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| Title: | 績效展望對公司垂直整合的影響研究
A Study on the Impact of Performance Prospect on Vertical Integration of Enterprises |
| Authors: | 吳小龍
Wu, Xiao-Long |
| Contributors: | 李志宏
黃思明
Lee, Jie-Haun
Hwang, Sy-Ming
吳小龍
Wu, Xiao-Long |
| Keywords: | 損失展望
利得展望
審慎程度
垂直整合
展望理論
績效展望
風險偏好
交易成本經濟學
Losses prospect
Gains prospect
Degree of prudence
Vertical integration
Prospect theory
Performance prospect
Risk preferences
Transaction of cost economics |
| Date: | 2020 |
| Issue Date: | 2020-07-01 13:30:41 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本文主要研究績效展望對於企業垂直整合的影響，「倂購還是自主研發？」，「自製還是外包？」，這些不但是公司管理的重要策略問題，同時也是公司有關垂直整合領域的重要問題。研究透過對經濟學相關文獻的歷史回顧，基於目前在垂直整合研究領域得到較多認可的交易成本經濟學（Transaction Cost Economics，TCE）的理論，重點分析了TCE的資產特用性（Asset Specificity，AS）架構，找出其存在的理論缺口以及對實務現象觀察結果解釋力的不足。通過藉鑒Chiles & McMackin（1996）放鬆風險中性假設的方法，引入可變風險偏好的觀點，從行爲經濟學的展望理論（prospect theory）提出的決策框架（The Framing of Decision）的概念，推衍出在不同績效展望下，企業垂直整合的實際決策者會有不同的風險偏好，這些風險偏好最終影響了決定企業的相關業務活動是放在企業內部還是外部去完成。
本研究創造性地提出利得展望（GP）和損失展望（LP）以及風險決策審慎程度（DOP）這三個新構念，從理論上連接起企業垂直整合和展望理論這兩個以前相距甚遠的研究領域，進而嘗試在交易成本經濟學和行爲經濟學之間架起協同的橋梁。
在實證環節通過運用Compustat數據庫與IBES數據庫提供的2009年到2019年的美國製造業上市公司資料，對提出的假說進行驗證。結果發現，在相同的資産特用性條件下，當公司的績效預期低於績效目標，決策者認爲不太可能實現年度績效目標時，其績效展望為損失展望（losses prospect），導致這些決策者的風險偏好爲尋求風險，尋求風險的決策者會低估資產特用性升高導致的機會主義風險，降低公司當年的垂直整合程度，更多選擇市場治理，即通過市場外包去完成更多的經濟活動，在我們收集的樣本庫研究中，以上假說通過了統計學上的顯著檢驗，但是當年的損失展望對於第二年與第三年的垂直整合程度變化影響缺乏統計顯著性，説明損失展望導致的決策對企業垂直整合不具有時間滯後性；另外，當公司的績效預期高於績效目標，決策者認爲已經有把握實現年度績效目標時，其績效展望為利得展望（gains prospect），導致這些決策者的風險偏好爲風險趨避。本研究對審慎程度（Degree Of Prudence）的實證檢驗結果支持了根據展望理論推衍出的績效展望會影響風險偏好的假説，以上假說也通過了統計學上的顯著檢驗；而且研究發現的LP對DOP的影響效果是GP對DOP的1.83倍，這點也和展望理論的觀點相契合。但是由於其他行爲偏誤（bias）的影響，決策者未必一定會採取增加垂直整合程度的策略，研究結果挑戰了Chiles & McMackin（1996）提出的部分理論假設。Williamson提出的資産特用性仍然是決定公司垂直整合程度的重要因素，這個因素將與績效展望共同影響垂直整合程度的相關決策。
This article focuses on the impact of performance prospect on vertical integration of enterprises, "Shall we merge or R&D?" ,"making or outsourcing?" These are important strategic issues not only in the management of the company, but also for the company to select relevant domains of vertical integration. Through the historical recap of the experience, the study went a step further from the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) that is currently popular in the vertical integration domain, and focused the analysis on TCE`s asset-specific architecture to figure out its existing theoretical gaps and deficiency of solution to practical phenomena. Considering the risk-neutral assumptions of Chiles and McMackin (1996), we introduce the view of variable risk preferences and demonstrate the concept of The Framing of The Decision proposed by the prospect theory of Behavioral Economics. It is noted that under different performance prospects, the actual decision makers of vertical integration of enterprises will have different risk preferences, which ultimately affect the decision of the enterprise`s related business activities are held within the enterprise or external to complete.
This study proposed three unprecedented constructs: Gain Prospect (GP), Loss Prospect (LP) and Degree Of Prudence (DOP), which theoretically connected the two previously distant studies of vertical integration and prospect theory, and then attempted to construct a synergy bridge between transaction cost economics and behavioral economics.
The study empirically supported the hypothesis by using data of U.S. manufacturing companies appearing on the market from 2009 to 2019 provided by Compustat and IBES databases. The results show that under the same asset-specific circumstances, when expectations of a company`s performance are lower than the performance targets and it is considered unlikely that it will achieve annual performance targets, policymakers of the company possess a performance prospect of losses prospect (LP), resulting in their risk preferences for seeking risk. The policymakers who seek risk underestimate the opportunism risk stake of asset specificity, reduce the company`s vertical integration extent in the year, and increase preference of market governance------to complete more economic activity in the market. In the sample library studies we collected, the hypothesis above passed a statistically significant test, whereas the first year ’s losses prospect shows little statistically significant impact on vertical integration degree changes in the second and third years, indicating that the decision-making of losses prospect does not have a time lag for the vertical integration of the enterprise; on the other hand, when a company`s performance expectations are higher than their performance targets and decision makers are confident of achieving their annual performance targets, their performance prospect is a gains prospect (GP), leading to risk avoidance of risk preferences. The empirical results for Degree Of Prudence (DOP) of the study supported the hypothesis that performance prospect based on the prospect theory will affect risk preferences, and this hypothesis has also passed a statistically significant test; moreover, the research found that the effect of LP on DOP is 1.83 times that of GP on DOP, which is also consistent with the relevant ideas of Prospect Theory. However, because of biases and not necessarily taking a strategy to increase vertical integration, the results challenge part of the theoretical assumptions put forward by Chiles and McMackin (1996). Williamson`s proposal on asset specificity remains an important determining factor on the extent of vertical integration of a company, which, together with the performance prospect, influences decision-making on the extent of vertical integration. |
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| Description: | 博士
國立政治大學
企業管理學系
102355508 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1023555081 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU202000459 |
| Appears in Collections: | [企業管理學系] 學位論文
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