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    Title: 異質混合寡占市場下公司稅對最適民營化政策之影響
    The Effect of Corporation Tax on the Optimal Privatization Policy under Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly
    Authors: 黃登莉
    Huang, Teng-Li
    Contributors: 翁堃嵐
    黃登莉
    Huang, Teng-Li
    Keywords: 利潤稅
    公司稅
    租稅中立性
    產品差異性
    Profit tax
    Corporate tax
    Product differentiation
    Tax neutrality
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-07-11 17:33:16 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 探討民營化的文獻大部分在同質混合市場下對民營化規模進行研究，忽略實際上產品具有差異性的考量，當產品分別由公、民營廠商提供，產品的差異性會影響消費者的福利以及商品購買的對象，進而影響政府對於民營化決策的規模及動機。因此在Fujiwara (2007)一文中加入了消費者對於商品種類的偏好程度(即異質商品)的設定，並發現在短、長期下對商品種類的偏好程度，對於影響民營化政策有很大的差異。不過Fujiwara (2007)一文忽略稅制因素的考量，租稅與商品差異性都會影響到廠商的利潤以及消費者福利，進而對社會福利造成影響，更使得在混合寡占下探討租稅以及產品差異性的議題顯得相當重要。因此為體現更貼近現實的研究，本文進一步在Fujiwara (2007)一文中分別導入利潤稅以及公司稅的設定，對於異質混合寡占市場的最適民營化政策、產品差異性以及租稅中立性進行探討。本文研究發現：在利潤稅制下，商品為異質時，短期可能會使民營廠商變為獨占，產生效率損失，因此完全國營化可能才是最好的結果；而長期下因為廠商能自由進出，不會出現獨占使效率損失的問題，反而因為公、民營廠商提供差異性的產品使消費者的福利提升，因此使得民營化動機最大。產品為同質時，不論是在短期或是長期下，公營廠商具有價格優勢，可能導致民營廠商退出市場，因此完全國營化為最適策略。上述結果皆不因為利潤稅的加入而改變，與Fujiwara (2007)一文結果相同。比較有趣的是，本文發現長期下當產品異質時，民營化程度會受稅率(t)影響，因為利潤稅的加入會影響公營廠商的利潤，公營廠商為了維持一定的利潤可以透過調整稅率來決定民營化程度。
    在公司稅制下，與利潤稅一樣，產品的差異性大小對於民營化程度有很大的影響，而當產品為同質以及異質時，完全國營化反而才是最好的策略。然而不同於Kuo et al (2017)一文利潤稅中立性成立的結果：公司稅不再具有中立性，因公司稅制下多了成本費用比例的變數，而政府無法透過調整最適民營化規模來影響該變數，因此無法完全導正稅率對社會福利的扭曲；且發現社會福利隨著費用成本比例增加而提高，因為當所有成本皆為可在稅基中扣除的費用成本時(即k=1)，此時利潤最大，而廠商的利潤對社福福利有正面的影響效果，因此利潤稅比起公司稅更有利於社會福利。
    While there are many literatures on mixed oligopoly with a homogeneous product, less attention has been paid to the implication of product differentiation. When products are provided by public and private firms, the product differentiation will affect the welfare of consumers, which affects the scale and motivation of the government for privatization decision-making. Therefore, Fujiwara (2007) added the consumer`s preference for product categories in its model. However, Fujiwara (2007) ignores the consideration of tax factors. The difference between tax and product differentiation will affect the profit of the firms and the welfare of the consumers, which will affect the social welfare. Therefore, in order to reflect the research closer to reality, this paper further introduces the profit tax and corporate taxation in Fujiwara (2007), and discusses the optimal privatization policy, product differentiation and tax neutrality of heterogeneous mixed oligopolistic market.
    We found that under the profit tax system, when the commodity is heterogeneous, the optimal policy is full nationalization; in the long run, the privatization motivation is the biggest. When the products are homogeneous, whether in the short-term or long-term, the public firms have a price advantage, which may lead to the exit of the private firms, so the optimal policy is full nationalization. None of the above results were changed by the addition of the profit tax, which is the same as the result of Fujiwara (2007). What is more interesting is that this paper finds that when the products are heterogeneous in the long run, the degree of privatization will be affected by the tax rate.
    Under the corporate tax system, like the profits tax, the difference in short-term product has a great influence on the degree of privatization. The optimal policy is full nationalization, when the product is homogenous or heterogeneous. However, unlike the profit tax conclusion, it found that the neutrality of corporate tax can not hold, and the social welfare is lower than the optimal privatization policy under profit taxation system.
    Reference: 邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006)，〈公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例分析〉，《經濟論文叢刊》，34(2)期，246-259。
    林宛儀 (2012)，〈公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例分析―考慮租稅的情況〉，《經濟論文》，1-29。
    郭虹瑩與翁堃嵐 (2007)，〈公司稅、租稅逃漏與最適出口貿易政策〉，《經濟論文叢刊》，35(1)，32-54。
    郭虹瑩與翁堃嵐 (2007)，〈低成本高補貼嗎？考慮公司稅的情況〉，《經濟論文叢刊》，35(3)，321–335。
    翁堃嵐與王伊君 (2012)，〈公司稅的中立性與逃漏稅行為〉，《社會科學論叢》，6(1)，1-14。
    翁堃嵐、林宛儀與郭虹瑩 (2014)，〈混合寡占市場下利潤稅的中立性與最適釋股比例〉，《應用經濟論叢》，96，105-126。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    105255016
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105255016
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.PF.004.2018.F07
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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