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    题名: 經理人到期選擇權與公司進行股票回購及投資之關聯性
    The Association between CEO Expiring Option, Repurchase and Investment
    作者: 張惟鈞
    Chang, Wei-Chun
    贡献者: 翁嘉祥
    Weng, Chia-Hsiang
    張惟鈞
    Chang, Wei-Chun
    关键词: CEO選擇權薪酬
    股票回購
    研發費用
    資本支出
    短視近利行為
    CEO option compensation
    Repurchase
    R&D expenditure
    Capital expenditure
    Short-termism
    日期: 2023
    上传时间: 2024-01-02 15:21:16 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究使用2007年至2022年美國S&P1500之公司作為樣本，探討經理人在面對與本身利益有關之短期誘因下，可能做出損害公司長期價值之決策。本研究以經理人所持有一年內到期之選擇權作為操縱股價短期誘因的衡量方式，發現當經理人持有未來一年到期之選擇權時，會減少未來一年之資本支出，但不會在未來一年更容易進行股票回購或減少未來一年之研發費用。接著，當經理人持有未來一年到期之選擇權時，未來一年的資產周轉率會降低，即到期選擇權所導致資本支出的減少是不效率的，會使公司的長期價值受到損害。最後，本研究發現在公司未來一年有小幅度獲利增加的情況下，持有未來一年到期選擇權之經理人會更傾向減少未來一年之資本支出，即在公司預測未來會有小幅度獲利減少的情況下，持有到期選擇權之經理人會更傾向減少資本支出，而在經理人能力較差的情況下，持有未來一年到期選擇權之經理人並不會更傾向減少未來一年之資本支出。整體而言，本研究發現到期選擇權所產生操縱股價的短期誘因確實會影響公司之投資決策並損害公司之價值，尤其在公司預測未來會有小幅度獲利減少的情況下，董事會應適當因應之。
    This paper studies the value-destroying actions induced by CEOs’ short-term incentives using the sample of S&P1500 companies from 2007 to 2022. I measure CEOs’ short-term incentives by their stock options scheduled to expire within one year and find that CEOs with expiring options will decrease capital expenditure in the following year, but they will not repurchase more shares or decrease R&D expenditure. Furthermore, asset turnover ratio will decrease in the following year when CEOs own expiring options, suggesting that decrease in capital expenditure is an inefficient decision-making and will potentially destroy the value of company. Finally, I find that CEOs with expiring options are more likely to decrease capital expenditure when companies have a small earning increase in the future, indicating that CEOs with expiring options are more likely to decrease capital expenditure when company is predicted to have a small earning decrease in the future, but not in the case when CEOs have lower ability. Overall, the short-term incentives from expiring options will induce decreases in capital expenditure, which is value-destroying, especially when company is predicted to have a small earning decrease in the future. This study’s finding should have important implications for corporate governance.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    110353003
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353003
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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