政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/140713

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/140713

English | 正體中文 | 简体中文 | Post-Print筆數 : 27 | 全文笔数/总笔数 : 113648/144635 (79%)
造访人次 : 51673164 在线人数 : 488

RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.

搜寻范围

查询小技巧：

您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果

若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据

进阶搜寻

主页 ‧ 登入 ‧ 上传 ‧ 说明 ‧ 关于政大典藏 ‧ 管理

到手机版

政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 科技管理與智慧財產研究所 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/140713

请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/140713

题名:	平台之競爭法議題－以應用程式商店為中心 Competition Law Issues of Platforms: Focusing on App Store
作者:	陳子瑄 Chen, Tzu-Hsuan
贡献者:	宋皇志 Sung, Huang-Chih 陳子瑄 Chen, Tzu-Hsuan
关键词:	數位平台應用程式商店競爭法網路效應市場界定濫用獨占地位搭售應用程式內購買限制導引條款 Digital platform App store Competition Law Network effect Definition of relevant market Abuse of monopolistic Position Tying In-app purchase Anti-steering provisions Epic Games v. Apple
日期:	2022
上传时间:	2022-07-01 16:31:52 (UTC+8)
摘要:	隨著行動通訊及網際網路快速發展，應用程式的出現改變了人們的工作方式及其他社會和經濟現象。然而於現階段應用程式商店發展中，Apple及Google之應用程式商店規模逐漸壯大，以致有濫用主導地位之疑慮存在，衍伸出應用程式商店是否透過控制主導地位以獲得不合理之利益，並使應用程式市場向有利於其的方向傾斜，亦透過訂定審查指南等規則強迫應用程式開發商須繳交一定之交易費用，以及是否存有搭售等其他競爭法爭議。本論文從以上問題出發，聚焦於討論應用程式商店所衍生之不同競爭法問題，並回顧近年於美國及歐盟針對應用程式商店之值得參考之判決，藉由判決中法院之意見得出本文所彙整之競爭法問題於法院實務中仍難以構成，惟其競爭法問題對於開發商、消費者而言仍皆造成傷害。因此本文提出數種應用程式商店平台、法院及監管機關未來可採取的做法，包括利用分離原則以使平台失去現有的優勢以制衡其發展；法院可透過個別化禁制令有效解決單一公司之壟斷行為而不致同時影響其他公司；監管機關可利用互操作性縮小大型企業之獨占地位以及與競爭對手之差距；亦可使用網路中立性將平台列為公共承運人，使其須負擔網路中立性之責任，由監管機關直接監督；也試圖重新規劃應用程式商店平台之商業模式。此外，本文嘗試融入行為經濟學角度，認為行為經濟學可透過其經驗論給予新的執法對策。亦分析各國目前針對應用程式商店所草擬新法案或是修正案，以了解目前各國對於應用程式商店競爭法議題上的態度。最終對於未來企業如何因應及監管機關如何執法上提出建議。 With the development of telecommunication and the internet, the emergence of apps changes the way of working and other social and economic phenomena. However, at the current stage of the development of the app store, the scale of the app stores of Apple and Google now are so huge that raises concern about abusing their dominant position. If they obtain unreasonable profit by controlling the dominant position and tilting the app market in their favor, and setting guidelines to force app developers to pay transaction fees, and whether there are other competition law issues such as tying and others. To answer the questions above, this thesis examines the different competitive law issues derived from app store and focuses on the important app store cases in the US, and the EU. From these cases, this study summarizes and analyses that issues of competition law are still difficult to fulfill in cases, but competition law issues still cause harm to both developers and consumers. Therefore, this thesis makes several suggestions that app store platforms, courts, and regulators can implement in the future: (1) using the principle of separation to make the platform lose its existing advantages to balance the development of app store; (2) the court can solve the monopoly problem of a single company by tailored injunctions; (3) regulator can use interoperability to narrow the gap of large companies and other competitors, and can also use net neutrality to make the platform become a common carrier, making it take the responsibility of net neutrality; (4) redesign the business model of the app store platform. In addition, this study attempts to integrate the perspective of behavioral economics, trying to provide the new law enforcement policies by behavioral economics. It also analyses the new bills or amendments currently to understand the current attitudes of countries on the issue of competition law for app store. To conclude the research of this thesis, this study provides the direction for companies and regulators.
參考文獻:	一、中文專書汪渡村，公平交易法，五南，2010年5月。丁茂中，論SSNIP測試法與相關市場的界定，中國方正，2008年9月。公平交易委員會，認識公平交易法，行政院公平交易委員會，2015年7月。楊偉文、胡浩叡，新公平交易法，華泰文化，2004年。胡祖舜，競爭法之經濟分析，元照，2019年9月。二、中文期刊林廷機，拒絕交易行為於獨占地位之濫用問題，公平交易通訊，第62期，2016年11月。劉孔中，以關鍵設施理論限制專利强制授權之範圍，公平交易季刊，15卷第1期，頁25-58，2007年1月。公平交易委員會，修正「行政院公平交易委員會對於電信事業之規範說明」第1點、第8點規定，並修正名稱為「公平交易委員會對於電信事業之規範說明」，行政院公報，第018卷第045期，2012年3月9日。邱敬淵、李素華，競爭法下市場封鎖經濟效果之研究--搭售，公平交易季刊，季刊第26卷第3期，頁121-171，2018年7月。江雅綺，網路反壟斷浪潮臺灣數位政策如何定位，交流雜誌，178期，頁13-16，2021年8月。三、研究計畫林常青、胡偉民、李芸慈、陳以洵、邱芝螢、施昕陽，市場界定實證分析法之應用，公平交易委員會107年委託研究報告，2018年。江雅綺、郭迺鋒、程法彰、黃子恬、楊宗翰，行為反托拉斯與消費者權益之探討，公平交易委員會109年委託研究報告，2020年。四、英文文獻（一）專書 Carl Shapiro, et al., Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Harvard Business Press. 1998). Hagiu Andrei, Platforms, Pricing, Commitment and Variety in Two-Sided Markets (Princeton University. 2004). Josef Drexl, Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing. 2010). Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (Profile books. 