政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/149694

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/149694

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政大機構典藏 > 國際事務學院 > 國際研究英語碩士學位學程 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/149694

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题名:	中國對美假資訊影響力作戰之研究 Chinese Disinformation Influence Operation in the United States
作者:	劉莉婷 Liu, Li-Ting
贡献者:	袁力強 Yuan, Li-Chung 劉莉婷 Liu, Li-Ting
关键词:	假訊息資訊操弄中國影響力作戰社群媒體資訊韌性假訊息攻擊鏈俄羅斯化 Disinformation Information Manipulation Chinese Influence Operations Social Media Information Resilience Disinformation Kill Chain Russification
日期:	2024
上传时间:	2024-02-01 13:06:05 (UTC+8)
摘要:	二十一世紀科技迅速地發展深刻地改變了全球的互動模式，多項新興的數位科技，如生成人工智慧及社交媒體機器人也被應用於數位資訊戰中。新興數位科技的蓬勃發展使社群媒體上的假訊息成為國家和非國家行為者塑造公眾輿論和實現其策略目標的有力工具。由於社群媒體平台的廣泛觸及率有放大假訊息影響力的特性，在COVID-19期間，大眾受資訊疫情（infodemic）影響，對於獨裁政權（如中國）所秉持的網路主權之立場有所擔憂，擔心其是否會利用社群媒體的特性重塑全球資訊環境。本論文將研究中國如何利用社群媒體進行假資訊影響力作戰爭取話語權、提升其全球形象，以及此作戰策略是否有俄羅斯化（Charon&Vilmer，2021）的跡象，並藉此達到「被恐懼而非被喜愛」的目標。本研究採用質性研究方法，分析來自Meta、Google、微軟等科技巨頭以及與其合作的相關研究單位如Graphika的報告，並著重於2020年美國總統選舉和COVID-19期間中國對美假資訊影響力作戰的案例進行研究。研究目的是評估這些假訊息攻擊鏈之案例是否有效提升了中國的全球形象，或是成功在目標國家中播下了內亂、不信任政府以及親中反美情緒等種子。研究結果發現，雖然中國的假資訊影響力作戰因觸及率低而取得的成功有限，但其短時間內的迅速發展、對新興數位科技的掌握以及作戰的持續性及韌性中可見各國對此需要採取積極措施，強化國際合作並增進資訊韌性的迫切性。然而，將散播網路假訊息完全歸咎於特定國家或識別其背後是否存在惡意具有一定的挑戰性，且民主國家亦可能是假資訊影響力作戰的操弄者。因此，本研究建議未來可進一步探討各國如何突破假訊息攻擊鏈及提升其資訊韌性。 The rapid advancement of technology in the 21st century has profoundly altered global interactions, ushering in the cyber domain and introducing transformative tools like generative AI and social media bots into digital information operations. This technological evolution has made disinformation on social media a potent instrument for both state and non-state actors to shape public opinion and achieve strategic objectives. The extensive reach of social media platforms has amplified the impact of disinformation, raising concerns during the COVID-19 infodemic about how authoritarian regimes, notably China, would utilize aggressive social media tactics to reshape global narratives and compromise the integrity of the global information landscape, supported by their stance on cyber sovereignty. This thesis delves into China's utilization of disinformation operations via social media to wield discourse power, enhance its global image, and potentially mirror Russia's strategies in this domain. It seeks to observe whether there is a Russification of Chinese operations to achieve the goal of “being feared rather to be loved” (Charon & Vilmer, 2021). Employing qualitative review methods, the study analyzes information drawn from tech giants such as Meta, Google, and its collaborating research centers and companies such as Graphika. It utilizes the disinformation kill chain and focuses on case studies of Chinese disinformation during the 2020 US Presidential Election and the course of COVID-19. The study aims to assess whether these operations have effectively bolstered China's global image or sown civil unrest, distrust in government, and pro-China, anti-United States sentiments in target nations. The research findings indicate that while the success of Chinese disinformation influence operations have been limited due to low traction and engagement. Its rapid development and sophistication within a short period, utilization of cutting-edge digital technologies, and persistence of these operations highlights the pressing need for heightened vigilance and proactive measures. It underscores the need for international collaboration to fortify information resilience in combating such threats. However, attributing online disinformation to a specific state or discerning malicious intent behind its dissemination presents inherent challenges. Moreover, disinformation kill chain strategies could also be employed by democratic states. Hence, the study suggests that future research could focus on how countries combat disinformation and increase information resilience.
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描述:	碩士國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程(IMPIS) 110862003
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110862003
数据类型:	thesis
显示于类别:	[國際研究英語碩士學位學程] 學位論文

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