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| Title: | 公司治理評鑑結果、董事會特性與公司績效關聯性之探討
The research of Corporate governance evaluation results, board characteristics and the relationship with company performance |
| Authors: | 陳有序
Chen, Yu-Hsu |
| Contributors: | 林宛瑩
陳有序
Chen, Yu-Hsu |
| Keywords: | 公司治理評鑑結果
獨立董事
董事會獨立性
公司價值
Corporate governance evaluation
Independent director
Independence of board members
Company’s value |
| Date: | 2019 |
| Issue Date: | 2019-08-07 15:55:20 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究針對我國近年施行的公司治理評鑑結果進行研究，本研究為符合可比較性，僅針對2016與2017兩年的受評鑑上市上櫃公司進行研究，發現獨立董事席次比率（IBR）與公司治理評鑑結果呈顯著正向關係，支持研究假說H1。再者，本研究為了解獨立董事成立後，董事會獨立性與各個公司治理要素將如何影響公司治理評鑑結果。以及用公司治理評鑑結果推斷級距結果與各個公司治理要素如何影響公司價值。本研究發現，獨立董事席次比率提高都有助於公司治理結果的表現，實證結果為顯著。Tobin’s Q（TBQ）表現上，公司治理評鑑結果（RT）與TBQ呈負向關係，不支持研究假說H2。
This study is based on the results of the corporate governance evaluation in recent years. According to the result of the evaluation in the 2016 and 2017 years, it represents that the ratio of independent directors (IBR) has the significant positive relationship with result of corporate governance evaluation, supporting the research hypothesis H1. Furthermore, this study is to understand how the independence of the board of directors and the various corporate governance factors will affect the results of corporate governance evaluation after the establishment of the independent directors. Using results of corporate governance evaluation anaylze the results of the ranking and how the various corporate governance factors affect the company`s value. The study shows that the increase in the ratio of the number of independent directors contributed to augment of the evaluation performance, so that the results are significant. Tobin’s Q (TBQ) performance, the corporate governance assessment results (RT) are negatively correlated with TBQ and do not support the research hypothesis H2. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
106353114 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353114 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU201900615 |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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