2019). （二）期刊論文 Friso Bostoen & Daniel Mândrescu, Assessing abuse of dominance in the platform economy: a case study of app stores, 16 European Competition Journal 431-491 (2020). Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two‐sided markets: a progress report, 37 The RAND Journal of Economics 645-667 (2006). David S Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses, NBER Working Paper (2013). David S Evans, Some empirical aspects of multi-sided platform industries, 2 Review of Network Economics (2003). Marc Rysman, The economics of two-sided markets, 23 Journal of Economic Perspectives 125-143 (2009). David S Evans, The antitrust economics of multi-sided platform markets, 20 Yale Journal on Regulation 325-381 (2003). Serkan Ada, Two-Sided Markets: Apples Digital Application Platform, 1 Journal of Social Sciences (2013). Thomas Eisenmann, et al., Strategies for two-sided markets, 84 Harvard Business Review 92-102 (2006). David Tilson, et al., Change and control paradoxes in mobile infrastructure innovation: the Android and iOS mobile operating systems cases 1324-1333 (IEEE 2012). Mathieu Renard, Practical iOS apps hacking 14-26 (2012). Gregory J Werden, Demand elasticites in antitrust analysis, 66 Antitrust Law Journal 363-414 (1997). European Commission, Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, 100 Official Journal of the European Community 5-13 (1997). Monopolies Commission, Competition policy: the challenge of digital markets, Special Report (2015). Catherine Tucker, Digital data, platforms and the usual [antitrust] suspects: Network effects, switching costs, essential facility, 54 Review of Industrial Organization 683-694 (2019). Konstantinos Stylianou, Apple v Pepper: the unintended fallout in Europe, 7 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 457-465 (2019). Suzin A Win, Privity vs. Proximity: The Supreme Court`s Erroneous Reading of the Illinois Brick Doctrine in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 51 Golden Gate University Law Review (2021). Herbert Hovenkamp, APPLE V. PEPPER, 120 Columbia Law Review 14-28(2020). Geoffrey Parker, et al., Digital platforms and antitrust, Available at SSRN 3608397 (2020). Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and platform monopoly, 130 Yale Law Journal 1952-2273 (2020). Damien Geradin & Dimitrios Katsifis, The antitrust case against the Apple App Store, 17 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 503-585 (2021). Urs Gasser, Interoperability in the Digital Ecosystem, Berkman Center Research Publication Series (2015). Tim Wu, Network neutrality, broadband discrimination, 2 Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law 141-178(2003). Harry First & Eleanor M Fox, Big Tech and Antitrust–Calling Big Tech to Account Under US Law, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper 20-53 (2020). Jens-Uwe Franck & Martin Peitz, Digital platforms and the new 19a tool in the German Competition Act, 12 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 513-528 (2021). Einer Elhauge, Tying, bundled discounts, and the death of the single monopoly profit theory, 123 Harvard Law Review 397-481(2009). Shili Shao, Antitrust in the Consumer Platform Economy: How Apple Has Abused its Mobile Platform Dominance, 36 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 353-412 (2020). Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, Tying, investment, and the dynamic leverage theory, The RAND Journal of Economics 52-71(2001). C Scott Hemphill, Less restrictive alternatives in antitrust law, 116 Columbia Law Review 927-991(2016). Adam Candeub, Behavioral economics, internet search, and antitrust, 9 ISJLP 407-434 (2013). 五、網路資料 David Curry, Apple Statistics (2022), https://www.businessofapps.com/data/apple-statistics/ Stephanie Chan, Global Consumer Spending in Mobile Apps Reached $133 Billion in 2021, Up Nearly 20% from 2020 (2021), https://sensortower.com/blog/app-revenue-and-downloads-2021 Data.ai, Weekly Time Spent in Apps Grows 20% Year Over Year as People Hunker Down at Home (2020), https://www.data.ai/en/insights/market-data/weekly-time-spent-in-apps-grows-20-year-over-year-as-people-hunker-down-at-home/ OECD, Two-Sided markets (2009), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf James MacTavish , Walled Gardens are back in fashion for all the right reasons (2014), https://www.appdirect.com/blog/walled-gardens-back-fashion-right-reasons Autoriteit Consument & Markt, Report: Market study into mobile app stores (2019), https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/market-study-into-mobile-app-stores.pdf Android Community, How much do you