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    Title: 經理人團隊能力是否為投資人所認知 —以股東大會投票通過率為例
    Do Investors Recognize Managerial Ability? Evidence from Shareholders' Meetings Voting Approval Rate
    Authors: 許容瑄
    Hsu, Jung-Hsuan
    Contributors: 潘健民
    許容瑄
    Hsu, Jung-Hsuan
    Keywords: 經理人能力
    投資人認知
    股東投票
    Managerial ability
    Investor recognition
    Shareholder voting
    Date: 2025
    Issue Date: 2025-07-01 14:17:56 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究旨在探討經理人團隊能力是否為投資人所認知,並以選任經理人議案之投票通過率作為投資人認知的衡量指標。股東會投票行為是股東參與公司治理與表達立場的具體形式,股東可以透過選任經理人議案之投票行為來表達其對經理人的支持度。本研究依照Demerjian et al. (2012)經理人能力衡量的方法,並在控制公司規模、財務狀況、持股結構等因素後,檢驗經理人能力與投票通過率之關聯性。
    研究結果顯示,經理人團隊能力與投票通過率不相關。進一步進行追加測試後發現,ROA與股東投票平均贊成率呈現顯著正相關。因此,本研究推測投資人在選任經理人時,可能無法認知經理人團隊自身的能力,但能認知經理人可直接觀察之經營成果。
    This study investigates if investors recognize the managerial ability of the top management team using the approval rate of managers’ appointments at shareholder meetings to proxy for investor recognition. This study follows Demerjian et al. (2012) to measure for managerial ability and examines the association between managerial ability and investor recognition.
    The empirical results show that managerial ability is not significantly associated with the shareholder approval rates. Further tests using ROA as an alternative proxy for managerial ability and find a positive association between ROA and shareholders’ approval. Taken together, this study suggests that investors may not recognize the inherent ability of the top management team but the observable performance outcomes.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    112353040
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112353040
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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