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    題名: 結盟數量是否增加安全：檢視同盟數量與衝突涉入之間的關係
    Does Quantity Enhance Security: Examining the Relation between the Number of Alliances Concluded and Conflict Involvement
    作者: 黃姿婷
    Huang, Tzu-Ting
    貢獻者: 陳秉逵
    Chen, Ping-Kuei
    黃姿婷
    Huang, Tzu-Ting
    關鍵詞: 同盟數量
    衝突涉入
    開口向下的拋物線
    Alliance Quantity
    Conflict Involvement
    Downward Opening Parabola
    日期: 2023
    上傳時間: 2024-01-02 15:32:52 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 國際關係論及同盟時，其數量「越多越好」的觀念雖不顯明，過往文獻亦未必秉持相同論點，卻仍反映在國家的實際行動上。換句話說，即使「同盟是否導致衝突」的結論眾說紛紜，各國廣結同盟的態度未曾消褪。於此同時，關於同盟「數量」的研究又少見於同盟理論中，致使該領域的相關分析仍存在闕漏。

    本研究故而探討「同盟數量與衝突涉入之間的關係」，以1960年至2003年的資料，透由量化分析的方式，不僅驗證結盟數量的上升帶來衝突涉入程度的增加，更揭示變數之間的關係實際上構成二次函數的形式，在圖形上呈現一個「開口向下的拋物線」。易言之，該同盟—衝突曲線反映兩個現象：一來，存在一個導致衝突涉入程度最高的特定同盟數量，即拋物線之頂點；二來，衝突涉入程度雖隨著結盟數量上升而增加，然而一旦超越頂點，涉入程度反而隨著其數量上升而減少。應當特別注意的是，由於少有國家擁有導致最大衝突的同盟數量，「結盟越多，衝突越多」方為普遍可察的現象，本研究其後以加拿大與利比亞為主體進行的質化分析亦佐證上述論點。綜上所述，本研究不僅填補同盟理論的闕漏，更提供對於結盟與衝突間關係的進一步洞察，從而作出貢獻。
    A perspective of “the more, the merrier” is demonstrated in international relations when it comes to alliances, despite the fact that studies on the issue comprise contrasting viewpoints. In other words, though whether the formation of institutionalized security coalitions begets conflict remains a topic of debate, state behavior implies that faith in an increment of alliances barely fades, albeit a lack of research on the influence of mere “quantity” demonstrates a huge gap in the field. As a result, through conducting a quantitative analysis that spans from 1960 to 2003, the thesis not only verifies that alliance quantity elicits conflict involvement, dispute participation and escalation included, but also reveals the fact that relations between the two variables in effect exhibit the quadratic function where a downward opening parabola is manifested. To put it in another way, the alliance-conflict curve presents two phenomena: first, a vertex, or a certain number of alliance for each state, exists at which dispute involvement is greatest; second, more coalitions come with more conflict before reaching the vertex while less disputes are followed once the point is achieved. Note that countries seldom arrive at the quantity which leads to a maximum amount of conflict, the relation of “the more alliances, the worst” stands out with ubiquity. A qualitative study focusing on Canada and Libya ensues, supporting the arguments proposed where both states follow the aforementioned pattern as disputes erupt. Overall, the thesis contributes by filling up the void in alliance theory as well as providing insight to explication concerning the relation between alliance and conflict.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    外交學系
    110253010
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110253010
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[外交學系] 學位論文

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