政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/141526

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/141526

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题名:	論歐盟對扭曲內部市場外國補貼問題之法制因應 A Study on the EU`s Regulatory Response to the Problems of Foreign Subsidies Distorting the Internal Market
作者:	魏世和 Wei, Shih-Ho
贡献者:	楊培侃 Yang, Pei-Kan 魏世和 Wei, Shih-Ho
关键词:	補貼中國國營企業市場扭曲效果 SCM協定美日歐三方聲明 CPTPP協定非商業考量援助條款歐盟外國補貼規則 Subsidy Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Market Distortion SCM Agreement US-Japan-EU Joint Statement CPTPP Non-Commercial Assistance EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation
日期:	2022
上传时间:	2022-09-02 14:41:05 (UTC+8)
摘要:	近年來中國為發展其產業政策，例如中國製造2025，不僅透過多方管道補貼中國國營企業，亦藉由其國營企業以低於市場價格方式提供產品或服務給其他中國海內、外之下游企業。隨著中企於全球規模的日益茁壯，此些中國非市場經濟性質之補貼措施也更加引起各國貿易扭曲及市場扭曲的擔憂。現今雖有《補貼暨平衡稅措施協定》（Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures，SCM協定）作為控管政府補貼的角色，然似已無法完全解決中國補貼所生之扭曲問題。於國際場域，《跨太平洋夥伴全面進步協定》（Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP）透過制訂國營企業補貼規範，以強化政府補貼之控管；另外，歐盟也聯合美國、日本提出改革補貼規則之三方聯合聲明，惟上述兩國際做法皆未能解決上述中國國營企業補貼所帶來的扭曲問題；實際上歐盟也曾意圖跟中國簽署《中歐全面投資貿易協定（EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, CAI）》，然而該方法也未能解決中國補貼問題；在歐盟內部之相關機制與制度下也因存有管制漏洞，導致該等機制與制度無法解決所有的中國補貼問題。歐盟即於上述國內、外之背景下提出了「扭曲內部市場運作之外國補貼規則草案」（Proposal for a Regulation on Foreign Subsidies Distorting the Internal Market，以下簡稱FSR）欲透過擴張現有救濟工具方式因應中國補貼扭曲問題。究竟當今國際相關規範及歐盟內部相關既有機制為何無法完全解決中國國營企業補貼問題，FSR又係如何擴張補貼規範，從而補足現行補貼相關制度與規範的缺漏，此外，該做法同時會帶來何等影響，本文將一一探討之。經本文分析後發現，面對中國國營企業補貼所生之扭曲效果，不論是在SCM協定、CPTPP協定、美日歐三方聲明倡議等國際場域下之有關補貼的救濟方法、或透過簽署CAI之雙邊協定方式、甚或歐盟內部之既有相關機制與制度確實皆未能完全解決中國國營企業補貼引發之扭曲效果，故歐盟提出FSR有其合理性，且此項新救濟工具有望協助歐盟解決中國國營企業補貼問題，惟目前FSR對參與歐盟內部市場之外國企業會帶來過於沈重之負擔，將嚴重影響內部市場經濟發展，故歐盟應再思考如何降低FSR所帶來之負面影響，進而取得「有效管制外國補貼」及「對內部市場與外國企業之最小衝擊」兩者之平衡。 In recent years, in order to develop its industrial policies, such as Made in China 2025, China not only subsidizes Chinese state-owned enterprises through various channels, but also through its state-owned enterprises to provide products or services at lower than market prices to other downstream Chinses enterprises in China and abroad. With the growing scale of Chinese enterprises globally, the non-market economic type of Chinese subsidy measures raised concerns about trade distortions or market distortions. Although the SCM Agreement is in place to control government subsidies, it seems not be able to completely solve the distortion caused by Chinese subsidies. In this regard, in the international arena, the EU has joined the United States and Japan to propose a joint statement on reforming industrial subsidies rules; In addition, CPTPP also has formulated new norms for state-owned enterprise subsidies to strengthen the control of government subsidies, but these international practices still have failed to solve the above-mentioned problems arising from the Chinese state-owned enterprises subsidies. The EU also intended to sign the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China, but this approach also failed to address the issue of subsidies for Chinese state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, the relevant EU’s mechanisms and systems are unable to effectively solve all the problems of Chinese subsidies due to possible regulatory loopholes. Therefore, the EU proposed the "Regulation on Foreign Subsidies Distorting the Internal Market" (FSR) under the above-mentioned background to expand its existing remedy measures. Why the current international norms and the relevant existing EU internal mechanisms and systems cannot solve the problem of Chinese state-owned enterprise subsidies? And how does the FSR expand the subsidy norms so as to make up for the gaps in the existing subsidy-related systems and norms? In addition, what impact of the FSR will have at the same time will be discussed in this article. After analysis, it was found that in the face of the distortion effects of Chinese state-owned enterprise subsidies, whether are the remedies in international fields such as the SCM Agreement, US-Japan-EU Joint Statement and CPTPP Agreement, or through the signing of bilateral agreements on CAI, or even the EU`s internal existing relevant mechanisms and systems are unable to completely solve the distortion effects caused by Chinese state-owned enterprise subsidies. Therefore, it is reasonable for the EU to propose FSR, and this new trade tool is expected to help the EU solve the subsidy problem of Chinese state-owned enterprises. However, the current FSR will bring an excessive burden on foreign companies participating in the EU internal market which will seriously affect the development of the internal market economy. Therefore, EU should reconsider how to reduce the negative impact of FSR, so as to achieve a balance between "effective control of foreign government subsidies" and "minimum impact on the internal market and foreign enterprises".
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描述:	碩士國立政治大學國際經營與貿易學系 108351047
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108351047
数据类型:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/NCCU202201432
显示于类别:	[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文

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