政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/146410
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 113656/144643 (79%)
造访人次 : 51721325      在线人数 : 626
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧：
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据
    •  进阶搜寻
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/146410


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/146410


    题名: CEO股權薪酬、股利政策與資本支出
    CEO Equity-Based Compensation, Dividend Policy and Capital Expenditures
    作者: 紀令文
    Chi, Ling-Wen
    贡献者: 翁嘉祥
    Weng, Chia-Hsiang
    紀令文
    Chi, Ling-Wen
    关键词: CEO限制性股票薪酬
    CEO認股權薪酬
    股利支付率
    資本支出
    CEO restricted stock compensation
    CEO stock option compensation
    Dividend Policy
    Capital Expenditures
    日期: 2023
    上传时间: 2023-08-02 13:28:14 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究發現，CEO的股權薪酬確實會影響其風險偏好，進而會影響公司的股利政策和投資決策。具體而言，當授予CEO更多的限制性股票薪酬時，公司傾向於採取更保守的投資策略，從而提高股利支付率，並增加公司下一年度風險較低的資本支出，減少下一年度風險較高的研發支出；而當授予CEO更多的認股權薪酬時，公司則傾向降低股利支付率。研究樣本選自美國2007至2022年S&P 1500的公司。研究結果顯示，當CEO的限制性股票薪酬對於股票價格(stock price)越敏感時，代表CEO愈風險趨避，則授予CEO的限制性股票薪酬之公允價值會與公司當年度的股利支付率有正向關聯；當CEO的認股權薪酬對於股票價格波動率(stock price volatility)越敏感時，代表CEO愈能承擔風險，則授予CEO的認股權薪酬之公允價值會與公司當年度的股利支付率有負向關聯。另外實證結果顯示，持有越多限制性股票薪酬的CEO，可能會考慮到他自身財富的持股組合會有股票價格下跌的風險，所以會傾向將公司資金分配於風險較低的資本支出決策，並減少研發支出的金額。
    This study finds that the risk preferences of CEOs and their personal attitudes toward wealth growth affect the dividend policy and investment decisions of their firms. Specifically, when CEOs are granted more restricted stock compensation, the firms tend to adopt more conservative investment strategies, which increase the dividend payout ratio, increase the low-risk capital expenditures in the next year, and decrease the high-risk R&D expenditures in the next year; while when CEOs are granted more stock options compensation, the firms tend to reduce the dividend payout ratio. The sample consists of US firms from the S&P 1500 index from 2007 to 2022. The results show that when the CEO’s restricted stock compensation is more sensitive to the stock price, it means that the CEO is more risk-averse and has a positive effect on the dividend payout ratio of the firm in that year; when the CEO’s stock options compensation is more sensitive to the stock price volatility, it means that the CEO is more risk-tolerant and has a negative effect on the dividend payout ratio of the firm in that year. This suggests that CEOs who hold more restricted stock compensation may consider the risk of their own wealth portfolio falling in value due to a decline in the stock price, and thus tend to allocate the firm’s funds to lower-risk decisions.
    參考文獻: 趙秉華（2018）。以經理人股權持有準則作為CEOs獎酬合約條件對公司風險的影響。國立台灣大學會計學系未出版碩士論文。
    Aboody, D., & Kasznik, R. 2008. Executive stock-based compensation and firms’ cash payout: The role of shareholders’ tax-related payout preferences. Review of Accounting Studies, 13, 216-251.
    Apostolou, N. G., & Crumbley, D. L. 2005. Accounting for stock options. The CPA Journal, 75(8), 30.
    Armstrong, C. S., & Vashishtha, R. (2012). Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 70-88.
    Bakke, T. E., Mahmudi, H., Fernando, C. S., & Salas, J. M. 2016. The causal effect of option pay on corporate risk management. Journal of Financial Economics, 120(3), 623-643.
    Bange, M. M., & De Bondt, W. F. 1998. R&D budgets and corporate earnings targets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 4(2), 153-184.
    Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. 2004. Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Harvard University Press.
    Bhagat, S., & Welch, I. 1995. Corporate research & development investments international comparisons. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19(2-3), 443-470.
    Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Michaely, R. 2005. Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of financial economics, 77(3), 483-527.
    Broussard, J. P., Buchenroth, S. A., & Pilotte, E. A. 2004. CEO incentives, cash flow, and investment. Financial Management, 51-70.
    Brown, L. D., & Lee, Y. J. 2011. Changes in option‐based compensation around the issuance of SFAS 123R. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 38(9‐10), 1053-1095.
    Burns, N., McTier, B. C., & Minnick, K. 2015. Equity-incentive compensation and payout policy in Europe. Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 85-97.
    Caliskan, D., & Doukas, J. A. 2015. CEO risk preferences and dividend policy decisions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 35, 18-42.
    Cao, Ying, Zhaoyang Gu, & Yang, George Yong, 2011. Adoption of executive ownership guidelines: A new look. SSRN working paper
    Carline, N. F., Pryshchepa, O., & Wang, B. 2022. CEO Compensation incentives and playing it safe: evidence from FAS 123R. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1-82.
    Carter, M. E., Lynch, L. J., & Tuna, I. R. 2007. The role of accounting in the design of CEO equity compensation. The Accounting Review, 82(2), 327-357.
    Carter, M. E., Lynch, L. J., & Tuna, I. R. 2007. The role of accounting in the design of CEO equity compensation. The Accounting Review, 82(2), 327-357.
    Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. 2006. Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of financial Economics, 79(2), 431-468.
    Core, J., & Guay, W. 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. Journal of accounting and economics, 28(2), 151-184.
    Core, J., & Guay, W. 2002. Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting research, 40(3), 613-630.
    DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Stulz, R. M. 2006. Dividend policy and the earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory. Journal of Financial economics, 81(2), 227-254.
    Denis, D. J., Hanouna, P., & Sarin, A. 2006. Is there a dark side to incentive compensation?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(3), 467-488.
    Edmans, A., Fang, V. W., & Lewellen, K. A. 2017. Equity vesting and investment. The Review of Financial Studies, 30(7), 2229-2271.
    Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. 2001. Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay?. Journal of Financial economics, 60(1), 3-43.
    Fenn, G. W., & Liang, N. 2001. Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives. Journal of financial economics, 60(1), 45-72.
    Ferri, F., & Li, N. 2020. Does option-based compensation affect payout policy? Evidence from FAS 123R. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55(1), 291-329.
    Graham, B., Dodd, D. L. F., Cottle, S., & Tatham, C. 1962. Security analysis: Principles and technique (Vol. 5). New York: McGraw-Hill.
    Grullon, G., Michaely, R., & Swaminathan, B. 2002. Are dividend changes a sign of firm maturity?. The journal of Business, 75(3), 387-424.
    Hall, B. J., & Liebman, J. B. 1998. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3), 653-691.
    Hall, B. J., & Murphy, K. J. 2002. Stock options for undiversified executives. Journal of accounting and economics, 33(1), 3-42.
    Hall, B. J., & Murphy, K. J. 2003. The trouble with stock options. Journal of economic perspectives, 17(3), 49-70.
    Hambrick, D. C., & Fukutomi, G. D. 1991. The seasons of a CEO`s tenure. Academy of management review, 16(4), 719-742.
    Haugen, R. A., & Senbet, L. W. 1981. Resolving the agency problems of external capital through options. The Journal of Finance, 36(3), 629-647.
    Haugen, R. A., & Senbet, L. W. 1981. Resolving the agency problems of external capital through options. The Journal of Finance, 36(3), 629-647.
    Hayes, R. M., Lemmon, M., & Qiu, M. 2012. Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R. Journal of financial economics, 105(1), 174-190.
    Hoberg, G., & Prabhala, N. R. 2009. Dividend policy, risk, and catering. Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 79-116.
    Hou, W., Lovett, S., & Rasheed, A. 2020. Stock option pay versus restricted stock: A comparative analysis of their impact on managerial risk-taking and performance extremeness. Strategic Organization, 18(2), 301-329.
    Irving, J. H., Landsman, W. R., & Lindsey, B. P. 2011. The valuation differences between stock option and restricted stock grants for US firms. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 38(3‐4), 395-412.
    Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American economic review, 76(2), 323-329.
    Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.
    Jolls, C. (1998). Stock repurchases and incentive compensation.
    Kahle, K. M. 2002. When a buyback isn’ta buyback: Open market repurchases and employee options. Journal of Financial Economics, 63(2), 235-261.
    Kempf, A., Ruenzi, S., & Thiele, T. 2009. Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 92(1), 92-108.
    Kenneth, B., 2011. Linear Regression Models with Logarithmic Transformations. Methodology Institute
    Kothari, S. P. 2001. Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of accounting and economics, 31(1-3), 105-231.
    Lambert, R. A., Lanen, W. N., & Larcker, D. F. 1989. Executive stock option plans and corporate dividend policy. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 24(4), 409-425.
    Lambert, R. A., Larcker, D. F., & Verrecchia, R. E. 1991. Portfolio considerations in valuing executive compensation. Journal of Accounting Research, 29(1), 129-149.
    Lim, E. N. 2015. The role of reference point in CEO restricted stock and its impact on R&D intensity in high‐technology firms. Strategic Management Journal, 36(6), 872-889.
    Lord, R. A., & Saito, Y. 2010. Trends in CEO compensation and equity holdings for S&P 1500 firms: 1994-2007. Journal of Applied Finance (Formerly Financial Practice and Education), 20(2).
    Lord, R. A., Saito, Y., Nicholson, J. R., & Dugan, M. T. 2020. CEO compensation, portfolio holdings and strategic investments. Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 12(1), 137-160.
    Lyke, B., Shorter, G. W., Domestic Social Policy Division, & Government and Finance Division. 2005. Stock options: The accounting issue and its consequences. Congressional Information Service, Library of Congress.
    Mao, C. X., & Zhang, C. 2018. Managerial risk-taking incentive and firm innovation: Evidence from FAS 123R. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53(2), 867-898.
    Miller, M. H., & Modigliani, F. 1961. Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares. the Journal of Business, 34(4), 411-433.
    Minnick, K., & Rosenthal, L. 2014. Stealth compensation: Do CEOs increase their pay by influencing dividend policy?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 25, 435-454.
    Murphy, K. J. 1999. Executive compensation. Handbook of labor economics, 3, 2485-2563.
    Murphy, K. J. 2013. Executive compensation: Where we are, and how we got there. In Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Vol. 2, pp. 211-356). Elsevier.
    Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. 2000. Taking stock: Equity‐based compensation and the evolution of managerial ownership. The Journal of Finance, 55(3), 1367-1384.
    Pereira, I. N., & Esperança, J. P. 2015. Top executive compensation in less developed capital markets. Corporate Governance.
    Richardson, S. 2006. Over-investment of free cash flow. Review of accounting studies, 11, 159-189.
    Ross, S. A. 2004. Compensation, incentives, and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness. The Journal of Finance, 59(1), 207-225.
    Ryan Jr, H. E., & Wiggins III, R. A. 2001. The influence of firm-and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(2), 101-123.
    SEC. 2006. Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Matters Press Release.
    Serfling, M. A. 2014. CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies. Journal of corporate finance, 25, 251-273.
    Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2), 737-783.
    Shue, K., & Townsend, R. R. 2017. How do quasi‐random option grants affect CEO risk‐taking?. The Journal of Finance, 72(6), 2551-2588.
    Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. 1985. The determinants of firms` hedging policies. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 20(4), 391-405.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    110353102
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353102
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 描述 大小格式浏览次数
    310201.pdf2697KbAdobe PDF20检视/开启


    在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回馈