know about the Android Open Source Project? (2017), http://androiddeveloper.galileo.edu/2017/04/28/how-much-do-you-know-about-the-android-open-source-project/ Apple Developer, Enrollment, https://developer.apple.com/support/enrollment/ Apple Developer, App Store Review Guidelines, https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/ Google Play，Google Play 開發人員發佈協議， https://play.google.com/about/developer-distribution-agreement.html Apple，擅自修改 iOS 可能會導致安全漏洞、不穩定、縮短電池續航力和其他問題，https://support.apple.com/zh-tw/HT201954 United States Department of Commerce, Exemptions to Permit Circumvention of Access Controls on Copyright Works, Doket No. 2017-10 (2018), https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/2018_NTIA_DMCA_Letter.pdf United Stated Copyright Ofiice, Long Comment Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under 17 U.S.C §1201 (2017), https://www.eff.org/document/eff-comment-2021-dmca-rulemaking-jailbreaking European Commision, Commission decision in Case AT.40099—Google Android (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40099/40099_9993_3.pdf Google Play, Developer Distribution Agreement Definitions, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1580732/000119312514056089/d564433dex1011.htm Play Console Help, Service fees, https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/112622?hl=en Play Console Help, Changes to Google Play`s service fee in 2021, available at https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/10632485 U.S. House Committee On The Judiciary , Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets (2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf?utm_campaign=4493-519 Epic Games, https://www.epicgames.com/store/zh-Hant/publish 公平交易委員會，公平交易委員會對於相關市場界定之處理原則，https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=1345&docid=13926 European Commission, Competition: Commission publishes findings of evaluation of Market Definition Notice (2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_3585 European Commission, Case AT.40099: Google Android (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40099/40099_9993_3.pdf Autoriteit Cconsumer Market, Market study into mobile app stores (2019), https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/market-study-into-mobile-app-stores.pdf Canalys, Global smartphone market returns to pre-COVID-19 level in 2021 despite supply issues (2022), https://canalys.com/newsroom/global-smartphone-market-2021 Stephanie Chan, Global Consumer Spending in Mobile Apps Reached $133 Billion in 2021, Up Nearly 20% from 2020 (2021), https://sensortower.com/blog/app-revenue-and-downloads-2021 GlobeNewswire, Qustodio & Kidslox File a Complaint Against Apple with the European Commission over Abuse of Dominant Position (2019), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/04/30/1812192/0/en/Qustodio-Kidslox-File-a-Complaint-Against-Apple-with-the-European-Commission-over-Abuse-of-Dominant-Position.html Nick Statt, Apple rejects Valve’s Steam Link game streaming app over ‘business conflicts’ (2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/24/17392470/apple-rejects-valve-steam-link-app-store-ios-game-steaming BNN Bloomberg, Apple’s App Store Rules Limit Rival Gaming Services While Arcade Runs Free (2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/apple-s-app-store-rules-limit-rival-gaming-services-while-arcade-runs-free-1.1411981 Jonathan Borck, Juliette Caminade, Markus von Wartburg, Apple’s App Store and Other Digital Marketplaces-A Comparison of Commission Rates (2020), https://www.analysisgroup.com/globalassets/insights/publishing/apples_app_store_and_other_digital_marketplaces_a_comparison_of_commission_rates.pdf Damien Geradin, Apple App Store’s Commission Rates study misses the mark (2020), https://theplatformlaw.blog/2020/07/24/apple-app-stores-commission-rates-study-misses-the-mark/ Kyle Andeer, Re: The Committee`s January 17, 2020 Field Hearing on Online Platforms and Market Power 2 (2020), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20200117/110386/HHRG-116-JU05-20200117-SD004.pdf PayPal, PayPal Merchant Fees, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/merchant-fees 公平交易委員會，搭售行為有無違反公平交易法，https://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=221&docid=397 CompTIA, White Paper: Competition, Competitors, and Comsumer Walfare: Observation on DG Competition’s Discussion Paper on Article 82 (2006), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/092.pdf Apple, Apple Launches Subscriptions on the App Store (2011), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2011/02/15Apple-Launches-Subscriptions-on-the-App-Store/ Zack Whittaker, Hackers