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    题名: 家族企業的股權質押與投資決策: 以台灣市場為例
    Share Pledging and Investment Decision of Family Firm: Evidence from Taiwan
    作者: 鄭松倫
    Cheng, Sung-Lun
    贡献者: 湛可南
    Chan, Konan
    鄭松倫
    Cheng, Sung-Lun
    关键词: 股權質押
    控制股東
    家族企業
    投資決策
    Share pledging
    Controlling shareholder
    Family firm
    Investment decision
    日期: 2022
    上传时间: 2022-07-01 16:08:13 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 近年來許多文獻均針對控制股東的質押行為對公司決策的影響進行研究，其 中包含:股票回購、公司價值、企業風險等。然而，過去尚未有文獻將股權質押 與家族企業進行連結，探討其質押行為是否與非家族企業有所差異，以及家族企 業控制股東的股權質押對公司決策造成的影響與非家族企業是否有所不同。
    本研究收集 2000 年至 2020 年期間存在所有控制股東台灣上市櫃公司作為 樣本，對家族企業的質押行為及投資決策進行探討，並發現以下結果:首先，家 族企業控制股東的質押比率顯著高於非家族企業。再者，控制股東的質押比率對 公司的投資決策有負向顯著影響，而家族企業的影響小於非家族企業。最後，家 族企業因控制股東的質押行為所造成的股價暴跌風險高於非家族企業。且以上這 些影響在經過了 2011 年政府修改相關法規以限制質押股份的表決權後效果仍然 存在。
    The recent literature has examined the impact of share pledging by controlling shareholders on corporate decisions, such as share repurchases, corporate value, and corporate risk. However, prior research does not link share pledging to family firms and examine whether share pledging behavior of family firms differs from that of non- family firms. More importantly, it is not clear whether the impact of controlling shareholders` share pledging on corporate decisions differs between family and non- family firms.
    In this study, I collect Taiwanese listed companies with controlling shareholders from 2000 to 2020 and examine the relationship between share pledging, investment decisions, and family firms. My empirical result shows that the share pledge ratio of controlling shareholders of family firms is significantly higher than that of non-family firms. Furthermore, the share pledge ratio of controlling shareholders has a negative and significant impact on firm investment, while the impact of family firms is smaller than that of non-family firms. Finally, the stock price crash risk arises from share pledging of controlling shareholders is higher for family firms than for non-family firms. These effects persist after the government amend new regulation in 2011 to restrict the voting rights of pledged shares.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    109357028
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109357028
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202200611
    显示于类别:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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