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| 题名: | ESG面向對金融機構併購之影響
Impacts on the Merger and Acquisition of Financial Institutions from ESG Perspective |
| 作者: | 林佳穎
Lin, Chia-Yin |
| 贡献者: | 陳明進
Chen, Ming-Chin
林佳穎
Lin, Chia-Yin |
| 关键词: | ESG
環境
社會及公司治理
金融機構併購
股東行動主義
董事受託義務
併購防禦措施
ESG
Environment
Social and Governance
Financial Institution M&A
Shareholder Activism
Fiduciary Duty
Anti-takeover Defense |
| 日期: | 2025 |
| 上传时间: | 2025-06-02 14:45:30 (UTC+8) |
| 摘要: | ESG（環境、社會及公司治理）浪潮自國際間席捲而來。在ESG倡議下，我國金融監督管理委員會亦積極推動深化永續治理文化、精進永續資訊揭露範圍與強化利害關係人溝通。ESG已成為企業內部控制及法令遵循所必須正視的問題。而金融機構間併購交易，於整體金融市場之規模競爭、金融秩序穩定、股東及各方利害關係人權益影響重大。本文透過ESG治理趨勢所開展之各項理論基礎，探討股東行動主義對於金融機構併購之影響及各方關係人面臨利益衝突調和之議題，其次以美國比較法及法律經濟分析研究金融機構董事於面對不同併購交易型態時，其受託及監督責任義務在ESG脈絡下之發展趨勢及審查標準，並以個案研究分析提出對於上述議題之省思與建議。
The wave of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) has swept in from the international community. Under the ESG initiative, Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has also been actively promoting the deepening of a sustainable governance culture, enhancing the scope of sustainability information disclosure, and strengthening communication with stakeholders. ESG has become an essential issue that companies must address in terms of internal control and compliance. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) among financial institutions carry significant implications for market competitiveness, financial stability, and the rights and interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. This article explores the theoretical foundations derived from the ESG governance trend, examining the influence of shareholder activism on financial institutions M&A, as well as the issue of balancing conflicting interests among stakeholders. This article further, from U.S. comparative law and economic analysis perspective, analyzes how the fiduciary duties of directors in financial institutions and the applicable standards of judicial review are evolving under the ESG sequence across different types of M&A transactions. Case studies are employed to provide critical insights and recommendations on the aforementioned issues. |
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| 描述: | 碩士
國立政治大學
國際金融碩士學位學程
112ZB1046 |
| 資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112ZB1046 |
| 数据类型: | thesis |
| 显示于类别: | [國際金融碩士學位學程] 學位論文
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