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    Title: 經營團隊能力及權力與審計意見購買之關聯性研究
    The Relationship between Managerial Ability, Power and Opinion Shopping
    Authors: 黃于珊
    Huang, Yu-Shan
    Contributors: 戚務君
    Chi, Wuh-Jiun
    黃于珊
    Huang, Yu-Shan
    Keywords: 經營團隊能力
    經營團隊權力
    審計意見購買
    經營績效
    資訊不對稱
    產業競爭程度
    Managerial ability
    Managerial power
    Opinion shopping
    Operating performance
    Information asymmetry
    Industry competition
    Date: 2020
    Issue Date: 2020-07-01 13:33:46 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 　　過去研究發現市場存在審計意見購買的情形，本文則為第一篇從經營團隊角度觀察企業是否成功進行審計意見購買之研究。實證結果顯示經營團隊能力與審計意見購買行為間並無顯著相關性。接著，透過手工辨識與文字探勘技術辨識經營團隊的學經歷背景，以建立能夠捕捉經營團隊的實質控制權與特質的權力指標，本文發現經營團隊權力與審計意見購買行為呈顯著正相關。最後，將樣本按照不同的舞弊誘因與機會指標進行分組，發現在公司經營績效較差的子樣本中，經營團隊能力將導致審計意見購買情形發生；在資訊不對稱程度較嚴重的子樣本中，經營團隊權力將導致審計意見購買情形發生；在公司處於產業競爭程度較高的子樣本中，經營團隊能力及權力均會同時導致審計意見購買的情形發生，且在給定經營團隊權力較高的情況下，此情形更為嚴重；在非上述的子樣本中，則沒有找到相同的證據，故本文可論證舞弊誘因與機會指標將會導致高能力及高權力的經營團隊從事審計意見購買行為。本文對於經營團隊能力及權力相關文獻提供不同以往的實證證據，並且嘗試從經營團隊角度回答其進行審計意見購買的誘因與機會。
    To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to examine whether firms could successfully engage in opinion shopping from the perspective of the management. The empirical result shows that the managerial ability is insignificant in the opinion shopping. Then, establishing the power index which captures the substantive control and characteristics of management through manual identification and text mining, I find that the existence of successfully engaging in opinion shopping is associated with increases in managerial power.

    Furthermore, based on the fraud incentives and opportunities, I divide the sample into two groups at the level of operating performance, information asymmetry as well as industrial competition. In the subsample of lower operating performance and higher industrial competition, the managerial ability is associated with opinion shopping. For the firms in the group of higher information asymmetry and higher industrial competition, the managerial power is associated with opinion shopping.

    Overall, this paper complements prior literature by providing additional evidence of the managerial ability and power, and I try to analyze the incentives and opportunities of opinion shopping from the management perspective.
    Reference: 官月缎與梁盛泰，2011，會計師更換與繼續經營疑慮審計意見，中華管理評論國際學報，第十四卷，第一期：1-23。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    107353011
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353011
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202000591
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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