資料載入中.....
|
請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/157685
|
| 題名: | 單一選區下三黨選擇攻擊對象之競選賽局：以 2024 年總統選舉為例
Three-Party Game of Choosing Attack Targets in a Single Member District Election: A Case Study of the 2024 Presidential Election |
| 作者: | 王舒亭
Wang, Shu-Ting |
| 貢獻者: | 王智賢
王舒亭
Wang, Shu-Ting |
| 關鍵詞: | 政黨攻擊
單純策略Nash均衡
序列均衡
party attack
pure strategy Nash equilibrium
sequential equilibrium |
| 日期: | 2025 |
| 上傳時間: | 2025-07-01 14:20:45 (UTC+8) |
| 摘要: | 隨著臺灣新興政黨的崛起，傳統藍綠兩黨的政治格局正在改變，新興政黨逐漸成為左右選情的關鍵，而政黨間攻擊策略的選擇，往往也是決定得票率高低的重要因素。本文觀察2024年總統選舉情況，建立賽局模型，設定有兩資深大黨與一新興政黨，分析單一選區下三政黨間攻擊對象的選擇。在三黨同時決策的情形中，各政黨攻擊對象的選擇取決於該決策所帶來的淨利益，而非他黨的策略。另外，在資訊不對稱下，我們舉出一組分離序列均衡與兩組混合序列均衡，在分離均衡中，強勢(s)型態大黨會同時攻擊其他兩黨，而弱勢(w)型態大黨會單獨攻擊另一大黨；在兩組混合均衡中，當攻擊新興政黨的淨利益相較於引起新興政黨反攻所造成的損傷較小時，兩型態的大黨均會採取單獨攻擊另一大黨之策略，而當攻擊新興政黨的成本相較於引起新興政黨反攻所造成的損傷較小時，兩型態的大黨均會採取同時攻擊其他兩黨之策略，以減輕決策帶來的負面效果。
As emerging political parties rise in Taiwan, the traditional political landscape dominated by the blue and green parties is shifting. Emerging parties are gradually becoming pivotal in influencing election outcomes, and the choice of attack strategies among political parties often plays a critical role in determining vote shares. This study observes the 2024 presidential election situation and establishes a game-theoretical model involving two established major parties and one emerging party to analyze the selection of attack targets among the three parties in single-seat elections. In a scenario where all three parties make decisions simultaneously, the choice of attack targets by each party depends on the net benefits of that decision rather than the strategies of other parties. Moreover, under conditions of asymmetric information, we present one separating sequential equilibrium and two pooling sequential equilibriums. In the separating equilibrium, a strong (s) type major party will attack both of the other parties, while a weak (w) type major party will attack only the other major party. In the pooling equilibrium, when the net benefits of attacking the emerging party outweigh the damages caused by potential counterattacks, both types of major parties will adopt a strategy of attacking only the other major party. Conversely, when the costs of attacking the emerging party are relatively lower compared to the damages from potential counterattacks, both types of major parties will adopt a strategy of attacking both other parties simultaneously, aiming to mitigate the negative effects of their decisions. |
| 參考文獻: | I. 中文部分
王智賢、陳虹羽，2022，〈單一選區下三政黨的合作與競爭之賽局分析〉，《選舉研究》，29(1): 1-30。
林繼文，2008，〈以輸爲贏：小黨在日本單一選區兩票制下的參選策略〉，《選舉研究》，15(2): 37-66。
徐維遠，2012，〈相對多數決制下為何小黨能生存?－英國與日本的比較分析〉，國立政治大學政治學系碩士學位論文。
盛杏湲、陳義彥，2003，〈政治分歧與政黨競爭：二○○一年立法委員選舉的分析〉，《選舉研究》，10(1)，7-40。
温姵瑩，2023，〈單一選區下三政黨的攻擊與提名策略之賽局分析〉，國立政治大學財政學系碩士學位論文。
II. 英文部分
Chisik, Richard A., and Robert J. Lemke. 2006. “When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash Equilibria in a three- candidate spatial competition model.” Social Choice and Welfare 26(1): 209-215.
Desposato, Scott. 2008. “Going Negative in Comparative Perspective: Electoral Rules and Campaign Strategies.” Working paper, University of California, San Diego.
Dowling, Conor M., and Steve B. Lem. 2009. “Explaining Major and Third Party Candidate Entry in U.S. Gubernatorial Elections, 1980–2005.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 9(1): 1–23.
Evrenk, Haldun. 2009. “Three-Candidate Competition When Candidates Have Valence: The Base Case.” Social Choice and Welfare 32(1): 157–169.
Fell, Dafydd. 2016. “Small Parties in Taiwan’s 2016 National Elections: A Limited Breakthrough?” American Journal of Chinese Studies 23(1): 41–58.
Gandhi, Amit, Daniela Iorio, and Carly Urban. 2016.“Negative Advertising and Political Competition.”The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 32(3): 433–477.
Harmel, Robert, and John D. Robertson. 1985. “Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross-National Analysis.” International Political Science Review 6(4): 501-523.
Haynes, Audrey A., and Staci L. Rhine. 1998. “Attack Politics in Presidential Nomination Campaigns: An Examination of the Frequency and Determinants of Intermediated Negative Messages Against Opponents.” Political Research Quarterly 51(3): 691-721.
Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. 1982. “Sequential Equilibria.” Econometrica 50(4): 863-894.
Ridout, Travis N., and Jenny L. Holland. 2010. “Candidate Strategies in the Presidential Nomination Campaign.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 40(4): 611–630.
Skaperdas, Stergios, and Bernard Grofman. 1995. “Modeling Negative Campaigning.”American Political Science Review 89(1): 49-61.
Theilmann, John M., and Alan W. Wilhite. 1998. “Campaign Tactics and the Decision to Attack.” The Journal of Politics 60(4): 1050–1062.
Walter, Annemarie S. 2014.“Choosing the Enemy: Attack Behaviour in a Multiparty System.”Party Politics 20(3): 311-323. |
| 描述: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
112255018 |
| 資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112255018 |
| 資料類型: | thesis |
| 顯示於類別: | [財政學系] 學位論文
|
文件中的檔案:
| 檔案 |
描述 |
大小 | 格式 | 瀏覽次數 |
|---|
| 501801.pdf | | 1504Kb | Adobe PDF | 0 | 檢視/開啟 |
|
在政大典藏中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.
|
