政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/153470

政大典藏 > College of Social Science > International Program in Asia-Pacific Studies\n(IMAS/IDAS) > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/153470

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/153470

Title:	夾在兩個巨人之間: 中美科技戰下台灣半導體與中國的貿易 In Between Two Giants: Taiwan's Semiconductor Trade with China Amid the U.S.-China Technology War
Authors:	艾麗蓉 Felos, Eliza
Contributors:	王信實 Shinn-Shyr Wang 艾麗蓉 Eliza Felos
Keywords:	台灣積體電路中國美國出口管制科技戰下 Taiwan Semiconductors China The United States Technology War Export Controls
Date:	2024
Issue Date:	2024-09-04 15:20:50 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	隨著技術對國家經濟和軍事安全的重要性日益增加，對這些關鍵技術的競爭也在加劇。這一現象在美國和中國之間的半導體競爭中尤為明顯。然而，由於行業特性及全球化經濟，這種衝突並不僅限於這兩個國家。在集成電路單元（IC單元）領域，台灣受衝突影響最大，因為它是世界上最大的先進IC單元生產國之一。台灣在技術和知識產權上嚴重依賴美國，同時也將大部分IC單元出口到中國。這項研究旨在確定台灣出口到中國的IC單元受影響的程度和方向。基於差異性回歸分析，結果顯示自美國對中國公司華為實施首項出口控制以來，台灣對中國的IC單元出口有所增加。雖然本文的初始假設未得到支持，但結果提供了對美國出口控制在短期內可能影響台灣的另一種觀點，並指出未來研究需要關注的方向。 As technology becomes increasingly important to country’s economic and military security, the competition for access to these key technologies grows. No where is it more obvious in than between the United States and China over semiconductors. However, due to the nature of the industry and the globalized economy, the conflict is not isolated to these countries alone. In the area of integrated circuit units, or IC units, Taiwan is the most affected by the conflict, as it is one of the largest producers of advanced IC units in the world. Taiwan heavily relies on the US for technology and IP access, and also exports most of its IC unit to China. This research set out to determine to what degree and direction Taiwan’s IC units exported to China was affected. Based on a difference in difference regression analysis, it was determined that in terms of IC units there was an increase in exports to China from Taiwan since the first US export control on the Chinese company Huawei was implemented. While the initial hypothesis of this paper was not supported, the results present an alternative viewpoint into the way the US export controls may be affecting Taiwan in the short term and where research may need to focus on in the future.
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Description:	碩士國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程(IMAS) 111926025
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111926025
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[International Program in Asia-Pacific Studies\n(IMAS/IDAS)] 學位論文

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