cambridge Univ Press, 2002.

    On the Progress = Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolf ’s Zeiten in Deutchland gemacht hat?
    (English Trans): Heath, Peter, What Real Progress Has Metaphy- sics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff ? Cambridge Univ Press, 2002.

    R= Reflexionen, (English Trans): C. Bawman, Paul Guyer, and F. Rau-scher, Immanuel Kant: Notes and Fragments. Cambridge Univ Press, 2005.

    The Jasche Logic= Jdsche Logik.(1800)
    (English Trans): Young,J. Michael, in: Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic, Cambridge Univ Press, 1992.

    Correspondance, (English ed. & Trans): Zweig,Amulf,Cambridge Univ Press, 1999.

    Physical Monadology = The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics combined with Geometry,瑾which Sample I contains the Physical Monadology. (English trans.) D. Walford & R. Meerbote, Cambridge, 1992.
    (English Trans): Gregor, Mary J. Anthropologyfrom a Pragmatic­ al Pointof View, Martinus Nijhoff.1974.

    Lectures on Metaphysics, (English ed. & Trans): Karl Ameriks & Steve Naragon, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997.

    Anthro = Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht,(1798)
    (English Trans): Gregor, Mary J. Anthropologyfrom a Pragmatic­ al Pointof View, Martinus Nijhoff.1974.


    *康德箸作中文譯本:
    李秋零讠爭,《純粹理性批判》(1787年第二版),北京:中囯人民大孛,2010年。
    ───,《純梓理性批判》(1781年第一版),北京:中囯人民大挙,2010年。
    ───,《未耒形而上羊寺讠令》,北京:中囯人民大羊,2005年。
    ─── ,《前批判時期著作Ⅱ》,北京:中國人民大學,2004 年。
    ─── ,《1781 年之後的論文》,北京:中國人民大學。
    鄧曉芒譯,《實踐理性批判》,北京:人民出版社,2004 年。
    ─── ,《判斷力批判》,北京:人民出版社,2004 年。
    ─── ,《純粹理性批判》,北京:人民出版社,2004 年。
    李明輝譯,《道德底形上學之基礎》,台北:聯經出版,民國 79 年。
    ───,《一切能作為學問而出現的未來形上學之序論》,台北:聯經出版,民國 110 年。