release a new jailbreak that unlocks every iPhone (2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/05/23/hackers-iphone-new-jailbreak/ Bloomberg, Tinder Bypasses Google Play Joining Revolt Against App Store Fee (2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-19/tinder-bypasses-google-play-joining-revolt-against-app-store-fee Spotify, A Timeline: How we got here, https://timetoplayfair.com/timeline/ Ryan Stotland, Gross Margin Blues (2016), http://www.thembj.org/2016/06/gross-margin-blues/ Whitney Shoemaker, Apple Music overtakes Spotify in number of paid U.S. subscribers (2019), https://www.altpress.com/news/apple-music-passes-spotify-paid-monthly-us-subscribers/ Natasha Lomas, Aptoide, a Play Store rival, cries antitrust foul over Google hiding its app (2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/04/aptoide-a-play-store-rival-cries-antitrust-foul-over-google-hiding-its-app/ Amy Y. Gu, [Case Brief] Atrium Health Settlement Encourages Enforcement of Anti-tiering/Anti-steering Clauses in Healthcare Contracts (2020), https://sourceonhealthcare.org/case-brief-atrium-health-settlement-encourages-enforcement-of-anti-tiering-anti-steering-clauses-in-healthcare-contracts/ Joyce Jung Min Yeo, Ohio v. American Express: Should Tech Giants Thank Amex? (2019), https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/announcement/view/163 Official Journal of the Eiropean Union, Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions (Text with EEA relevance) (2015), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R0751&from=EN Stratechery, Antitrust, the App Store, and Apple (2018), https://stratechery.com/2018/antitrust-the-app-store-and-apple/ Kathy L. Osborn , Susanne A. Johnson , Anna E. Sallstrom, Future of Antitrust Class Actions Foreshadowed in Apple Inc. v. Pepper (2019), https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2019/5/future-of-antitrust-class-actions-foreshadowed-in-apple-inc-v-pepper Rima Alaily, 10 app store principles to promote choice, fairness and innovation (2020), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/08/app-store-fairness-caf-interoperability-principles/ Shannon Liao, The man behind Fortnite is making the riskiest bet of his career. The payoff could be huge (2021), https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/10/tech/tim-sweeney-epic-games-risk-takers/index.html Nick Statt, Apple just kicked Fortnite off the App Store (2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/13/21366438/apple-fortnite-ios-app-store-violations-epic-payments Shannon Liao, Did Fortnite just kill the App Store as we know it? (2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/08/15/tech/fortnite-apple-google-lawsuit/index.html Mike Peterson, Apple fires back in Epic Games `Fortnite` saga, seeks damages for breach of contract (2020), https://appleinsider.com/articles/20/09/08/apple-fires-back-in-epic-games-fortnite-saga-seeks-damages-for-breach-of-contract James Batchelor, UK antitrust tribunal blocks Epic`s case against Apple (2021), https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2021-02-23-uk-antitrust-tribunal-blocks-epics-case-against-apple Manny Li，行動應用商店的關鍵審判：Epic Games v. Apple 判決書精華 (2021)，https://manny-li.com/epic-games-v-apple/#htoc-epic-games Eropean Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google`s search engine (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4581 Spotify, Time to Play Fair, https://www.timetoplayfair.com/ European Commission, Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Apple on App Store rules for music streaming providers (2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2061 Authority for Consumers & Markets, ACM launches investigation into abuse of dominance by Apple in its App Store (2019), https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-launches-investigation-abuse-dominance-apple-its-app-store Authority for Consumers & Markets, ACM obliges Apple to adjust unreasonable conditions for its App Store (2019), https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-obliges-apple-adjust-unreasonable-conditions-its-app-store Natasha Lomas, Apple sends new offer to Dutch antitrust authority over dating apps payments, racks up 9th fine (2022), https://techcrunch.com/2022/03/21/apple-acm-nine-fines/ GOV.UK, CMA investigates Apple over suspected anti-competitive behavior (2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-investigates-apple-over-suspected-anti-competitive-behaviour Competition and Markets Authority, Mobile ecosystems: Market study interim report (2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1048746/MobileEcosystems_InterimReport.pdf