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    題名: 經理人能力與現金持有的關聯—以日本企業為例
    The Association between Managerial Ability and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Japan
    作者: 楊于萱
    Yang, Yu-Hsuan
    貢獻者: 潘健民
    Pan, Chien-Min
    楊于萱
    Yang, Yu-Hsuan
    關鍵詞: 經理人能力
    現金持有
    Managerial ability
    Cash holdings
    日期: 2018
    上傳時間: 2018-07-10 15:33:18 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究以2005年至2017年之日本東京證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，主要探討日本企業之經理人能力與現金持有之關聯性。實證結果發現，日本企業之經理人能力與超額現金持有量具正向關聯性。在分析整體企業樣本時，經理人能力與企業超額現金持有量呈顯著正相關，意即經理人能力愈好，則企業之超額現金持有量愈多。在分析超額現金持有量為正之企業樣本時，實證結果亦相同，意即當企業現金持有量超過正常現金持有量時，經理人能力愈好，則企業超額現金持有量愈多。然而，在分析超額現金持有量為負之企業樣本時，經理人能力與企業超額現金持有量並不具顯著之關聯性。
    Using data of firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2017, I investigate the association between managerial ability and cash holdings. The empirical results show that there is a positive relationship between managerial ability and excess cash holdings of Japanese firms. This result suggests that managers with higher abilities tend to hold more excess cash. I also find that managerial abilities are positively associated with excess cash holdings for firms that have positive excess cash, but I do not find significant results for firms that have negative excess cash holdings.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    105353012
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105353012
    資料類型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ACCT.014.2018.F07
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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