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    Title: 雙重紅利假說與綠色租稅改革的政治經濟學
    The Political Economy of the Double-Dividend Hypothesis and Green Tax Reform
    Authors: 賴育邦
    Contributors: 財政系
    Date: 2017-09
    Issue Date: 2025-06-23 13:21:28 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本計畫旨在由政治經濟的觀點,探討環境經濟學中兩個重要且相關的議題:雙重紅利假說與綠色租稅改革。前者係指環境稅的課徵,除了可減少污染,其稅收亦可用於降低其他租稅,減少整體稅制的超額負擔。而後者則是在總稅收不變下,以環境稅取代其他具扭曲性的租稅。在第一年計畫中,我們認為,當環境稅稅率是由大眾投票決定,且其稅收用於降低所得稅時,環境稅不必然較無法取得稅收的政策工具(如污染配額)來得有效率。原因在於:當所得稅隨著環境稅稅率提高而下降時,所得分配將變得更不均。所得分配的惡化造成中位數選民不願意支持較高的環境稅。上述計畫中,環境稅收分配的比率為外生決定,而在第二年計畫中,我們將該分配比率內生化。在一階段由選民投票決定該比配,而該比率則反應綠色稅改的程度。到了第二階段,政策制定者決定環境稅稅率。我們將利用此架構分析何以綠色稅改不易推動。我們將以一般均衡模型分析上述兩項議題。由於兩者密切相關,且基本模型類似,故申請兩年期計畫,以利研究之進行。
    This project aims to investigate two important issues from the political economy perspective: the double-dividend hypothesis, and the green tax reform. The former asserts that adopting revenue-raising (RR) instruments can generate two benefits: one is the environmental protection, and the other is the welfare enhancement arising from cutting other distortionary taxes. A green tax reform means that a country adopts RR instruments to lower pre-existing distortionary taxes (usually remains the total tax revenues constant). According to the double-dividend hypothesis, introducing a green tax reform can enhance a country's overall efficiency. In the first-year project, we discuss the feasibility of the double-dividend hypothesis in a democratic economy. We attempt to demonstrate that, in a democratic economy where the goal of environmental protection is determined through a majority voting mechanism, the two benefits from the RR instruments may conflict. This result will cast a shadow over the feasibility of the double-dividend hypothesis. In the first-year project, the proportion of the environmental tax revenues used to cut other distortionary taxes is exogenously fixed. The second-year project will endogenize such a proportion. The political process consists of two stages. All individuals vote for the distribution of the environmental rents in the first stage, and then the policymaker chooses the environmental tax rate in the second stage. We will use this setting to demonstrate the unpopularity of the green tax reform. Since the two projects have a similar basic model, and their main themes are closed related, we decide to apply for a two-year project to facilitate the research.
    Relation: 科技部, MOST104-2410-H004-006-MY2, 104.08-106.07
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 國科會研究計畫

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