政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/152074

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/152074

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政大典藏 > College of Commerce > Department of International Business > Theses > Item 140.119/152074

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/152074

Title:	具互補要素之垂直供應鏈中的專利授權方式 Patent Licensing Strategies in Vertical Supply Chains with Complementary Input
Authors:	黃詩硯 Huang, Shih-Yen
Contributors:	溫偉任潘振宇 Wen, Wei-Jen Pan, Chen-Yu 黃詩硯 Huang, Shih-Yen
Keywords:	垂直授權權利金雙重邊際化互補要素社會福利
Date:	2023
Issue Date:	2024-07-01 12:41:37 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本文以高通公司的「無授權、無晶片」案例為基礎,探討專利擁有者供應生產要素和授權專利來追求利潤極大化的策略是否能同時實現整體社會福利的最大化。文中透過導入互補要素供應商之垂直關係模型,比較五種授權方式,包括直接出售生產要素、收取從價權利金、收取利潤權利金、出售生產要素並收取從價權利金,以及出售生產要素並收取利潤權利金,以評估高通公司的授權模式是否合理。本文的模型分析結果顯示,高通公司的整機授權方式不僅能實現利潤最大化,也有可能帶來最高的社會福利。在上游互補要素供應商和下游市場競爭較不激烈時,採取該商業模式雖可能導致供應鏈中各個廠商的利潤分配不均,但因專利擁有者可通過協調從價權利金的百分比和通訊晶片的價格,使互補要素供應商和下游製造商的利益全數歸於自己,同時限制它們根據自身的利潤最大化策略來選擇產量,並實現無扭曲的供應鏈結構,緩解雙重邊際化問題,其策略對特定的供應鏈情況而言,可能達到社會福利最大化。
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Description:	碩士國立政治大學國際經營與貿易學系 110351010
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110351010
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[Department of International Business] Theses

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