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    题名: 薪酬差距與公司績效－論薪酬委員會品質之影響
    The Relationship between Pay Disparity and Firm Performance: The Impact of Compensation Committee Quality
    作者: 王奕玲
    Wang, Yi-Ling
    贡献者: 李佳玲
    Lee, Chia-Ling
    王奕玲
    Wang, Yi-Ling
    关键词: 薪酬差距
    薪酬委員會品質
    公司治理
    Pay disparity
    Compensation committee quality
    Corporate governance
    日期: 2021
    上传时间: 2021-07-01 16:50:55 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究探討薪酬差距與公司績效之關聯性，並進一步分析薪酬委員會品質對薪酬差距與公司績效的影響。薪酬差距為高階經理團隊與基層員工間的薪酬差距比率，考量薪酬差距產生的因素，本研究先建立迴歸模型分析高階經理團隊及基層員工平均薪酬，利用該模型估計出可以被經濟因素解釋的薪酬差距及不可被經濟因素解釋的薪酬差距，再分析薪酬差距與公司績效的關聯性。研究結果顯示可以被經濟因素解釋的薪酬差距與公司績效具有正向影響，不可以被經濟因素解釋的薪酬差距與公司績效有負向影響。本研究再進一步探討薪酬委員會的品質是否達到監督機制，並發現當薪酬委員會的品質越完善，可以強化可以被經濟因素解釋的薪酬差距與公司績效的正向關係。
    I study the effect of compensation committee quality on the relationship between pay disparity and firm performance. To begin with, the pay disparity is defined by the ratio of executives to mean employee compensation. In order to separate the components of executive pay and employee compensation, I set up empirical models to estimate the compensation which can be explained by economic factors. I next predict the explained pay disparity and unexplained pay disparity by using the models to evaluate the effects of future firm performance. I find a positive relationship between the explained pay disparity and future firm performance. However, I also find that there is a negative relationship between the unexplained pay disparity and future firm performance. On the other hand, the results indicate that by increasing the compensation committee quality, the positive relationship between the explained pay disparity and future firm performance will become stronger.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    108353016
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108353016
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202100508
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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