政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/133412

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政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 資訊管理學系 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/133412

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题名:	開放銀行框架研究 Open Road to Banking
作者:	黃冠叡 Huang, Kuan-Jui
贡献者:	姜國輝 Kuo-Huie Chiang 黃冠叡 Huang, Kuan-Jui
关键词:	開放銀行開放API 開放金融博弈理論銀行即服務開放即共識 Open Banking Open API Open Finance Game Theory Banking as a Service Open as a Consensus
日期:	2020
上传时间:	2021-01-04 10:47:18 (UTC+8)
摘要:	開放銀行(Open Banking) 無疑是全球金融業在近年的大事件之一，金融發展先進地區無不推出相應的開放API 政策，本研究針對開放銀行發展方式提出基於博弈理論(Game Theory) 與技術實現觀點的架構論述。從聯盟賽局Coalition Game Theory 的分析中，得知若為銀行公協會主導的合作賽局，推出之架構框架易傾斜於強勢業者利益，否則聯盟將無法取得穩定解，且決策共識可能無法達成，此情況並可導致公平利益分配的困難。而若業者間對於聯盟運作進行一定讓步，彼此聯盟產生之利益得以減除雙方原本業務交集，則仍能產生穩定且公平的分配效率。另以金融機構與第三方服務提供業者的聯盟而論，雙方可能基於報酬矩陣(Payoff matrix) 產生四種不同合作結果：合作互惠(cooperation)，惡意對立(spite)，自我中心(selfishness) 與支持發展(altruism) 等，平等基礎有利於合作推展，而強勢方的主動付出(altruism) 正是互惠(reciprocation) 的起點。另為了達成較大社會福祉(social welfare)，根據Arrow Paradox 原理，若成員數不小於兩個，可選擇方案大於三個時，不可能產生一個同時兼顧成員偏好，無強力獨裁者，或方案彼此獨立性的選舉機制設計。因此，主管機關有介入開放銀行機制設計之必要。在技術實現上，本論文從銀行核心系統特性與安全網路階層出發，探討開放應用程式種類、服務導向功能化，資安要求與階層式通訊架構的銜接設計，為不同標準化程度的拓樸結構(topology) 進行總體時間複雜度探討，分析認為，透過有力的中央處理機構，中立緩衝區設計，藉以橋接安全金融與開放交易環境，將有助於簡化網路拓樸，便利達成技術與商業協定，提升資料交換效率。依照不同標準化程度，此中介機構可扮演API交換平台，憑證Token 驗證中心，以及API 規格制訂等功能。進階運用上，可再作為資訊整合提供、資料加值服務、即時監理與犯罪偵防的平台。此外，開放生態系應發展相關周邊機構，以協助技術服務、資料應用加值與監理實施。基於推論結果，本研究總結開放銀行生態系的有續發展模式，安全高效的工程管理模式，並歸納出”Banking as a Service” 與”Open as a Consensus” 兩大方向做為未來的發展建議。期以博弈策略、技術實現與生態競合觀點，提供政策研究與機制設計參考，協助實現金融普惠目標。 Open banking is an initiative aiming to increase financial data sharing and service customization by connecting the traditional financial industry and Fintech under the premise of customer authorization of predefined scopes. Although there have been some implementing cases, more economies and prospective participants are still waiting on the sidelines as they closely watch the evolvement alongside the new collaborative patterns. More analyses explaining the reasons behind existing different designs and their limitations are eagerly desired. This research aims to this purpose. Grounded on Pareto efficiency and coalition game theory, this study analyzes the collective decision to justify the necessity of interference from the authority, the compulsory attendance of leading financial institutions, and the altruistic behavior from these institutions to third party service providers. In the analysis of Coalition Game, it suggests that in a union (such as a bank association) where members in higher position or a strong subgroup collectively conclude the important decisions for the organization, the Core set would focus on stability, rather than on the impartiality of all participants. For the coalition between financial institutes and third party providers, the reciprocation originates from the altruism of the dominant party. For the social welfare, the Arrow Paradox asserts that under such condition, it is impossible to design a fair electoral system that satisfies unanimity, non-dictatorship, and independence of irrelevant alternatives at the same time. Therefore, the authority should actively get involved in mechanism design of open banking. From the engineering perspective, it discusses data governance related issues, types and characteristics of open APIs, blind spots and influences that are easily overlooked, as well as API security and the required hierarchical communication structure design. By the above framework, it explains topological complexity of different open banking development approaches, and the societal computational efficiency they affect. On these bases, it provides advice on the orderly development model of open banking, effective management of ecosystem competition, and the efficient engineering framework design. It then summarizes two suggestions: "Banking as a Service" and "Open as a Consensus" for future development of Open Banking. This research hopes to provide policymakers, researchers and mechanism designers with referential directions based on ecological competition and engineering realization perspectives, so as to help society achieve the goal of financial inclusion.
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描述:	博士國立政治大學資訊管理學系 103356501
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103356501
数据类型:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/NCCU202001846
显示于类别:	[資訊管理學系] 學位論文

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