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| Title: | 貿易政策與最適民營化政策—非線性需求的情況
Trade Policy and Mixed Oligopoly: the Nonlinear Demand Case |
| Authors: | 翁堃嵐 |
| Contributors: | 財政系 |
| Date: | 2018-10 |
| Issue Date: | 2025-06-23 13:21:40 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 在貿易自由化的思維下，公營企業民營化這股浪潮迄今仍然持續進行未曾間斷，公部門對整個經濟體系的影響還是相當深遠，這種現象在一些開發中國家尤其明顯，也使得在混合寡占市場下探討策略性貿易政策的議題顯得相當重要。Megginsonand Netter (2001) 針對已開發國家的估計，國有企業 (包含部分民營化的企業) 的生產份額占 GDP 的比重，平均來說，大約在5%左右。根據最近OECD所做的研究顯示，儘管國有企業部門的生產規模和範圍逐年在減少，但是依然普遍存在各個國家 (請參閱 Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005 年，表18)。另外，OECD (2005) 的報告也指出，在這些國家中國有企業的資產價值對各國的經濟仍然具有實質的影響力，只是民營化的程度在各個國家以及產業間的確存在明顯的差別。根據該報告，從附加價值來看，這些OECD 的國家中，國有企業的占比高達40%，就業方面的占比則大約在10%左右，若以市場的資本總值來說則約有50%左右。若以波音 (Boeing) 和空中巴士 (Airbus) 兩家噴氣式飛機製造商之間的競爭為例，二家都是國有持份相當高的公司。換言之，即使在國際寡占市場中，公營、私營並存的混合寡占市場仍是相當常見的現象，使得混合寡占市場下的貿易政策與民營化政策間的關聯成為一個相當重要的課題。然而既存文獻為了求得解析解 (closed form)，通常將需求函數以及邊際成本函數線性化，例如: White (1996)、Pal and White (1998, 2003)、Poyago-Theotoky (2001)、Myles (2002)、Chang (2005)、Chao and Yu (2006) 以及Long and Staehler (2008,2009) 等。此種將需求函數線性化的簡易設定，明顯忽略產業集中度與配置的生產效率效果等重要經濟效果對經濟體系的影響。有鑒於此，本計畫擬發展一個非線性的需求函數來重新探討混合寡占市場下的最適民營化政策以及最適貿易政策 (包含進口關稅以及出口補貼政策)，模型中的國際混合寡占市場包含一公營廠商、n 家成本異質的本國民營廠商、m 家成本異質外國民營廠商，在本國市場上進行Cournot –Nash 的同質數量競爭。本國政府除了對外國廠商的產品課徵稅率為t 的進口關稅外，同時對本國公、民營廠商的生產進行補貼。計畫中將探討產業集中度與配置的生產效率效果所扮演的角色，所得結果並與傳統的簡易模型作一比較。
Traditional studies on the policies of privatization and trade under international mixed oligopoly framework are mostly based on some simplified scenarios such as linear demand or symmetric costs, and they may miss some important economic effects, say the allocation efficiency in production or how the degree of concentration affect the above policies. Therefore, this proposal tries to construct a more generalized model of international mixed oligopoly, where one public firm, n domestic private firms, and m foreign private firms have different cost functions and they all face non-linear demands. Based on our framework, we can analyze how those simplified models may miss some important welfare effects and how their policy suggestions may induce some false results. I have been devoted so many efforts on this issue and have tried many ways to construct a tractable system of equations in the policy stage. If my proposal is approved, the optimal privatization policy and the optimal trade policy under international mixed oligopoly will be remodeled in a more general framework and the consequences social welfare will also be discussed. Long and Stahler (2009) assumed that there only exists domestic mixed enterprise, but no private domestic firms and claimed that (1) the degree of privatization will not affect the production and social welfare under the best trade policy, (2) The best import tax policy is independent to the degree of privatization, and when this tax rate is positive, the best export subsidy rate will increase as the degree of privatization. Actually, Long and Stahler (2009) is only a special cost of our new framework, i.e., the scenario of n=0 and m>1. A preliminary result of our model is that when there are no domestic private firms, the degree of privatization is independent to the social welfare (i.e., “neutrality” in their term). In contrast, the social welfare is increasing with degree of privatization, majorly depending on the average marginal cost of all domestic firms. When the average cost for all domestic firms is less (higher) than the cost of the public firm, the social welfare increases (decreases) as the degree of privatization. In other words, if we include the domestic private firms, the neutrality in Long and Staehler (2009) can no longer valid. The future works of this project are how the heterogeneity of cost functions affecting the allocative efficiency, the privatization policy, the trade policy, and the social welfare. |
| Relation: | 科技部, MOST106-2410-H004-004, 106.08-107.07 |
| Data Type: | report |
| Appears in Collections: | [財政學系] 國科會研究計畫
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