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| Title: | 投資人如何評價經理人團隊年齡：以股東大會議案贊成率為例
How Do Investors Evaluate Vintage of the Top Management Team? Evidence from Voting Approval Rate in the Shareholders' Meeting |
| Authors: | 蔣明珊
Jiang, Ming-Shan |
| Contributors: | 潘健民
Pan, Chien-Min
蔣明珊
Jiang, Ming-Shan |
| Keywords: | 年齡
經理人團隊
投資人認可
Board Age
Top Management Team
Shareholder Approval |
| Date: | 2025 |
| Issue Date: | 2025-07-01 14:17:13 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 管理階層的個人特質日益成為投資人關注焦點，投資人對經理人團隊與個別成員特質的認知，尤其是年齡，可能是影響股東決策的重要依據。本研究以日本東京證券交易所之上市企業為樣本，探討經理人團隊與個人年齡結構對投資人認可之影響。實證結果顯示，經理人團隊平均年齡及最高年齡愈高，股東大會議案贊成率顯著降低；最年輕成員之年齡則對投資人認可無明顯影響。個人層級方面，經理人年齡愈高亦使股東認可度下降。惟追加測試顯示，投資人尤對年齡介於50至59歲之經理人團隊表現正面認可，且針對不同產業之年齡特質關注重點不一，突顯產業異質性對投資人認知之調節效果。
The characteristics of management teams have been drawing significant public attention. Characteristics of the top management teams and top executives, particularly age, may influence shareholders’ decisions. This study investigates the relationship between the age structures of management team and shareholders’ approval, using data from firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Empirical results show that average age and maximum age of the top management team is significantly associated with lower shareholder approval rates, while the age of the youngest board member is not. At the individual level, older CEO age is also linked to lower shareholder support in the main tests; however, additional tests reveal that this negative effect of CEO age is significant only among firms in the manufacturing industry. Moreover, when the sample is divided by team age structure, shareholders tend to view teams aged between 50 and 59 more favorably, while teams with members aged 60 and above are associated with reduced shareholder support. These findings highlight that both age structure and industry characteristics jointly shape investor perceptions of corporate leadership. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
112353016 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112353016 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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