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    Title: 我國監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權之實證分析
    The Correction and Impeachment Power of Taiwan`s Control Yuan Members: An Empirical Analysis
    Authors: 東方翔
    Tung, Fang-Hsiang
    Contributors: 俞振華
    Yu, Chen-Hua
    東方翔
    Tung, Fang-Hsiang
    Keywords: 監察委員
    糾正權
    彈劾權
    黨派模型
    專業模型
    Date: 2021
    Issue Date: 2021-08-04 15:56:08 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 監察院為我國憲法機關之一，然長期以來政治學領域對其重視程度並不高。既有關於監察學的研究，多聚焦在制度層次，監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權的行為研究可謂付之闕如，故本文欲填補相關文獻於此的討論。具體言之，本文的研究問題是：什麼因素會影響監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權的行為？
    綜合過往學理，由於關於監察委員的行為研究實乃過於少數。故根據監察院在制度上從民意機關轉變為準司法機關的性質，從而，本文自司法政治和立法行為研究，爬梳出影響監察委員的行為因素。在司法政治研究中，文獻強調黨派因素會影響大法官的行為，不同黨派總統提名的大法官會有不同的意見表達行為。立法行為研究的資訊模型理論，則是強調國會議員的行為，不是受到政黨及選區的影響，而是其會展現出其專業性。
    本文建構出兩個理論模型—黨派模型和專業模型—解釋監察委員的行使糾正權和彈劾權的行為。在黨派模型方面，民進黨的監察委員傾向對國民黨的機關和人員提糾正或彈劾，國民黨的監察委員則傾向對民進黨的機關和人員提糾正或彈劾。在專業模型方面，監察委員會傾向提出與過去職業經歷相同議題領域的糾正或彈劾案。本文透過統計方法驗證理論和假設，依變數若為連續變數，則使用OLS模型；依變數若為計次變數，則使用Poisson模型。整體而言，本文的理論與假設大多獲得驗證。亦即，監察委員行使糾正權和彈劾權時會有黨派考量，但也會有專業因素的考量。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    政治學系
    107252008
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107252008
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202100875
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Political Science] Theses

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