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| Title: | 網紅自媒體在群眾募資平台的行銷定位：以嘖嘖平台為例
The Marketing Positioning of Social Media Influencers on Crowdfunding Platforms: A Case Study of Zec Zec |
| Authors: | 呂垣瑭
Lu, Yuan-Tang |
| Contributors: | 蘇威傑
傅浚映
Su, Weichieh
Fu, Jyun-Ying
呂垣瑭
Lu, Yuan-Tang |
| Keywords: | 網紅
自媒體
群眾募資
訊息不對稱
訊號理論
influencer
social media
crowdfunding
information asymmetry
signaling theory |
| Date: | 2025 |
| Issue Date: | 2025-03-03 13:59:02 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究探討社群媒體網紅在群眾募資平台上的行銷定位，並以台灣知名的嘖嘖平台為例。 隨著數位媒體的興起，網紅已成為行銷溝通的關鍵角色。透過他們獨特的個人品牌和影響力，他們吸引了大量的受眾，並且經常是推廣各種群眾募資專案的首選。本研究應用訊號理論，分析網紅如何有效減少群眾募資平台上常見的訊息不對稱，並增強支持者對專案的信任。
本研究以訊號理論為框架，探討網紅行銷在群眾募資平台中的應用價值與影響機制，旨在解決募資平台上的訊息不對稱問題，提升專案的成功率。研究採用質性研究方法，通過對 Zec Zec 平台上典型募資專案的個案分析與深度訪談，系統性分析網紅行銷如何在產品資訊、價格合理性及項目風險等層面發揮作用。研究結果顯示，網紅透過真實的使用經驗、專業推薦與多層次行銷策略，有效傳遞可信訊號，降低訊息不對稱並提高支持者的參與意願。本研究亦提出具體的實務建議，包括選擇與品牌契合的網紅、強調內容真實性、多重網紅策略整合等，為募資專案業主、行銷公司及平台運營者提供參考。透過本研究的發現，不僅豐富了訊號理論在新媒體環境中的實踐應用，亦為未來研究提供了重要指引。
This study explores the marketing positioning of social media influencers on crowdfunding platforms, with a focus on Taiwan's well-known platform, Zec Zec. With the rise of digital media, influencers have become key players in marketing communication. Leveraging their unique personal brands and influence, they attract large audiences and are often the preferred choice for promoting various crowdfunding projects. This research applies signaling theory to analyze how influencers effectively reduce information asymmetries on crowdfunding platforms and enhance supporters' trust in projects.
Employing a qualitative case study approach, this study uses in-depth interviews to explore the perspectives of three key roles involved in projects on Zec Zec, aiming to understand the impact of influencer marketing. The findings indicate that influencers, through authentic experiences, personal endorsements, and brand storytelling, can alleviate supporters' concerns about pricing, product information, and risks. This effectively reduces information asymmetry and increases the likelihood of crowdfunding success. The results provide valuable insights for future influencer marketing strategies on crowdfunding platforms, and suggest that platforms adopt more diverse communication methods to enhance supporter engagement and trust. Specifically, this research demonstrates how influencer marketing can act as a signaling mechanism to mitigate the information asymmetry prevalent in crowdfunding environments, leading to improved project outcomes. |
| Reference: | 第七章 參考資料
參考網頁
嘖嘖群眾募資平台. (2024). 關於我們. Retrieved from https://www.zeczec.com/about
中文文獻
林安國 (2010)。群眾募資的發展與挑戰。《財金研究季刊》，32(4)，45-67。
高偉峰 (2018)。數位媒體行銷的策略分析。《管理學報》，56(2)，35-58。
英文文獻
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Cialdini, R. B. (2001). Influence: Science and Practice. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Fu, J. Y., Wen-Ching, S. C., Yu, C. M. J., & Kuo-Feng, H. (2022). The More, the Merrier? The Bystander Effect on Crowdfunding Platforms. NTU Management Review,32(2), 123.
Hennig-Thurau, T., Gwinner, K. P., Walsh, G., & Gremler, D. D. (2004). Electronic Word-of-Mouth via Consumer-Opinion Platforms: What Motivates Consumers to Articulate Themselves on the Internet? Journal of Interactive Marketing, 18(1), 38–52.
Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977). Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 32(2), 371–387.
Miller, M. H., & Rock, K. (1985). Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information. The Journal of Finance, 40(4), 1031–1051.
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187–221.
Ross, S. A. (1977). The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach. The Bell Journal of Economics, 8(1), 23–40.
Schramm, W. (1954). How Communication Works. In W. Schramm (Ed.), The Process and Effects of Communication (pp. 3–26). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355–374.
Yin, R. K. (2014). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
企業管理研究所(MBA學位學程)
109363037 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109363037 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [企業管理研究所（MBA學位學程）] 學位論文
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