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| Title: | 高階管理人員能力與強制性盈餘預測的關聯
The association between managerial ability and mandatory management earnings forecasts |
| Authors: | 陳逸庭
Chen, Yi-Ting |
| Contributors: | 潘健民
Pan, Chien-Min
陳逸庭
Chen, Yi-Ting |
| Keywords: | 高階管理人員能力
強制性盈餘預測
Managerial ability
Mandatory management earnings forecasts |
| Date: | 2018 |
| Issue Date: | 2018-07-10 15:33:25 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 日本東京證券交易所強制要求上市公司發布盈餘預測，惟是否所有企業之高階管理人員都有能力發布具有足夠準確性的盈餘預測為人所疑，故本研究以日本東京證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，探討高階管理人員能力與日本強制性盈餘預測的關聯性。
從實證結果，本研究發現：（1）高階管理人員能力越好，企業實際盈餘表現越好，企業越可能上修其盈餘預測，且此情形在盈餘預測最終為上修之情況下也可確認。（2）高階管理人員能力越好，企業實際盈餘表現越好，企業越不可能下修其盈餘預測。且高階管理人員能力越好，企業盈餘預測能力亦越好，故企業較少需要修正盈餘預測，所做出之預測值之間亦較接近。此外，在盈餘預測最終為下修的情況下，高階管理人員能力越好，盈餘預測修正次數越少，所做之預測值之間也較接近。（3）高階管理人員能力與盈餘預測偏差間皆無顯著關係，表示高階管理人員能力不會對預測偏差產生顯著影響。
This study tries to shed some light on this issue by examining the relation between managerial ability and mandatory management earnings forecasts. Listing firms in Japan have started to issue management earnings forecasts in the mid-1970s to comply with the request for timely disclosure from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. A mandatory regulation that requires all listing firms to increase its level of disclosure by issuing firm specific forecasts seems rigor to the firms because it is obvious that not all firms are capable of issuing legitimate earnings forecasts.
The empirical results show that (1) firms with higher ability managers tend to have better earnings performance, and are more likely to upward revise its earnings forecasts. In addition, the results are consistent in the case that firms eventually upward revise its forecasts. (2) managers with better managerial ability tend to have higher earnings performance, so it would be less likely for them to announce downward revisions of earnings forecasts. Furthermore, high ability managers tend to generate accurate management earnings forecasts. Besides, for firms that eventually downward its earnings forecasts, firms with more able managers provide more accurate forecasts. (3) the results show that there is no statistically significant relationship between managerial ability and earnings forecasts bias. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
105353018 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105353018 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ACCT.009.2018.F07 |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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