政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/153441

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/153441

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政大機構典藏 > 文學院 > 哲學系 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/153441

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題名:	超驗論證之條件關係與形上立基之探討 On the conditional relation of transcendental arguments and metaphysical grounding
作者:	楊佳儒 Yang, Chia-Ju
貢獻者:	鄭會穎 Cheng, Huei-Ying 楊佳儒 Yang, Chia-Ju
關鍵詞:	超驗論證必要條件形上立基心智哲學現象學反事實條件後設形上學 transcendental arguments necessary condition metaphysical grounding philosophy of mind phenomenology counterfactual condition metametaphysics
日期:	2024
上傳時間:	2024-09-04 15:15:36 (UTC+8)
摘要:	超驗論證在哲學史中最著名的使用者無疑是康德，但在當代分析哲學中也有不少使用者，如Putnam(1981)、Davidson(1989)與Lowe(2012)等。本文將著重於探討超驗論證於當代分析哲學中之使用所遇到的問題，而不會處理康德原始版本的超驗論證或涉及哲學史中超驗論證的討論。當代對超驗論證的形式化包含了作為前提之條件句，因此條件句是否為真成為了對超驗論證攻防的焦點。形上立基是近年後設形上學的熱門研究對象，被認為比上世紀形上學討論主流之模態概念更為細緻，但受到了當代超驗論證研究者的忽視而鮮有相關討論。本文指出形上立基關係有助於推進關於超驗論證的討論，使之得以與當前的後設形上學對話，並論證使用形上立基關係的超驗論證較過往模態關係版本的更有可能成功。 The most famous user of transcendental argument in the history of philosophy is undoubtedly Kant, but there are also many users in contemporary analytic philosophy, such as Putnam (1981), Davidson (1989) and Lowe (2012). This article will focus on the problems encountered in the use of transcendental arguments in contemporary analytic philosophy, and will not deal with Kant's original version of the transcendental arguments or involve the discussions of transcendental arguments in the history of philosophy. The contemporary formalization of transcendental arguments includes a conditional statement as premises, so whether the conditional statements are true has become the focus of the discussions of transcendental arguments. Metaphysical grounding has been popular in metametaphysics recent years. It is considered to be more fine-grained than the modal concept that was the mainstream of discussions of metaphysics in the last century. However, it has been ignored by contemporary researchs of transcendental arguments and there is few relevant discussion. This paper points out that metaphysical grounding relations can help advance the discussion of transcendental arguments, allowing them to dialogue with current metametaphysics, and demonstrates that transcendental arguments using metaphysical grounding relations are better and more likely to succeed than the old ones using modal relation.
參考文獻:	Bardon, A. (2023). Transcendental arguments, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, https://iep.utm.edu/, 2023/4/24. Burge, T. (2010). Origins of objectivity. Oxford University Press. Cassam, Q., editor (2007). The Possibility of Knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford, GB. Cheng, T. (2023). Transcendental imagination. [Unpublished manuscript]. Davidson, D. (1989). The conditions of thought. le Cahier (Collège International de Philosophie), 7:165–171. Fine, K. (2012). Guide to ground. Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality, pages 37–80. Gomes, A. (2017). Perception and reﬂection. Philosophical Perspectives, 31:131– 152. Hoffmann, M. H. (2019). Transcendental arguments in scientiﬁc reasoning. Erkenntnis, 84:1387–1407. Illies, C. (2003). The grounds of ethical judgement: new transcendental arguments in moral philosophy. Clarendon Press. Kannisto, T. (2019). Transcendentally idealistic metaphysics and counterfactual transcendental arguments. In Metametaphysics and the Sciences, pages 153–167. Routledge. Lowe, E. J. (2012). What is the source of our knowledge of modal truths? Mind, 121(484):919–950. Putnam, H. (1981). Brains in a Vat, chapter 1, pages 1–21. Cambridge University Press. Raven, M. J. (2015). Ground. Philosophy Compass, 10(5):322–333. Schnieder, B. (2020). Grounding and dependence. Synthese, 197(1):95–124. Skiles, A. (2015). Against grounding necessitarianism. Erkenntnis, 80:717–751. Stern, R. (2007). Transcendental arguments: A plea for modesty. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74:143–161. Stern, R. and Cheng, T. (2023). Transcendental Arguments. In Zalta, E. N. and Nodelman, U., editors, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Fall 2023 edition. Stroud, B. (1968). Transcendental arguments. Journal of Philosophy, 65(9):241–256. Walker, R. C. S. (2006). Kant and transcendental arguments. In Guyer, P., editor, Kant and modern philosophy. Cambridge University Press. Ward, D. (2021). Phenomenology as radical reﬂection. In Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception, pages 234-257. Oxford University Press. Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of philosophy. Blackwell.
描述:	碩士國立政治大學哲學系 110154005
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110154005
資料類型:	thesis
顯示於類別:	[哲學系] 學位論文

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