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    题名: 民營化中立性定理、環境企業社會責任與皮古稅
    Privatization Neutrality Theorem, Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility and Pigouvian Tax
    作者: 王敏音
    Wang, Min-Yin
    贡献者: 翁堃嵐
    Ueng, Kun-Lan
    王敏音
    Wang, Min-Yin
    关键词: 混合寡占
    民營化
    民營化中立性定理
    環境企業社會責任
    皮古稅
    Mixed Oligopoly
    Privatization
    Privatization Neutrality Theorem
    Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility
    Pigouvian Tax
    日期: 2021
    上传时间: 2021-08-04 16:05:52 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 民營化（privatization）及企業社會責任（Corporate Social Responsibility，CSR）之議題已廣為受到重視多時，而晚近幾年企業社會責任之重心又從多面向的議題逐漸聚焦在環境保護、永續發展之上，使得環境企業社會責任（Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility，ECSR）更顯重要。因此本文遵循White（1996）之分析架構，使市場中存在政府、公營廠商與民營廠商來觀察民營化前後對於均衡結果之影響及差異。與White（1996）乙文不同之處在於，本文章除了產品間品質之差異性外，亦考量了廠商投入ECSR後因消費者偏好所造成的不同，並對廠商課徵皮古稅（Pigouvian tax），最後檢驗在此條件下民營化中立性定理（Privatization Neutrality Theorem）是否會成立。
    本文研究結果顯示：（1）在對生產進行從量補貼、對污染課徵皮古稅兩種工具雙管齊下時，民營化中立性成立。（2）在特定函數之設定之下，政府要完全補貼廠商之生產，才能矯正市場扭曲。
    本文除補貼之外，皮古稅亦可為政策工具。雙管齊下之下，在民營化前除了能矯正私人廠商生產量不足之問題，亦矯正了私人廠商ECSR投入量不足的問題。相同地，在民營化後亦是能夠同時針對兩私人廠商矯正生產量過少及ECSR投入量不足的問題。因此當政府擁有兩項政策工具時，民營化中立性定理成立。
    For the past few years, privatization and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) issues have become increasingly important in the world. In recent years, much attention has been paid to environmental protection and sustainable development instead of other aspects of CSR, which contributes to the discussion of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR). This paper follows the analysis framework of White (1996) and constructed a mixed oligopoly model to measure the social welfare before and after privatization. Different from White’s, this paper takes consumer’s preferences of ESCR into consideration and impose Pigouvian taxes on pollution to test whether the Privatization Neutrality Theorem holds or not.
    This paper shows:
    (1) Privatization Neutrality Theorem holds when the government is able to subsidize producers and impose Pigouvian taxes on pollution as well.
    (2) Under specific settings of utility function, the government should subsidize totally to the amount of production to correct the distortion of market.
    Subsidy and Pigouvian tax can correct not only the problem of insufficient production, but also the ESCR engagement with private firms. This conclusion also holds after privatization. This paper shows that the government is able to subsidize producers and impose Pigouvian taxes on pollution as well, the Privatization Neutrality Theorem holds true.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    108255024
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108255024
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202100905
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 學位論文

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