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    題名: 寡占競爭、環境管制與利益團體
    Three essays on oligopolistic competition, environmental regulation, and interest groups
    作者: 施惠敏
    Shih, Hui-Min
    貢獻者: 賴育邦
    Lai, Yu-Bong
    施惠敏
    Shih, Hui-Min
    關鍵詞: 政治捐獻
    環境管制
    利益團體
    Political contributions
    Environmental regulation
    Interest groups
    日期: 2019
    上傳時間: 2019-07-01 11:03:44 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文建構一個兩國三地的寡占模型，容許兩國廠商的污染減量成本可以不同，且廠商會遊說政府以獲得有利的環境政策。在廠商間進行數量競爭、生產的產品為同質的情況下，我們發現，當兩國廠商為成本同質，若政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數較高者，制定的污染排放標準將較寬鬆。而在兩國廠商成本為異質的情況下，若政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較高者，當該國廠商污染減量成本相對較高時，政府會制定較寬鬆的污染排放標準；若政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較低，只要成本差異較大，或成本差異較小且環境損害係數小於一定值，政府會依然制定較寬鬆的污染排放標準，惟若成本差異較小，但環境損害係數大於一定值，縱使該國廠商污染減量成本相對較高，政府反而會制定較嚴格的污染排放標準。
    而在兩國廠商成本相同，但產品為異質的情況下，我們發現，不論兩國廠商係進行數量競爭或價格競爭，若兩國政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相同，兩國政府制定的污染排放標準相等。若政府對於利益團體給予的權數不同，則政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較高者，會制定較寬鬆的污染排放標準；而政府對於政治捐獻給予的權數相對較低，會制定較嚴格的污染排放標準。
    This dissertation constructs a third-market model with oligopolistic competition. In the model, the firms may have different pollution abatement costs, and they can lobby for the governments to obtain favorable regulations. I find that, in the case with Cournot competition and homogeneous goods, the government that attaches a larger weight to the political contributions will set a less stringent policy. The same result occurs, when a country’s firm has higher abatement costs, provided that its government attaches a larger weight to the political contribution. However, when the government attaches a smaller weight to the contributions, the difference in the abatement costs between firms and a sufficiently large marginal environmental damage will lead the government to select a more severe regulation.
    In the case with heterogeneous products and same abatement costs, I find that, the government that attaches a larger weight to the political contributions will set a less stringent policy. However, if the government attaches a smaller weight to the contributions, then it will choose a more stringent regulation. The same result holds in both Cournot and Bertrand competition model.
    參考文獻: 林瑞益、孫嘉宏(2017)。整合型市場之下的混合雙占－價格與數量競爭。經濟研究，53:2, 261-294。
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    描述: 博士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    99255501
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099255501
    資料類型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/DIS.NCCU.PF.001.2019.F07
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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