    二、二手文獻及其他哲學家著作:
    Allais, Lucy, 2010, “Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics” , Kant Yearbook 2, De Gruyter, 1-32.
    ───2015, Manifest Reality, Oxford Univ Press.
    Allison, Henry E , 1968, “Kant’s Concept of the Transcendental Object”, Kant-Studien, 59: 165-86.
    ───, 1978, “Things in themselves, Noumena, and the Transcendental Object”, Dialectica 32:41-76.
    ───, 1983, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (1st edition), Yale Univ. Press.
    ───, 1987, “Transcendental Idealism: The Two-Aspects View”, in B. den Ouden & M. Moen (eds). New Essays on Kant, 155-78, New York Lang.
    ───, 1996, “Transcendental Idealism : A Retrospective”, in: Allison, Henry E., Idealism and Freedom, 3-26, Cambridge Univ. Press.
    ───, 2004, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, (Revised & Enlarged edition), Yale Univ. Press.
    ───, 2012, “Where Have all the Categories Gone? Reflections on Longuenesse’s Reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction”, in: Allison, Essays on Kant, Oxtord Univ. Press.
    ───, 2015, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Oxtord Univ Press.
    Ameriks, Karl, 1983, “Kant and Guyer on Apperception”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 65: 175-86.
    ───, 2003, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques, Oxtord: Clarendon Press.
    ───, 1992, “Kantian Idealism Today”, History of Philosophy Quarterly, 9: 329-42.
    ───, 2000, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Cambridge Univ. Press.
    Anderson, R. Lanier, 2022, “Transcendental Idealism as Formal Idealism”, European Journal of Philosophy, 30: 889-923.
    ───, 2017, “Lucy Allais on Transcendental Idealism”, Philosophical Studies, 174: 1661-1674.
    Barker, Stephen, 1969, “Appearing and Appearances in Kant”, in: L.W. Beck (ed.), Kant Studies Today, Illinois: Open Court.
    Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb, 1783, (2-Ausgabe), Metaphysik, Deutsche übersetzt von G. F. Meier, Dietrich Scheglmann Reprints, 2004.
    Bayne, Steven M., 1994, “Objects of Representations and Kant’s Second Analogy”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 32: 381-410.
    Beck, L. W. 1969, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predessors, Cambridge: Bclknap Press.
    Bencivenga, Ermanno, 1987, Kant’s Copernican Revolution, Oxford Univ. Press.
    ───, 1992, “Knowledge as a Relation and Knowledge as an Experience in the Critique of Pure Reason”, in: Ruth Chadwick (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Critical Assessments, Vol.Ⅱ, 15-35.
    Bennett, Jonathan, 1966, Kant’s Analytic, Cambridge Univ. Press.
    Bird, Graham, 1962, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, London: Routledge & Kagan Paul.
    ───, 2006, “The Neglected Alternative: Trendelenburg, Fisher, and Kant”, in: Bird(ed.) A Companion to Kant: Critical Assessments, Vol.Ⅱ, 15-35.
    Buroker, Jill Vance, 2006, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge Univ. Press.
    Caranti, Luigi, 2007, Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy, Toronto: Univ. of Toronto.
    Caygill , Howard, 1995, A Kants Dictionary, Blackwell Publishing.
    Descartes, Réne, Meditations of First Philosophy.
    ───, Principles of Philosophy.
    ───, Rules for Directions of Our Native Intelligence.
    [以上三部笛卡兒著作,均收入 John Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch (eds & trans). Descartes: Selected Philosophical Wirtings, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990.笛卡兒著作引文頁碼,採用標準的 AT版(Adam & Tannery)]
    Eisler, Rudolf, 1964, Kant-Lexikon, Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung Hildesheim.
    Falkenstein, Lorne, 1995, Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic, Univ. of Toronto Press.
    Gardner, Sebastian, 1999, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, London: Routledge.
    Gibbons, Sarah., 1994, Kant’s Theory of Imagination, Oxford: Clarenton Press.
    Gram, Moltke, 1975, “The Myth of Double Affection”, in: W. H. Werkmeister (ed.) Reflections on Kants Philosophy, 29-63, Univ. of Florida Press, 1975.
    Grier, Michelle, 2001, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion, Cambridge Univ. Press.
    Guyer, Paul, 1979, “Review of Dieter Henrich’s Identität und Objektivität” Journal of Philosophy, 76: 151-67.
    ───, 1980, “Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 17: 205-12.
    ───, 1987, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
    Heidegger, Martin, 1967, Die Frage nach dem Ding (English trans. by W.
    B. Barton Jr. & V. Deutch What Is a Thing ? Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.
    Henrich, Dieter, 1969, “The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction”, Review of Metaphysics, 22: 640-59.
    ───, 1976(1994), “Identity and Objectivity: An Inquiry into Kant’s Transcendental Deduction”, (trans. by Jeffrey Edwards), in: R. L. Velkley (ed.) The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy, Harvard Univ. Press, 1994.
    Hintikka, Jaakko, 1967, “Kant on the Mathematical Method”, The Monist, 51: 352-75. Reprinted in Carl J. Posy (ed.), Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
    Hughes, Fiona, 2007, Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology. Edingburgh Univ. Press.
    Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed. By P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
    Kemp Smith, Norman, 1962, A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed., revised & enlarged, New York: Humanities Press.
    Langton, Rae, 1998, Kantian Humility, Oxford Univ. Press.
    Laywine, Allison, 1993, Kant’s Early Metaphysics and the Origins of the Critical Philosophy, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. Press.
    ───, 2003, “Kant on Sensibility and the Understanding in 1770s”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33: 443-82.
    Leibniz, G. W., New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. By P. Remnant & J. Bennett, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981.
    ───, Philosophical Papers and Letter, ed. & trans. By L. E. Loemker, 1976.
    Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. ed. By P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
    Longuenesse, Béatrice, 1998a, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, trans. by C. Wolfe. Princeton Univ. Press.
    ───, 1998b, “The Divisions of the Transcendental Logic and the Leading Threads”, in: G. Mohr & M. Willaschek (eds). Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
    ───, 2005, Kant on the Human Standpoint, Cambridge Univ. Press.
    Meerbote, Ralf, 1972, “Kant’s Use of the Notions ‘Objectivie Reality’ and ‘Objective Validity’ ” Kant-Studien, 63: 51-8.
    Onof, Ch. & Schulting, D., 2012, “Space as Form of Intuition and as Formal Intuition” Philosophical Review, 124: 1-29.
    Paton, H. J., 1936, Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience, 2 vols. New York: Macmillian.
    Patt, Walter, 1987, Transzendentaler Idealismus, New York: Walter de Gruyter.
    Pippin, Robert, 1982, Kant’s Theory of Form, New Heven: Yale Univ. Press.
    Prauss, Gerold, 1971, Erscheinung bei Kant. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
    ───, 1974, Kant und das Problem des Ding an sich, Bonn: Bouvier.
    Rickert, Heinrich, 1903, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntis, VDM Verlag Dr. Muller.
    Schrader, George, 1968, “The Thing in Itself in Kantian Philosophy” in: R. P. Wolff (ed.) Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays, 172-88.
    Stang, Nicolas, 2022,“Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    ───, 2021, “Kant and the Concept of an Object”, European Journal of Philosophy, 29: 299-322.
    ___ ____ , 2015, “Who’s Afraid of Double Affection ?”, Philosopher’s Imprint, vol. 15, no. 18, pp. 1-27.
    Strawson, P. F., 1966, The Bound of Sense, London: Methuen.
    Thompson, Manley, 1972, “Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant’s Epistemology”, Review of Meaaphysics, 26: 314-43.
    Van Cleve, James, 1999, Problems from Kant, Oxford Univ. Press.
    Wolff, Christian, 1751, Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele der Menschen, auch alle Dingen überhaupt, reprinted Ann Arbor, MI, 2005.
    Westphal, Kenneth R., 1997, “Noumenal Causality Reconsidered: Affection, Agency, and Meaning in Kant”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 27: 209-45.
    Watkins, Eric, 2002, “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and the Categories”, History of Philosophical Quarterly, 19: 191-215.
    Willaschek, Murcus, Mohr, Georg, Stolzenberg, Jürgen, (eds), 2015 Kant-lexikon, De Gruyter.
    Wolff, Robert Paul, 1973, Kant’s Theory of Mental Ativity, Havard Univ. Press.
    Young, J. Michael, 1988, “Kant’s View of Imagination”, Kant-Studien, 79: 140-64.
    ───, 1979, “Kant’s Notion of Objectivity”, Kant-Studien, 70: 131-148.
    ───, 1994, “Synthesis and the Content of Pure Concepts in Kant’s First Critique”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 32: 331-57.
    Zöller, Günter, 1984, Theoretische Gegenstandsbeziehung bei Kant, Berlin: de Gruyter.
    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    哲學系
    104154502
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104154502
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[哲學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    450201.pdf5985KbAdobe PDF0View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback