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    題名: Say-on-Pay制度和CEO與一般員工薪酬比之關聯性研究
    The Association between Say-on-Pay and Pay Ratio
    作者: 蕭惠云
    Shiau, Huei-Yun
    貢獻者: 梁嘉紋
    Liang, Jia-Wen
    蕭惠云
    Shiau, Huei-Yun
    關鍵詞: 陶德法蘭克法案
    Say-on-Pay
    薪酬比
    CEO薪酬
    員工薪酬
    Dodd-Frank Act
    Say-on-Pay
    Pay ratio
    CEO compensation
    Employee compensation
    日期: 2022
    上傳時間: 2022-09-02 14:43:20 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 近年來，許多國家陸續規範公司執行諮詢性質股東投票(Say-on-Pay)，並揭露CEO與一般員工之薪酬比(pay ratio)。美國於2015年修正陶德法蘭克法案 (Dodd-Frank Act)，透過美國證券交易委員會(Securities and Exchange Commission)要求符合條件之公司揭露薪酬比，並預期將能為股東Say-on-Pay投票提供攸關且實用之資訊。本研究探討股東Say-on-Pay投票結果對公司未來薪酬比相關資 訊之影響，包含：薪酬比、CEO 薪酬、員工中位數薪酬和薪酬比揭露之說明。本研究以2018至2020年的美國標準普爾500指數公司為樣本，實證研究發現股東反對率高的公司較傾向於次年大幅調降薪酬比、CEO薪酬及薪酬比揭露內容之長度。而針對員工中位數薪酬，僅於股東反對率達 30%時，才有微幅調升傾向。整體而言，董事會會根據股東Say-on-Pay投票結果，對未來薪酬及揭露政策作出調整，顯示在 Say-on-Pay 制度下，股東確以監督角色參與薪酬設計，並對公司薪酬相關決策造成影響。
    In recent years, many countries mandated advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation and the disclosure of CEO-employee pay ratio. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expects that pay ratio is relevant and useful to shareholders’ Say-on-Pay (SOP) voting. This study examines the effects of SOP on subsequent pay ratio, its components, i.e. CEO compensation and median employee compensation, and the disclosure of pay ratio information. Based on a sample of S&P500 firms from 2018 to 2020, I find that firms with high SOP dissent tend to adjust their pay ratio and CEO compensation downwards and provide lengthier discussion on pay ratio information. However, I find little evidence on the relation between SOP votes and future changes in median employee compensation, except for firms with a 30% voting dissent. In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that boards adjust compensation and disclosure policy in response to voting outcomes, which demonstrates that shareholders can influence corporate pay practice via their SOP votes.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    109353005
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109353005
    資料類型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202201408
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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