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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/152720


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    題名: Non-GAAP 盈餘調整與高階經理人薪酬組成之關聯
    The Relationship Between Non-GAAP Earnings Adjustment and Executive Compensation Components
    作者: 張家瑜
    Chang, Chia-Yu
    貢獻者: 張元晨
    Chang, Yuan-Chen
    張家瑜
    Chang, Chia-Yu
    關鍵詞: non-GAAP盈餘調整
    高階經理人獎酬
    盈餘管理
    non-GAAP adjustment
    executive compensation
    earning management
    日期: 2024
    上傳時間: 2024-08-05 13:42:08 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究探討non-GAAP盈餘調整與高階經理人薪酬組成之間的關聯，樣本涵蓋2003年至2020年，著重在公司內部獎酬政策選擇以及外部法規改變的影響。實證結果顯示，代表經理人短期績效導向的非權益獎酬和non-GAAP盈餘調整呈現負向關係，而代表長期績效導向的權益基礎獎酬，特別是股票獎酬，則與non-GAAP盈餘調整呈現正向關係。這個結果強化了不同種類薪酬對應到不同財務報導的特性，也顯示出non-GAAP盈餘調整所扮演資訊提供的角色。

    本文也檢驗了管制性政策如FAS123R，對於non-GAAP盈餘調整使用的效果，實證顯示FAS123R實行後，使用選擇權獎酬的公司沒有因此使用更多的non-GAAP盈餘調整作為費用的補償，這源自大部分的公司選擇權獎酬的使用大幅減少，而以股票獎酬作為替代；此外，穩健性檢驗顯示有較投機行為的公司，其長短期獎酬工具使用和non-GAAP盈餘調整方向的關係與一般公司一致。因此，從外部法規規範調整，以及內部薪酬政策角度皆顯示non-GAAP盈餘調整是同時存在資訊提供以及投機效果的工具。
    This study examines the relationship between non-GAAP earnings adjustments and executive compensation composition from 2003 to 2020, focusing on the impact of internal reward policies and external regulatory changes. The results show that short-term non-equity rewards negatively relate to non-GAAP earnings adjustments, while long-term equity-based rewards, especially stock rewards, have a positive relationship. This suggests different compensation types align with different financial reporting characteristics and underscore non-GAAP earnings adjustments as informative tools.

    Additionally, the study finds that after implementing FAS123R, companies did not increase non-GAAP earnings adjustments despite reduced use of option rewards in favor of stock rewards. Robustness tests indicate consistent relationships in companies with speculative behaviors. Overall, non-GAAP earnings adjustments serve as both information and opportunism tools influenced by external regulatory changes and internal compensation policy changes.
    參考文獻: Aboody, D., Barth, M. E., & Kasznik, R. (2006). Do firms understate stock option-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123? Review of Accounting Studies, 11, 429-461.
    Aboody, D., & Kasznik, R. (2000). CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures. Journal of accounting and economics, 29(1), 73-100.
    Barth, M. E., Landsman, W. R., Lang, M., & Williams, C. (2012). Are IFRS-based and US GAAP-based accounting amounts comparable? Journal of accounting and economics, 54(1), 68-93.
    Bentley, J. W., Christensen, T. E., Gee, K. H., & Whipple, B. C. (2018). Disentangling managers’ and analysts’ non‐GAAP reporting. Journal of accounting research, 56(4), 1039-1081.
    Bhattacharya, N., Black, E. L., Christensen, T. E., & Larson, C. R. (2003). Assessing the relative informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating earnings. Journal of accounting and economics, 36(1-3), 285-319.
    Black, D. E., Christensen, T. E., Ciesielski, J. T., & Whipple, B. C. (2021). Non‐GAAP earnings: a consistency and comparability crisis? Contemporary Accounting Research, 38(3), 1712-1747.
    Black, E. L., Christensen, T. E., Kiosse, P. V., & Steffen, T. D. (2017). Has the regulation of non-GAAP disclosures influenced managers’ use of aggressive earnings exclusions? Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 32(2), 209-240.
    Bradshaw, M. T., & Sloan, R. G. (2002). GAAP versus the street: An empirical assessment of two alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of accounting research, 40(1), 41-66.
    Brosnan, M., Duncan, K., Hasso, T., & Hollindale, J. (2024). Happy 20-year anniversary non-GAAP earnings: a systematic review of the literature. Journal of Accounting Literature, 46(1), 82-104.
    Brown, L. D., & Sivakumar, K. (2003). Comparing the value relevance of two operating income measures. Review of Accounting Studies, 8, 561-572.
    Campbell, J. L., Hansen, J., Simon, C. A., & Smith, J. L. (2015). Audit committee stock options and financial reporting quality after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 34(2), 91-120.
    Curtis, A., Li, V., & Patrick, P. H. (2021). The use of adjusted earnings in performance evaluation. Review of Accounting Studies, 1-33.
    Curtis, A. B., McVay, S. E., & Whipple, B. C. (2014). The disclosure of non-GAAP earnings information in the presence of transitory gains. The Accounting Review, 89(3), 933-958.
    Ferri, F., & Li, N. (2020). Does option-based compensation affect payout policy? Evidence from FAS 123R. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55(1), 291-329.
    Guest, N. M., Kothari, S., & Pozen, R. C. (2022). Why do large positive non-GAAP earnings adjustments predict abnormally high CEO pay? The Accounting Review, 97(6), 297-326.
    Hall, B. J., & Liebman, J. B. (1998). Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3), 653-691.
    Hayes, R. M., Lemmon, M., & Qiu, M. (2012). Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R. Journal of financial economics, 105(1), 174-190.
    Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society, 153-161.
    Holmstrom, B. (1983). Equilibrium long-term labor contracts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 23-54.
    Isidro, H., & Marques, A. (2013). The effects of compensation and board quality on non-GAAP disclosures in Europe. The International Journal of Accounting, 48(3), 289-317.
    Keller, W., & Olney, W. W. (2021). Globalization and executive compensation. Journal of International Economics, 129, 103408.
    Laurion, H. (2020). Implications of Non-GAAP earnings for real activities and accounting choices. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 70(1), 101333.
    Shavell, S. (1979). Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship. The Bell journal of economics, 55-73.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    111357008
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111357008
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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