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| Title: | 美中科技競爭：美國2022年晶片法之形成與影響
U.S.-China Technology Competition：The Formation and Impact of U.S. CHIPS Act |
| Authors: | 張孟頴
Chang, Meng-Ying |
| Contributors: | 陳純一
Chen, Chun-I
張孟頴
Chang, Meng-Ying |
| Keywords: | 美中科技競爭
晶片法
晶片四方聯盟
U.S.-China Technology Competition
U.S. CHIPS Act
Chip 4 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| Issue Date: | 2025-03-03 15:35:53 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 美國參眾兩院於2022年7月通過《晶片與科學法案》（CHIPS and Science Act，以下簡稱《晶片法》），經總統拜登（Joe Biden）於同年8月簽署成為法律。該立法目的除了對應中國提出的《中國製造2025》的國力崛起挑戰外，亦是為解決美國國內晶片製造能力衰退及短缺的危機。其試圖透過產業政策，鼓勵與擴大投資美國本土晶片產業的發展，並就現在美國及其盟國的半導體供應鏈進行重組。臺灣的半導體業者，特別是台積電（TSMC）成為美國朝野關注與美中科技競逐的重要目標，而該法案有部分是與臺灣的業者是密切相關的。爰此，本文主要探究《晶片法》之立法背景、半導體獎勵計畫，以及美國科研領域研發與創新之相關立法內容，並對於《晶片法》後續一系列的管制措施及其對Chip 4各國所帶來的影響，進行論述與分析。
研究結果發現，美國透過《晶片法》實現「晶片自主」的目標在執行上面臨人力、環境及資金等諸多高成本的挑戰。在對中國的高階晶片技術圍堵方面，雖然透過修訂《出口管制條例》、《晶片法》中的「護欄條款」（guardrails）及Chip 4盟友的合作與管制等，以期多方遏制中國在半導體領域的進展，但現階段的管制措施並不足以長期有效壓制中國當前2025製造所力求的高階半導體技術的突破。該《晶片法》及相關管制措施也間接激化全球晶片競賽，在多數國家優先追求跟進「晶片自主」的情況下，未來三年內預期有關12/16及28/22奈米製程的產能將快速增長。若無供應鏈監控機制來平衡供需，全球半導體產業恐將面臨產能過剩的風險。最後值得注意的是，川普總統在2024年末總統大選的勝選回歸，預料川普總統的2025上任更將加劇美國晶片產業政策的新改變，並對全球半導體主要供應國產生重大的衝擊與影響。
The CHIPS and Science Act, which was passed by the U.S. Congress in July 2022 and signed into law by President Joe Biden in August, aims to counter China's "Made in China 2025" initiative while addressing the decline in U.S. chip manufacturing capacity and shortages. The act seeks to enhance investment in the U.S. semiconductor industry and restructuring the supply chain among the U.S. and its allies. This paper examines the legislative background of the CHIPS Act, its semiconductor incentive programs, and related legislation concerning U.S. research and innovation. Additionally, it analyzes the subsequent regulatory measures and their impact on the Chip 4 countries.
The research indicates that the United States faces significant costs—related to labor, the environment, and capital—in its pursuit of "chip independence" under the CHIPS Act. While the U.S. has implemented measures to curb China's advancements in advanced chip technology through export controls, guardrails on CHIPS Act, and alliances such as Chip 4, these current strategies are inadequate for the long-term containment of China's technological ambitions. Furthermore, the CHIPS Act has heightened global competition, prompting many countries to strive for their own chip independence. This trend may result in rapid growth in the production of 12/16 and 28/22-nanometer chips over the next three years, with potential risks of overcapacity if a supply-demand monitoring mechanism is not established. Lastly, the anticipated return of President Trump is expected to bring about significant changes to U.S. semiconductor industry policies in 2025. These changes could have substantial impacts and repercussions for major semiconductor-supplying countries around the globe. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
國家發展研究所
109261007 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109261007 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [國家發展研究所] 學位論文
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