政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/152395

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/152395

English | 正體中文 | 简体中文 | Post-Print筆數 : 27 | Items with full text/Total items : 113648/144635 (79%)
Visitors : 51682342 Online Users : 602

RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.

Scope

please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results

please goto advance search for comprehansive author search

Adv. Search

Home ‧ Login ‧ Upload ‧ Help ‧ About ‧ Administer

Goto mobile version

政大典藏 > College of Commerce > Department of International Business > Theses > Item 140.119/152395

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/152395

Title:	自製或外包?共同供應商與購買商的議價分析 Make or buy? A model of bargaining among a common supplier and buyers
Authors:	楊仕傑 Yang, Shyh-Jye
Contributors:	溫偉任潘振宇楊仕傑 Yang, Shyh-Jye
Keywords:	自製或外包決定納許議價共同供應商 Make-or-buy decision Nash bargaining Common supplier
Date:	2024
Issue Date:	2024-08-05 11:56:33 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本文分析下游廠商議價能力與生產邊際成本關係對下游廠商外包決策的影響。本文提出一個一家共同上游供應商對兩家下游廠商的兩階段納許議價架構來決定廠商之間的利潤分配。本文發現，當下游廠商生產邊際成本相同時，給定競爭對手選擇「外包」，下游廠商的最佳反應取決於競爭對手之議價能力，同時，存在一個下游廠商議價能力水準，當兩家下游廠商之議價能力皆低於此水準時，膽小鬼賽局發生。而當下游廠商生產邊際成本不同時，給定競爭對手選擇「外包」，下游廠商的最佳反應除了取決於競爭對手之議價能力也會受到下游廠商之間生產邊際成本關係的影響，此時，兩家生產邊際成本不同的下游廠商，也會有不同的最佳反應。因此，在不同的下游廠商議價能力與生產邊際成本關係組合之下，下游廠商外包決策的均衡結果也會有所不同。 This thesis analyzes the impact of downstream firms’ bargaining power and marginal cost relationship on their outsourcing decisions. We propose a two-stage Nash bargaining framework involving a common upstream supplier and two downstream firms to determine the profit distribution among the firms. We show that when the downstream firms have identical marginal costs, given that its rival firm chooses to outsource, the best response of the downstream firm depends on the bargaining power of its rival firm. Additionally, there exists a level of bargaining power for downstream firms such that when the bargaining power of both firms is below that level, a game of chicken occurs. When the downstream firms have different marginal costs, given that its rival firm chooses to outsource, the best response of the downstream firm depends not only on the bargaining power of its rival firm but also on the marginal cost relationship between the downstream firms. In this scenario, two downstream firms with different marginal costs will have different best responses. Therefore, the equilibrium of the downstream firms’ outsourcing decisions will vary depending on different combination of their bargaining power and marginal cost relationship.
Reference:	Arya, A., Mittendorf, B., & Sappington, D. E. (2008). The make-or-buy decision in the presence of a rival: strategic outsourcing to a common supplier. Management Science, 54(10), 1747-1758. Chen, Y. (2011). Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion. Journal of Economics, 102, 137-156. Chen, J., & Guo, Z. (2014). Strategic sourcing in the presence of uncertain supply and retail competition. Production and Operations Management, 23(10), 1748-1760. Feng, Q., & Lu, L. X. (2012). The strategic perils of low cost outsourcing. Management Science, 58(6), 1196-1210. Gilbert, S. M., Xia, Y., & Yu, G. (2006). Strategic outsourcing for competing OEMs that face cost reduction opportunities. IIE transactions, 38(11), 903-915. Liu, Y., & Tyagi, R. K. (2011). The benefits of competitive upward channel decentralization. Management Science, 57(4), 741-751. Wen, W. J., Lee, W. C., & Lo, C. Y. (2023). To make or to buy from a common supplier? Strategic considerations and welfare consequences. International Journal of Economic Theory, 19(1), 39-61.
Description:	碩士國立政治大學國際經營與貿易學系 111351018
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111351018
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[Department of International Business] Theses

Files in This Item:

File	Description	Size	Format
101801.pdf		1762Kb	Adobe PDF	1	View/Open

All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

社群 sharing

著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement

1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.

DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004 MIT & Hewlett-Packard / Enhanced by NTU Library IR team Copyright © - Feedback