政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/136306

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/136306

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政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/136306

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題名:	經理人能力與成本僵固性之關聯 The Association Between Managerial Ability and Cost Stickiness
作者:	莊雅婷 Chuang, Ya-Ting
貢獻者:	潘健民莊雅婷 Chuang, Ya-Ting
關鍵詞:	經理人能力成本僵固性 Managerial ability Cost stickiness
日期:	2021
上傳時間:	2021-08-04 14:32:12 (UTC+8)
摘要:	本研究旨在探討經理人能力是否與成本僵固性有所關聯。成本僵固性為銷貨收入減少時成本下降的幅度小於銷貨收入增加時成本上升的幅度之現象，一般認為此現象源於決策者面臨需求下降時，選擇等待資訊而暫緩削減成本。本研究以2005年至2019年東京證券交易所的上市公司為研究對象，探討經理人能力與成本僵固性之關聯。本研究以Demerjian et al. (2012)之研究衡量經理人能力，並參考Anderson et al. (2003)的模型衡量成本僵固性。實證結果發現，經理人能力越佳，企業產生成本僵固性的現象越明顯。 This paper investigates whether managerial ability affects cost stickiness. Cost stickiness occurs when costs increase with sales increase but do not decrease in proportion to the decrease in sales, i.e., asymmetrical decrease in costs, a result from managers delay cost reduction until more information is available. Using data from firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2019, this paper investigates the association between managerial ability and cost stickiness. Follow Demerjian et al. (2012) and Anderson et al. (2003), this paper finds that competent managers will engage in stronger degree of cost stickiness.
參考文獻:	Anderson, M., R. Banker, and S. Janakiraman. 2003. Are selling, general, and administrative costs “sticky”? Journal of Accounting Research 41 (1): 47-63. Balakrishnan, R., M. Petersen, and N. Soderstrom. 2004. Does capacity utilization affect the “stickiness” of cost? Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 19 (3): 283-300. Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208. Balakrishnan, R., and T. Gruca. 2008. Cost stickiness and core competency: A note. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (4): 993-1006. Banker, R., D. Byzalov, M. Ciftci, and R. Mashruwala. 2014. The moderating effect of prior sales changes on asymmetric cost behavior. Journal of Management Accounting Research 26 (2): 221-242. Banker, R., D. Byzalov, and J. Plehn-Dujow. 2014. Demand uncertainty and cost behavior. Accounting Review 89 (3): 839-865. Banker, R., R. Huang, and Y. Yan. 2021. Managerial Ability and Cost Rigidity. Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper 2019-05-01. Cheng, S. 2006. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2008): 157-176. Demerjian, P., B. Lev, M. Lewis, and S. McVay. 2013. Managerial ability and earnings quality. Accounting Review 88 (2): 463–498. Demerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability: A new measure and validity tests. Management Science 58 (7): 1229-1248. Dierynck, B., W. Landsman, and A. Renders. 2012. Do managerial incentives drive cost behavior? Evidence about the role of the zero earnings benchmark for labor cost behavior in private Belgian firms. Accounting Review 87 (4):1219-1246. Fee, C. E., C. Hadlock. 2003. Raids, rewards, and reputations in the market for managerial talent. Review of Financial Studies 16 (4): 1315-1357. Francis, J., A. Huang, S. Rajgopal, and A. Zang. 2010. CEO reputation and earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (1): 109-147. Milbourn, T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2): 233–262. Noreen, E. 1991. Conditions under which activity-based cost systems provide relevant costs. Journal of Management Accounting Research 3 (4): 159-168. Rajgopal, S., T. Shevlin, and V. Zamora. 2006. CEOs` Outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. Journal of Finance 61 (4): 1813-1844.
描述:	碩士國立政治大學會計學系 108353041
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353041
資料類型:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/NCCU202100669
顯示於類別:	[會計學系] 學位論文

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