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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/139139
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/139139


    Title: 《揭弊者保護法》草案與股票市場反應:來自台灣資本市場的證據
    The Draft of Whistleblower Protection Act and Stock Market Reaction: Evidence from Taiwan’s Capital Market
    Authors: 劉芳妤
    Yu, Liu Fang
    Contributors: 戚務君
    Chi, Wuchun
    劉芳妤
    Liu Fang Yu
    Keywords: 揭弊者保護法
    事件研究法
    公司治理
    經營團隊
    Whistleblower Protection Act
    Event study
    Corporate governance
    Management team
    Date: 2022
    Issue Date: 2022-03-01 16:38:22 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 利用2017年至2019年一系列與台灣《揭弊者保護法》草案的相關事件日,本文檢視該草案的市場反應。實證結果顯示,整體而言,股票市場對《揭弊者保護法》持正面看法。進一步的分析顯示,公司治理制度較佳、經營團隊異質性較高或經營團隊能力較好的企業,相關事件日的異常報酬率愈高。前述的實證結果隱含,資本市場對不同企業關於《揭弊者保護法》實際遵循與落實的預期差異,可以解釋相關事件日的股價行為。
    This study examines the stock market reaction to the draft of Whistleblower Protection Act. Specifically, I observe the abnormal return (AR) on series event days between 2017 and 2019 which are related to the draft of Whistleblower Protection Act. The empirical results show that the average AR on these event days is significantly positive, indicating that market investors have a positive view of the Whistleblower Protection Act. Further analysis shows that companies with better corporate governance, higher management team heterogeneity, and better managerial ability result in higher AR on the draft-related event days. In other words, it shows that investors have more confidence in the compliance and implementation of Whistleblower Protection for such companies.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    108353013
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353013
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202200329
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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