European Commission, Competition for the Digital Era report (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf Data Transfer Project, https://datatransferproject.dev/ Congress.Gov, H.R.3849 - ACCESS Act of 2021 (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3849 European Commission, The Digital Markets Act: ensuring fair and open digital markets (2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_en The White House, Net Neutrality: President Obama`s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/net-neutrality Miranda Millwe, 53% of Organic Search Clicks Go to First Link [Study] (2012), https://www.searchenginewatch.com/2012/10/10/53-of-organic-search-clicks-go-to-first-link-study/ 公平交易委員會，數位經濟與競爭政策白皮書（初稿），https://www.ftc.gov.tw/upload/ebab864a-d164-48da-980b-32e4d5d9a4ce.pdf General Court of the European Union, Case T-612/17, The General Court largely dismisses Google’s action against the decision of the Commission finding that Google abused its dominant position by favouring its own comparison shopping service over competing comparison shopping services (2021), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-11/cp210197en.pdf Lauren Feiner, Lawmakers unveil major bipartisan antitrust reforms that could reshape Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google (2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/11/amazon-apple-facebook-and-google-targeted-in-bipartisan-antitrust-reform-bills.html Chicago Both Stigler Center for the study of the Economy the State, Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms: Final Report (2019), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-report---stigler-center.pdf Autorité de la concurrence, The Autorité de la concurrence hands down a €150M fine for abuse of a dominant position (2019), https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/en/press-release/autorite-de-la-concurrence-hands-down-eu150m-fine-abuse-dominant-position Congress.Gov, S.2992 - American Innovation and Choice Online Act, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/2992/text Michael R. Bloomberg, A Bipartisan Bad Idea: Congress’s attack on tech companies would harm consumers, workers and the economy (2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-28/the-american-innovation-and-choice-online-act-is-a-bipartisan-bad-idea Kent Walker, The harmful consequences of Congress’s anti-tech bills (2022), https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/public-policy/the-harmful-consequences-of-congresss-anti-tech-bills/ We Support Senate Bill 2992, RE: S. 2992, The American Innovation and Choice Online Act (2022), https://wesupportsb2992.medium.com/re-s-2992-the-american-innovation-and-choice-online-act-f49cc61abd87 Congress.Gov, S.2710 - Open App Markets Act, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/2710/text?r=23&s=1 Lauren Feiner, Senate committee advances bill targeting Google and Apple’s app store profitability (2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/03/senate-committee-advances-open-app-markets-act.html European Commission, The Digital Services Act: ensuring a safe and accountable online environment, https://ec.europa.eu/info/digital-services-act-ensuring-safe-and-accountable-online-environment_en Henry Mostyn & Nuna Van Belle, Final Agreement Reached on Digital Markets Act: A Paradigm Shift In Digital Regulation (2022), https://www.clearyantitrustwatch.com/2022/03/final-agreement-reached-on-digital-markets-act-a-paradigm-shift-in-digital-regulation/ 経済産業省，特定デジタルプラットフォームの透明性及び公正性の向上に関する法律のポイント， https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/mono_info_service/digitalplatform/transparency.html 経済産業省，「デジタルプラットフォームの透明性・公正性に関するモニタリング会合」を開催します， https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2021/12/20211221001/20211221001.html 전기통신사업법：제정·개정이유， https://www.law.go.kr/%EB%B2%95%EB%A0%B9/%EC%A0%84%EA%B8%B0%ED%86%B5%EC%8B%A0%EC%82%AC%EC%97%85%EB%B2%95 Dongwoo Kim, The Implications of South Korea’s “Anti-Google Law” (2021), https://keia.org/the-peninsula/the-implications-of-south-koreas-anti-google-law/
描述:	碩士國立政治大學科技管理與智慧財產研究所 108364206
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108364206
数据类型:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/NCCU202200586
显示于类别:	[科技管理與智慧財產研究所] 學位論文

文件中的档案:

档案	描述	大小	格式	浏览次数
420601.pdf		3552Kb	Adobe PDF2	202	检视/开启

在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.

社群 sharing

著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement

1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.

DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004 MIT & Hewlett-Packard / Enhanced by NTU Library IR team Copyright © - 回馈