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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/125941


    Title: 以併購調整財務槓桿之探討
    A discussion about Restructuring Leverage Ratio by Merger and Acquisition
    Authors: 林炫勲
    Lin, Hsuan-Hsun
    Contributors: 屠美亞
    Twu, Mi-A
    林炫勲
    Lin, Hsuan-Hsun
    Keywords: 財務槓桿
    以併購作為融資方法
    累積超額報酬
    代理問題
    Capital structure
    Leverage ratio
    Financing by merger and acquisition
    Cumulative abnormal return
    Agency problem
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2019-09-05 17:33:54 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 過去台灣2009年至2017年一共完成了501件併購案，而其中併購前後財務槓桿變化率超過10%之樣本合計為285件，約佔全部已完成之併購案件的六成，可以見併購導致財務槓桿大幅變動為常見之現象，故以變化率超過正負10%作為區分之標準，挑選出『併購後財務槓桿有明顯下調組』、『併購後財務槓桿有明顯上升組』及將前兩組合併的『併購後明顯調整財務槓桿組』共三組，發現在併購前『併購後財務槓桿明顯下調組』財務槓桿及市淨率都顯著高於『併購後財務槓桿明顯提升組』。
    本研究實證結果發現，當企業的財務槓桿越小或是企業的規模越小，那企業越有機會利用併購來大幅調整其財務槓桿。也發現全部併購案件樣本的累積超額報酬顯著大於零，『併購後財務槓桿有明顯下調組』未能達到統計上的顯著，而『併購後財務槓桿明顯上升組』和『併購後明顯調整財務槓桿組』皆只有在宣告日前後一天的時間區間內獲得顯著正向的累積超額報酬。
    最後發現當企業欲降低其財務槓桿，且其自由現金流量越低，代表該企業較不易透過內部融資來降低其過高的財務槓桿，較需要透過外部融資的方式，而透過併購來調降自身財務槓桿將較不容易有資訊不對稱所帶來的負面影響，因此投資人也較不擔心代理問題的產生，且認同企業調整自身財務槓桿至最適資本結構之決策，所以企業將獲得較高的累積報酬，進而提升股東之財富。
    This paper studied all merger and acquisition cases from 2009 to 2017 in Taiwan. And it finds that almost 60% M&A cases changed their leverage ratio over 10%. So it separated the samples into two group by the change of leverage ratio over 10% between before M&A and after M&A, and find that the leverage ratio and price-to-book ratio of the group of leverage ratio decreasing more 10% are higher than the group of leverage ratio increasing more 10%.
    The finding shows the companies with lower leverage ratio or smaller size would tend to restructure their leverage ratio dramatically by M&A. And the finding also shows all the sample of M&A cases get cumulative abnormal return which greater zero significantly, but the sample which decrease the leverage ratio after M&A don’t get that. And the sample which increase the leverage ratio after M&A get the cumulative abnormal return bigger than zero during announcement to two day after announcement.
    In the end, it finds that low free cash flow means that company can’t save the problem of too high leverage ratio by internal financing. It has to financing by external way. And there is less negative influence by information asymmetry through financing by M&A. Hence, the investors won’t worry about agent problem so that the company will get the higher cumulative abnormal return. It raises the shareholder fortune.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    企業管理研究所(MBA學位學程)
    106363003
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106363003
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900815
    Appears in Collections:[企業管理研究所（MBA學位學程）] 學位論文

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