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| Title: | 承租人條件限制對於房屋出租成交時間之影響
The effect of requirements for potential tenants on time to rent |
| Authors: | 白承叡
Pai, Cheng-Jui |
| Contributors: | 林子欽
江穎慧
Lin, Tzu-Chin
Chaing, Ying-Hui
白承叡
Pai, Cheng-Jui |
| Keywords: | 租屋廣告
承租人條件限制
委託房仲
出租成交時間
參數存活模型
Rental Advertisment
Requirements of potential tenants
Real estate brokerage industry
Transaction time
Parametric survival model |
| Date: | 2021 |
| Issue Date: | 2021-09-02 17:28:11 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 網路使交易資訊流通更加快速，然而房東仍無法完全掌握承租人的素質，承租人亦無法完全掌握房屋資訊，雙方存有人與物資訊不對稱問題。本文利用591租屋網臺北市已出租成交資料，並選擇存活分析中模型配適度最佳之韋伯加速失敗模型混合逆高斯脆弱性模型，分別建立兩個模型，針對「雅房、獨立套房及分租套房」與「整層住家」進行實證分析，用以衡量資訊不對稱的情況下，房東篩選承租人及委託房仲，是否能降低雙方搜尋成本並縮短房屋成交所需時間，亦即達到提升交易效率的效果。
實證結果顯示，委託房仲能夠縮短雅房、獨立套房及分租套房出租成交所需時間1.88天（45.1小時），縮短整層住家0.52天（13小時）；租屋廣告中限制承租人性別條件將延長房屋出租成交所需時間0.65天（15.6小時）；租屋廣告中限制承租人身分條件將縮短雅房、獨立套房及分租套房出租成交所需時間0.6天（14.4小時），縮短整層住家0.86天（20.6小時）。
Despite the increasing speed of flowing transaction information on the Internet, landlords still cannot fully grasp the qualities of their tenants, whereas the tenants cannot fully acquire the housing information as well. For both sides, a problem of information asymmetry lies between tenant quality and housing information. This study utilizes the data of Taipei city obtained from 591 website, applies Weibull accelerated failure time model, which is the most suitable model regarding survival analysis, combined with Inverse-Gaussian frailty model, and establishes two models respectively. Empirical analysis of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio”, and “apartment” is performed, so as to observe whether the act of both tenant selection and real estate agent commission can solve the information asymmetry and improve transaction efficiency in the rental housing market. Also, to observe whether or not these acts could reduce the searching cost and shorten the transaction time.
The empirical results show that real estate brokers can shorten the transaction time of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio” by 1.88 days (45.1 hours), whereas “apartment” by 0.52 days (13 hours). Restriction on the gender of the tenant showed in the rental advertisement will extend the transaction time of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio” by 0.65 days (15.6 hours). Restriction on the identity of the tenant showed in the rental advertisement will shorten the transaction time of “room to share, subdivided studio and studio” by 0.6 days (14.4 hours), whereas “apartment” by 0.86 days (20.6 hours). |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
地政學系
107257017 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107257017 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU202101238 |
| Appears in Collections: | [地政學系] 學位論文
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