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| Title: | 阻礙式專利與所得不均等： R&D品質提升模型的分析
Blocking patent and income inequality in a R&D quality-ladder model |
| Authors: | 許元豪
Hsu, Yuan-Hao |
| Contributors: | 賴景昌
Lai, Ching-Chong
許元豪
Hsu, Yuan-Hao |
| Keywords: | 研發
阻礙式專利
專利廣度
利潤分配規則
所得不均等
R&D
Blocking patents
Patent breadth
Profit-division rule
Income inequality |
| Date: | 2020 |
| Issue Date: | 2020-09-02 12:46:51 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本篇研究建構在R&D品質提升模型的基礎上，並將阻礙式專利(blocking patents)以及利潤分配規則(profit-division-rule)的機制納入此模型，進一步探討在此模型架構下，政府能否透過阻礙式專利的機制來改善異質家計單位間所得不均等的程度。政府擁有兩項政策工具，分別是對領導技術專利權的保護，以及對舊一代技術專利權的保護，即為專利廣度與阻礙式專利。在此研究中，將品質提升幅度設計為內生變數，並納入利潤分配規則之中，新一代研發廠商可以透過決定品質提升幅度來影響利潤分配比例。最後本文探討了兩項政策工具對經濟成長及所得不均等的影響。
我們發現在特定條件下，隨著對領導技術專利權的保護程度越大，經濟成長率就上升得越高；然而，隨著對舊一代技術專利權的保護程度越大，對經濟成長率的影響可能正也可能負。在所得不均等的方面，兩項政策皆會對所得不均等產生兩種效果，分別是利率效果與資產效果；其中，利率效果為政策對所得不均等影響的關鍵因素。
This thesis builds up a quality-ladder growth model with blocking patents and the profit-division rule, and used it to explore whether the government can improve income inequality among heterogeneous households through blocking patents. Two policy instruments available to the government for protecting patent rights are considered in this thesis. The first is patent breadth, which captures the protection of the leading patents. The second is blocking patents, which captures the protection of the former patent owners. The main feature of the model is that the step size of innovation is designed as an endogenous variable and incorporated into the profit-division rule. Therefore, the current inventor can affect the profit-division ration by way of choosing the step size of innovation. In addition, this thesis explores the impact of two patent policy instruments on economic growth and income inequality.
Two main findings emerge from the analysis. First, we find that, under certain conditions, following an increase in the protection of the leading patent owner, the economy’s growth rate will rise in response. However, following an increase in the protection of the former patent owner, the economy’s growth rate may either rise or decline in response. Second, both patent policy instruments affect economy’s income inequality by means of the interest rate effect and the asset-value effect. In particular, the interest rate effect plays a crucial role in determining income inequality. |
| Reference: | 一、 中文部分
賴景昌 (2005)，勞動搜尋理論。
賴景昌 (2013)，內生成長理論：R&D，逢甲經研所上課講義。
賴景昌 (2015)，內生成長理論：品質提升模型，逢甲經研所上課講義。
賴景昌 (2018)，內生成長理論，政大經研所上課講義。
二、 英文部分
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt. (1992) A model of growth through creative destruction. Econometrica 60, 323-351.
Chu, A. (2009) Effects of blocking patents on R&D: A quantitative DGE analysis. Journal of Economic Growth 14, 55-78.
Chu, A. (2010) Effects of patent policy on income and consumption inequality in an R&D growth model. Southern Economic Journal 77, 336-350.
Chu, A., and Y. Furukawa. (2011) On the optimal mix of patent instruments. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 35, 1964-1975.
Chu, A., G. Cozzi, and S. Galli. (2012) Does intellectual monopoly stimulate or stifle innovation? European Economic Review 56, 727-746.
Chu, A., and S. Pan. (2013) The escape-infringement effect of blocking patents on innovation and economic growth. Macroeconomic Dynamics 17, 955-969.
Chu, A., and G. Cozzi. (2018) Effects of patents versus R&D subsidies on income inequality. Review of Economic Dynamics 29, 68-84.
Chu, A., and P. Peretto. (2019) Innovation and inequality from stagnation to growth. MPRA Paper No. 96073.
Cozzi, G., and L. Spinesi. (2006) Intellectual appropriability, product differentiation, and growth. Macroeconomic Dynamics 10, 39-55.
Cozzi, G., (2007) The Arrow effect under competitive R&D. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 7, 1-18.
Cozzi, G., P. Giordani, and L. Zamparelli. (2007) The refoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models. Journal of Economic Theory 136, 788-797.
García-Peñalosa, C., and S. Turnovsky. (2006) Growth and income inequality: A canonical model. Economic Theory 28, 25-49.
Grossman, G., and E. Helpman. (1991) Quality ladders in the theory of growth. Review of Economic Studies 58, 43-61.
Goh, A.-T., and J. Olivier. (2002) Optimal patent protection in a two-sector economy. International Economic Review 43, 1191-1214.
Lerner, J. (1994) The importance of patent scope: An empirical analysis. Rand Journal of Economics 25(2), 319-333.
Li, C.-W., (1998) Inequality and growth: A Schumpeterian perspective. Unpublished paper, University of Glasgow.
O’Donoghue, T., and J. Zweimuller. (2004) Patents in a model of endogenous growth. Journal of Economic Growth 9, 81-123.
Scotchmer, S. (2004) Innovation and incentives. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Segerstrom, P. (1998) Endogenous growth without scale effects. American Economic Review 88, 1290-1310.
Shapiro, C. (2001) Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting. In A. Jaffe, J. Lerner, & S. Stern (Eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol. 1, 119-150. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Sorek, G. (2011) Patents and quality growth in OLG economy. Journal of Macroeconomics 33, 690-699.
Wright, D. (1999) Optimal patent breadth and length with costly imitation, International Journal of Industrial Organization 17, 419-436.
Yang, Y. (2018) On the optimality of IPR protection with blocking patents. Review of Economic Dynamics 27, 205-230. |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
107258039 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107258039 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU202001328 |
| Appears in Collections: | [經濟學系] 學位論文
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