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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/154978
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/154978


    Title: 董事會成員年齡與經理人盈餘預測修正 : 以期後事項修正為例
    Board Member Age and Management Earnings Forecast Revisions: Evidences From After Fiscal Year Revisions
    Authors: 林庭瑄
    Lin, Ting-Shiuan
    Contributors: 潘健民
    Pan, Chien-Min
    林庭瑄
    Lin, Ting-Shiuan
    Keywords: 董事會年齡
    強制性揭露盈餘預測
    盈餘預測修正
    期後事項
    Board age
    Mandatory earnings forecast disclosure
    Earnings forecast revisions
    After fiscal year event
    Date: 2024
    Issue Date: 2025-01-02 11:38:42 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究旨在探討董事會成員年齡與經理人盈餘預測修正之關聯性。過往文獻指出經理人盈餘預測修正可作為企業揭露品質之代理變數,經理人盈餘預測在日本屬強制性揭露事項,本研究以日本證券交易所上市公司資料為研究對象,透過期後事項探討董事會成員年齡與企業揭露品之間是否存在關聯。研究發現,董事會成員之平均年齡與經理人是否於關帳後期後事項期間修正盈餘預測並未存在顯著關聯性。實證結果進一步顯示,在新冠疫情(COVID-19)期間,董事會成員之平均年齡與經理人是否於關帳後期後事項期間修正盈餘預測呈現正向關聯,意旨在疫情期間董事會成員平均年齡會影響經理人盈餘預測修正的時間點,傾向於期後事項進行修正;然而,此情況可能為新冠疫情(COVID-19)造成的不確定性。本研究之實證結果顯示,盈餘預測修正時間點與董事會成員平均年齡之間之關聯性並不顯著。
    This study is to examine the association between age of board members and management earnings forecast revisions. Prior researches suggest that managers' earnings forecast revisions can serve as a proxy for the quality of corporate disclosure. In Japan, management earnings forecasts are mandatorily disclosed. Using data from companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in Japan, this study investigates the association between age of board members and corporate disclosure quality through after fiscal year events. Empirical results reveal that there is no significant correlation between the average age of board members and whether managers revise earnings forecasts during the after fiscal year events. However, the empirical results show that during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a positive correlation between the average age of board members and whether managers revise earnings forecasts during the after fiscal year events. This suggests that during the pandemic, the average age of board members influences the timing of managers' earnings forecast revisions, tending towards making adjustments during after fiscal year events. Nevertheless, this situation may be due to the uncertainties caused by the pandemic. The empirical results indicate that the timing of earnings forecast revisions is not significantly related to the average age of board members.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    111353028
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111353028
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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